3 research outputs found
A Taxonomy for and Analysis of Anonymous Communications Networks
Any entity operating in cyberspace is susceptible to debilitating attacks. With cyber attacks intended to gather intelligence and disrupt communications rapidly replacing the threat of conventional and nuclear attacks, a new age of warfare is at hand. In 2003, the United States acknowledged that the speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult. Even President Obama’s Cybersecurity Chief-elect recognizes the challenge of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks. Now through April 2009, the White House is reviewing federal cyber initiatives to protect US citizen privacy rights. Indeed, the rising quantity and ubiquity of new surveillance technologies in cyberspace enables instant, undetectable, and unsolicited information collection about entities. Hence, anonymity and privacy are becoming increasingly important issues. Anonymization enables entities to protect their data and systems from a diverse set of cyber attacks and preserves privacy. This research provides a systematic analysis of anonymity degradation, preservation and elimination in cyberspace to enhance the security of information assets. This includes discovery/obfuscation of identities and actions of/from potential adversaries. First, novel taxonomies are developed for classifying and comparing well-established anonymous networking protocols. These expand the classical definition of anonymity and capture the peer-to-peer and mobile ad hoc anonymous protocol family relationships. Second, a unique synthesis of state-of-the-art anonymity metrics is provided. This significantly aids an entity’s ability to reliably measure changing anonymity levels; thereby, increasing their ability to defend against cyber attacks. Finally, a novel epistemic-based mathematical model is created to characterize how an adversary reasons with knowledge to degrade anonymity. This offers multiple anonymity property representations and well-defined logical proofs to ensure the accuracy and correctness of current and future anonymous network protocol design
Security in Distributed, Grid, Mobile, and Pervasive Computing
This book addresses the increasing demand to guarantee privacy, integrity, and availability of resources in networks and distributed systems. It first reviews security issues and challenges in content distribution networks, describes key agreement protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and key management protocols for complex distributed systems like the Internet, and discusses securing design patterns for distributed systems. The next section focuses on security in mobile computing and wireless networks. After a section on grid computing security, the book presents an overview of security solutions for pervasive healthcare systems and surveys wireless sensor network security
Private and censorship-resistant communication over public networks
Society’s increasing reliance on digital communication networks is creating unprecedented opportunities for wholesale
surveillance and censorship. This thesis investigates the use of public networks such as the Internet to build
robust, private communication systems that can resist monitoring and attacks by powerful adversaries such as national
governments.
We sketch the design of a censorship-resistant communication system based on peer-to-peer Internet overlays in which
the participants only communicate directly with people they know and trust. This ‘friend-to-friend’ approach protects
the participants’ privacy, but it also presents two significant challenges. The first is that, as with any peer-to-peer
overlay, the users of the system must collectively provide the resources necessary for its operation; some users might
prefer to use the system without contributing resources equal to those they consume, and if many users do so, the
system may not be able to survive.
To address this challenge we present a new game theoretic model of the problem of encouraging cooperation between
selfish actors under conditions of scarcity, and develop a strategy for the game that provides rational incentives for
cooperation under a wide range of conditions.
The second challenge is that the structure of a friend-to-friend overlay may reveal the users’ social relationships to
an adversary monitoring the underlying network. To conceal their sensitive relationships from the adversary, the
users must be able to communicate indirectly across the overlay in a way that resists monitoring and attacks by other
participants.
We address this second challenge by developing two new routing protocols that robustly deliver messages across
networks with unknown topologies, without revealing the identities of the communication endpoints to intermediate
nodes or vice versa. The protocols make use of a novel unforgeable acknowledgement mechanism that proves that a
message has been delivered without identifying the source or destination of the message or the path by which it was
delivered. One of the routing protocols is shown to be robust to attacks by malicious participants, while the other
provides rational incentives for selfish participants to cooperate in forwarding messages