Competition and Cooperation Analysis for Data Sponsored Market: A Network Effects Model

The data sponsored scheme allows the content provider to cover parts of the cellular data costs for mobile users. Thus the content service becomes appealing to more users and potentially generates more profit gain to the content provider. In this paper, we consider a sponsored data market with a monopoly network service provider, a single content provider, and multiple users. In particular, we model the interactions of three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the service provider and content provider act as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first stage, and the users act as the followers deciding on their data demand in the second stage. We investigate the mutual interaction of the service provider and content provider in two cases: (i) competitive case, where the content provider and service provider optimize their strategies separately and competitively, each aiming at maximizing the profit and revenue, respectively; and (ii) cooperative case, where the two providers jointly optimize their strategies, with the purpose of maximizing their aggregate profits. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in both cases. Via extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the network effects significantly improve the payoff of three entities in this market, i.e., utilities of users, the profit of content provider and the revenue of service provider. In addition, it is revealed that the cooperation between the two providers is the best choice for all three entities.Comment: 7 pages, submitted to one conferenc

An intervention to improve provider-patient interaction at methadone maintenance treatment in China.

BackgroundThis study evaluated an intervention aiming to improve methadone maintenance therapy (MMT) service providers' interaction with their patients in China.MethodsSixty-eight MMT clinics were randomized to either an intervention or a control condition. Providers in the intervention group attended three group training sessions to enhance their communication skills. Trained providers were encouraged to practice the taught communication skills through provider-initiated individual sessions with their patients. A total of 418 service providers completed assessments from baseline to 24-month. Linear mixed-effects regression models were used to compare self-reported short-term and sustained improvement in provider-patient interaction between the intervention and the control conditions.ResultsThe intervention group service providers perceived significantly greater short-term and sustained improvement in provider-patient interaction compared to the control group service providers (estimated difference (±SE): 1.20 (0.24) and 1.35 (0.33), respectively; p-values < 0.0001). Providers' baseline job satisfaction was significantly associated with a greater perceived improvement in provider-patient interaction for both periods (reg. coef. (±SE): 0.02 (0.01) and 0.04 (0.01) for short-term and sustained periods, respectively; p-values < 0.01).ConclusionStudy findings suggest that the intervention could be beneficial for improving perceived provider-patient interaction in MMT programs. Service providers' job satisfaction should be addressed in training programs for the improvement of provider-patient interaction

Implications of customer participation in outsourcing noncore services to third parties

Purpose Focal service providers increasingly involve customers in the decision-making about outsourcing parts of the service delivery process to third parties. The present study investigates how customers' outsourcing decisions affect the formation of the waiting experience with the focal service provider, by which the objective waiting time, environmental quality and interactional quality act as focal drivers. Design/methodology/approach To test our hypotheses in the context of cancer care, we gathered process data and experience data by means of a patient observation template (n = 640) and a patient survey (n = 487). The combined data (n = 377) were analyzed using Bayesian models. Findings This study shows that opting for a service triad (i.e. outsourcing non-core services to a third party) deduces customers' attention away from the objective waiting time with the focal service provider but not from the environmental and interactional quality offered by the focal service provider. When the type of service triad coordination is considered, we observe similar effects for a focal service provider-coordinated service triad while in a customer-coordinated service triad the interactional quality is the sole experience driver of waiting experiences that remains significant. Originality/value By investigating the implications of customer participation in the decision-making about outsourcing parts of the service delivery process to third parties, this research contributes to the service design, service triad and service operations literature. Specifically, this study shows that customer outsourcing decisions impact waiting experience formation with the focal service provider.Purpose Focal service providers increasingly involve customers in the decision-making about outsourcing parts of the service delivery process to third parties. The present study investigates how customers' outsourcing decisions affect the formation of the waiting experience with the focal service provider, by which the objective waiting time, environmental quality and interactional quality act as focal drivers. Design/methodology/approach To test our hypotheses in the context of cancer care, we gathered process data and experience data by means of a patient observation template (n = 640) and a patient survey (n = 487). The combined data (n = 377) were analyzed using Bayesian models. Findings This study shows that opting for a service triad (i.e. outsourcing non-core services to a third party) deduces customers' attention away from the objective waiting time with the focal service provider but not from the environmental and interactional quality offered by the focal service provider. When the type of service triad coordination is considered, we observe similar effects for a focal service provider-coordinated service triad while in a customer-coordinated service triad the interactional quality is the sole experience driver of waiting experiences that remains significant. Originality/value By investigating the implications of customer participation in the decision-making about outsourcing parts of the service delivery process to third parties, this research contributes to the service design, service triad and service operations literature. Specifically, this study shows that customer outsourcing decisions impact waiting experience formation with the focal service provider.A

Web Hosting Service Level Agreements

This paper proposes a model for a relatively simple Web hosting provider. The model assumes the existence of a load-dispatcher and a finite number of Web-servers. We quantify the quality of service towards the clients of this facility based on a service level agreement between the two parts: the web hosting provider and the client. We assume that the client has the knowledge and resources to quantify its needs. Based on these quantifications, which in our model become parameters, the provider can establish a service offer. In our model, this offer covers the quality of service and the price options for it

Working Report #1: Service Model Accessibility (Service Provider Perspectives)

This report examines the differences in service accessibility across central, integrated, and school/community based child welfare service delivery models including geographic proximity to families, acceptability of the setting to families, and accessibility expectations of service providers. Results suggest that accessibility characteristics of the model can make a significant difference to front-line service delivery from the perspective of front-line protection workers. A defining feature of the community and school based child welfare models was increased accessibility for families and workers. Through making themselves more accessible, the community and school based settings had some significant service delivery advantages including more regular, varied, and timely contact with children and families. It seems likely that location along with a culture of accessibility has the potential to contribute to key child protection goals

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game