Sequential Valuation Networks: A New Graphical Technique for Asymmetric Decision Problems

This paper is a short (14-pp) version of a longer working paper titled "Sequential Valuation Networks for Asymmetric Decision Problems," University of Kansas School of Business Working Paper No. 286, January 2001, Revised June 2004, available from KU Scholarworks.This paper deals with representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems. We describe a new graphical representation called sequential valuation networks, which is a hybrid of Covaliu and Oliver’s sequential decision diagrams and Shenoy’s asymmetric valuation networks. Sequential valuation networks inherit many of the strengths of sequential decision diagrams and asymmetric valuation networks while overcoming many of their shortcomings. We illustrate our technique by representing and solving a modified version of Covaliu and Oliver’s Reactor problem

Sequential valuation networks for asymmetric decision problems

This paper deals with representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems. We describe a new representation called sequential valuation networks that is a hybrid of Covaliu and Oliver’s sequential decision diagrams and Shenoy’s valuation networks. The solution algorithm is based on the idea of decomposing a large asymmetric problem into smaller sub-problems and then using the fusion algorithm of valuation networks to solve the sub-problems. Sequential valuation networks inherit many of the strengths of sequential decision diagrams and valuation networks while overcoming many of their shortcomings. We illustrate our technique by representing and solving a modified version of Covaliu and Oliver’s [Manage. Sci. 41(12) (1995) 1860] Reactor problem in complete detail

A New Method for tackling Asymmetric Decision Problems

Chain Event Graphs are probabilistic graphical models designed especially for the analysis of discrete statistical problems which do not admit a natural product space structure. We show here how they can be used for decision analysis through designation of some nodes as decision nodes, and the addition of utilities. We provide a local propagation algorithm for finding an optimal decision strategy and maximising expected utility. We also compare CEGs with Influence diagrams, Valuation Networks, Sequential decision diagrams, Sequential influence diagrams and Decision circuits for the representation and analysis of asymmetric decision problems

Sequential Influence Diagrams: A Unified Asymmetry Framework

We describe a new graphical language for specifying asymmetric decision problems. The language is based on a filtered merge of several existing languages including sequential valuation networks, asymmetric influence diagrams, and unconstrained influence diagrams. Asymmetry is encoded using a structure resembling a clustered decision tree, whereas the representation of the uncertainty model is based on the (unconstrained) influence diagram framework. We illustrate the proposed language by modeling several highly asymmetric decision problems, and we outline an efficient solution procedure

Sequential influence diagrams: A unified asymmetry framework

We describe a new graphical language for specifying asymmetric decision problems. The language is based on a filtered merge of several existing languages including sequential valuation networks, asymmetric influence diagrams, and unconstrained influence diagrams. Asymmetry is encoded using a structure resembling a clustered decision tree, whereas the representation of the uncertainty model is based on the (unconstrained) influence diagram framework. We illustrate the proposed language by modeling several highly asymmetric decision problems, and we describe an efficient solution procedure

A Comparison of Graphical Techniques for Asymmetric Decision Problems

We compare four graphical techniques for representation and solution of asymmetric decision problems—decision trees, influence diagrams, valuation networks, and sequential decision diagrams. We solve a modified version of Covaliu and Oliver’s Reactor problem using each of the four techniques. For each technique, we highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and some open issues that perhaps can be resolved with further research

Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege

This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, game of siege, multi-period resource allocation, experiments.

An Open Source Based Data Warehouse Architecture to Support Decision Making in the Tourism Sector

In this paper an alternative Tourism oriented Data Warehousing architecture is proposed which makes use of the most recent free and open source technologies like Java, Postgresql and XML. Such architecture's aim will be to support the decision making process and giving an integrated view of the whole Tourism reality in an established context (local, regional, national, etc.) without requesting big investments for getting the necessary software.Tourism, Data warehousing architecture

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Algorithm for Computations

Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence