Batch Sequencing and Cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufactur- ing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. We first consider sequencing situations with a single batch machine and analyze cooperative games arising from these situations. It is shown that these games are convex and an expression for the Shapley value of these games is provided. We also introduce an equal gain splitting rule for these sequencing situa- tions and provide an axiomatic characterization. Second, we analyze various aspects of flow-shop sequencing situations which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we provide two cases in which the cooperative game arising from the flow-shop sequencing situation is equal to the game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to one specific machine in the flow-shop.Sequencing situations;sequencing games;batch machines

Job Scheduling, Cooperation and Control

This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output.Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic sequencing problems is dropped: the one to one correspondence between clients and jobs.It is shown that the corresponding cooperative games are balanced for specific types of cost criteria.scheduling;cooperation;game theory;cooperative games

Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.

The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is a¤ected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.Endogenous Timing, Cooperation

Sequencing regional integration and monetary cooperation in Asia : are there lessons from the EU?.

n.a.Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen; Wirtschaftsintegration; Handelsregionalismus; Optimaler Währungsraum; Außenhandelsliberalisierung; Asien;

Collaboration scripts - a conceptual analysis

This article presents a conceptual analysis of collaboration scripts used in face-to-face and computer-mediated collaborative learning. Collaboration scripts are scaffolds that aim to improve collaboration through structuring the interactive processes between two or more learning partners. Collaboration scripts consist of at least five components: (a) learning objectives, (b) type of activities, (c) sequencing, (d) role distribution, and (e) type of representation. These components serve as a basis for comparing prototypical collaboration script approaches for face-to-face vs. computer-mediated learning. As our analysis reveals, collaboration scripts for face-to-face learning often focus on supporting collaborators in engaging in activities that are specifically related to individual knowledge acquisition. Scripts for computer-mediated collaboration are typically concerned with facilitating communicative-coordinative processes that occur among group members. The two lines of research can be consolidated to facilitate the design of collaboration scripts, which both support participation and coordination, as well as induce learning activities closely related to individual knowledge acquisition and metacognition. In addition, research on collaboration scripts needs to consider the learners’ internal collaboration scripts as a further determinant of collaboration behavior. The article closes with the presentation of a conceptual framework incorporating both external and internal collaboration scripts

Cooperation and allocation

This thesis deals with various models of cooperation, including games with transferable utility, games with nontransferable utility, bankruptcy situations, communication situations, spillover games and sequencing situations. The focus is on analysing rules for dividing the profits of cooperation. This analysis is performed in terms of properties that one might require of such an allocation mechanism. In addition, properties of the underlying situations and games are studied.

A rewiring model of intratumoral interaction networks.

Intratumoral heterogeneity (ITH) has been regarded as a key cause of the failure and resistance of cancer therapy, but how it behaves and functions remains unclear. Advances in single-cell analysis have facilitated the collection of a massive amount of data about genetic and molecular states of individual cancer cells, providing a fuel to dissect the mechanistic organization of ITH at the molecular, metabolic and positional level. Taking advantage of these data, we propose a computational model to rewire up a topological network of cell-cell interdependences and interactions that operate within a tumor mass. The model is grounded on the premise of game theory that each interactive cell (player) strives to maximize its fitness by pursuing a rational self-interest strategy, war or peace, in a way that senses and alters other cells to respond properly. By integrating this idea with genome-wide association studies for intratumoral cells, the model is equipped with a capacity to visualize, annotate and quantify how somatic mutations mediate ITH and the network of intratumoral interactions. Taken together, the model provides a topological flow by which cancer cells within a tumor cooperate or compete with each other to downstream pathogenesis. This topological flow can be potentially used as a blueprint for genetically intervening the pattern and strength of cell-cell interactions towards cancer control