The 1993 Goddard Conference on Space Applications of Artificial Intelligence

This publication comprises the papers presented at the 1993 Goddard Conference on Space Applications of Artificial Intelligence held at the NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD on May 10-13, 1993. The purpose of this annual conference is to provide a forum in which current research and development directed at space applications of artificial intelligence can be presented and discussed

Time and the digital: whitehead, deleuze and the temporality of digital aesthetics

The aesthetics of digital art seem to be inextricable from time and process. Surprisingly though, interaction with digital systems has traditionally been marked by spatial concepts and metaphors, positioning the aesthetics of interaction as a convergence of spaces where data and agents 'meet'. This preoccupation with space has placed restrictions on aesthetic theories that seek to represent interaction with digital systems. Within this dissertation, I argue that questions of time and the more specific questions of the temporal and 'temporalising' nature of interaction have been neglected. Through a process-oriented investigation of interactive digital art works, produced by a range of artists such as George Legrady, Jeffrey Shaw, along with Dennis Del Favero, Peter Weibel and Neil Brown and Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau, I address this problem and propose a temporal aesthetic theory of interaction. I thus offer a specific understanding of digital aesthetics in which the process of interaction is foregrounded. I work towards this aesthetic theory of interaction by firstly enacting particular tenets of A. N. Whitehead's process philosophy and Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of time, informed by Brian Massumi, Manuel DeLanda and Michel Serres. These thinkers are used to develop a theoretical framework that centres on an understanding of time, process and the event. Directed by this framework, I firstly investigate several non-interactive works by David Claerbout, Bill Viola and the installations of Dan Graham. This investigation of non-interactive works provides the grounding from which I argue that the digital re-presentation of events produces a particular type of time. Thus, particular processes, such as the technological mediation of events, exemplified in the work of Claerbout, Viola and Graham, can be thought to produce their own type of time. From here I propose that, when the process of interaction is introduced into the aesthetic event, time is both produced by digital re-presentations and also encountered in interaction. As a user comes into contact with a database of information, they encounter a particular type of time. In this event, the database enacts a temporal aesthetic in the sense that it archives various sections of the past, and then these are made available again for the user in the present (or for other users in the future). A user is able to navigate through these sections of past, experiencing them simultaneously, or in a nonlinear fashion, or re-sorting them into a temporal order. Motivated by this Whiteheadian approach and by investigating a set of artworks that utilise archives, such as those of the Atlas Group, Armin Linke, George Legrady, Luc Courchesne and Masaki Fujihata, I develop a temporal aesthetic theory that accounts for the multiple modes of temporality immanent to digital interaction. My understanding of Whitehead's conception of time is modulated by Deleuze's philosophy of the virtual. Enlisting what Steven Shaviro would term Whitehead's "pursuit of univocity" or an object-oriented philosophy, I focus upon the event as a processual encounter. Using the paradigm established by Whitehead's panexperietialism, I view all the digital actants as processes. These processes ¬ software, archiving, visualisation or the physical processes of interaction ¬ all transpire over different scales of time, producing different temporal rhythms. Informed by Whitehead, Deleuze and supplemented by Serres, I thus propose a type of time that is scalar. Here, digital temporality can be seen to yield nonlinear and chaotic temporalities, produced by, and encountered in, interactive events. User-generated occasions are sequential, software occasions are asynchronous, and the temporality of the archive nests within it various levels of the past. The interactive event is the coming together of these occasions an event in which we encounter multiple scales of the temporal; an event that I will describe as multi-temporal in nature

Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)

The deconstruction of time

Derrida's claim that there can be no concept of time that escapes from the sphere of the metaphysical presents us with three major questions: (1) Why does Derrida make this claim? What does he mean by it? (2) How, in the light of this claim ought we to read Husserl and Heidegger who aimed at just what Derrida rules out? (3) How can we square the claim with other things Derrida says about time and about metaphysics? We undertake a critical reading of the two major works on time by Husserl and Heidegger respectively, arguing that while each of these two texts does indeed subscribe to such metaphysical values as fundamentality, certainty, unity, identity and wholeness, they nonetheless make a substantial contribution to our release from the domination of 'the ordinary concept of time'. Furthermore, we argue, Derrida's own writing is marked by the same (perhaps inevitable) 'metaphysical' shadow, albeit in an exemplary self-conscious manner. To Derrida's claim about the impossibility of a non-metaphysical concept of time we reply (a) he elsewhere endorses a 'pluri-dimensional' temporality, and (b) when being careful, he admits that it is not concepts per se that are metaphysical, but their mode of textual articulation. From these two concessions our double strategy develops. I. His denial of an original, primitive time, coupled with his understanding of metaphysics in terms of textual articulation licences a programme for the description of temporal structures and representations of time, one abjuring any foundationalist pretensions, and resisting the temptation to spatializing interpretations. II. We redescribe the 'moment' in a way that breaks utterly with any representational element whatever. This approximates in temporal terms the time-dissolving moves found both in the latter Heidegger, and also in Derrida

Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory

This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The thesis is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the thesis in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims

Proficiency-aware systems

In an increasingly digital world, technological developments such as data-driven algorithms and context-aware applications create opportunities for novel human-computer interaction (HCI). We argue that these systems have the latent potential to stimulate users and encourage personal growth. However, users increasingly rely on the intelligence of interactive systems. Thus, it remains a challenge to design for proficiency awareness, essentially demanding increased user attention whilst preserving user engagement. Designing and implementing systems that allow users to become aware of their own proficiency and encourage them to recognize learning benefits is the primary goal of this research. In this thesis, we introduce the concept of proficiency-aware systems as one solution. In our definition, proficiency-aware systems use estimates of the user's proficiency to tailor the interaction in a domain and facilitate a reflective understanding for this proficiency. We envision that proficiency-aware systems leverage collected data for learning benefit. Here, we see self-reflection as a key for users to become aware of necessary efforts to advance their proficiency. A key challenge for proficiency-aware systems is the fact that users often have a different self-perception of their proficiency. The benefits of personal growth and advancing one's repertoire might not necessarily be apparent to users, alienating them, and possibly leading to abandoning the system. To tackle this challenge, this work does not rely on learning strategies but rather focuses on the capabilities of interactive systems to provide users with the necessary means to reflect on their proficiency, such as showing calculated text difficulty to a newspaper editor or visualizing muscle activity to a passionate sportsperson. We first elaborate on how proficiency can be detected and quantified in the context of interactive systems using physiological sensing technologies. Through developing interaction scenarios, we demonstrate the feasibility of gaze- and electromyography-based proficiency-aware systems by utilizing machine learning algorithms that can estimate users' proficiency levels for stationary vision-dominant tasks (reading, information intake) and dynamic manual tasks (playing instruments, fitness exercises). Secondly, we show how to facilitate proficiency awareness for users, including design challenges on when and how to communicate proficiency. We complement this second part by highlighting the necessity of toolkits for sensing modalities to enable the implementation of proficiency-aware systems for a wide audience. In this thesis, we contribute a definition of proficiency-aware systems, which we illustrate by designing and implementing interactive systems. We derive technical requirements for real-time, objective proficiency assessment and identify design qualities of communicating proficiency through user reflection. We summarize our findings in a set of design and engineering guidelines for proficiency awareness in interactive systems, highlighting that proficiency feedback makes performance interpretable for the user.In einer zunehmend digitalen Welt schaffen technologische Entwicklungen - wie datengesteuerte Algorithmen und kontextabhängige Anwendungen - neuartige Interaktionsmöglichkeiten mit digitalen Geräten. Jedoch verlassen sich Nutzer oftmals auf die Intelligenz dieser Systeme, ohne dabei selbst auf eine persönliche Weiterentwicklung hinzuwirken. Wird ein solches Vorgehen angestrebt, verlangt dies seitens der Anwender eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit. Es ist daher herausfordernd, ein entsprechendes Design für Kompetenzbewusstsein (Proficiency Awareness) zu etablieren. Das primäre Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, eine Methodik für das Design und die Implementierung von interaktiven Systemen aufzustellen, die Nutzer dabei unterstützen über ihre eigene Kompetenz zu reflektieren, um dadurch Lerneffekte implizit wahrnehmen können. Diese Arbeit stellt ein Konzept für fähigkeitsbewusste Systeme (proficiency-aware systems) vor, welche die Fähigkeiten von Nutzern abschätzen, die Interaktion entsprechend anpassen sowie das Bewusstsein der Nutzer über deren Fähigkeiten fördern. Hierzu sollten die Systeme gesammelte Daten von Nutzern einsetzen, um Lerneffekte sichtbar zu machen. Die Möglichkeit der Anwender zur Selbstreflexion ist hierbei als entscheidend anzusehen, um als Motivation zur Verbesserung der eigenen Fähigkeiten zu dienen. Eine zentrale Herausforderung solcher Systeme ist die Tatsache, dass Nutzer - im Vergleich zur Abschätzung des Systems - oft eine divergierende Selbstwahrnehmung ihrer Kompetenz haben. Im ersten Moment sind daher die Vorteile einer persönlichen Weiterentwicklung nicht unbedingt ersichtlich. Daher baut diese Forschungsarbeit nicht darauf auf, Nutzer über vorgegebene Lernstrategien zu unterrichten, sondern sie bedient sich der Möglichkeiten interaktiver Systeme, die Anwendern die notwendigen Hilfsmittel zur Verfügung stellen, damit diese selbst über ihre Fähigkeiten reflektieren können. Einem Zeitungseditor könnte beispielsweise die aktuelle Textschwierigkeit angezeigt werden, während einem passionierten Sportler dessen Muskelaktivität veranschaulicht wird. Zunächst wird herausgearbeitet, wie sich die Fähigkeiten der Nutzer mittels physiologischer Sensortechnologien erkennen und quantifizieren lassen. Die Evaluation von Interaktionsszenarien demonstriert die Umsetzbarkeit fähigkeitsbewusster Systeme, basierend auf der Analyse von Blickbewegungen und Muskelaktivität. Hierbei kommen Algorithmen des maschinellen Lernens zum Einsatz, die das Leistungsniveau der Anwender für verschiedene Tätigkeiten berechnen. Im Besonderen analysieren wir stationäre Aktivitäten, die hauptsächlich den Sehsinn ansprechen (Lesen, Aufnahme von Informationen), sowie dynamische Betätigungen, die die Motorik der Nutzer fordern (Spielen von Instrumenten, Fitnessübungen). Der zweite Teil zeigt auf, wie Systeme das Bewusstsein der Anwender für deren eigene Fähigkeiten fördern können, einschließlich der Designherausforderungen , wann und wie das System erkannte Fähigkeiten kommunizieren sollte. Abschließend wird die Notwendigkeit von Toolkits für Sensortechnologien hervorgehoben, um die Implementierung derartiger Systeme für ein breites Publikum zu ermöglichen. Die Forschungsarbeit beinhaltet eine Definition für fähigkeitsbewusste Systeme und veranschaulicht dieses Konzept durch den Entwurf und die Implementierung interaktiver Systeme. Ferner werden technische Anforderungen objektiver Echtzeitabschätzung von Nutzerfähigkeiten erforscht und Designqualitäten für die Kommunikation dieser Abschätzungen mittels Selbstreflexion identifiziert. Zusammengefasst sind die Erkenntnisse in einer Reihe von Design- und Entwicklungsrichtlinien für derartige Systeme. Insbesondere die Kommunikation, der vom System erkannten Kompetenz, hilft Anwendern, die eigene Leistung zu interpretieren

Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies - Part 1

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue titled "Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies" - Part 1 that was published in the journal Philosophies

Self-consciousness and the body in Sartrean phenomenology

Commentators interested in applying Sartre\u27s work to topics currently discussed in analytic philosophy of mind have missed some crucial distinctions and relations. Most notably, they have paid no attention to the relationship between the apprehension of a kind of Cartesian ego in impure reflection and the apprehension of oneself as a physical object. My dissertation examines Sartre\u27s analyses in Being and Nothingness in relation to more familiar approaches to the mind-body problem, the problem of other minds, and the problem of personal identity over time. Crucial to Sartre\u27s analyses are distinctions between several types and levels of reflection or selfawareness. Corresponding to these are various dimensions of seltbood and bodily existence ignored by more familiar approaches. The constitution of a Cartesian ego in impure reflection is the issue to which The Transcendence of the Ego is primarily devoted. However, Sartre also notes in that work that one\u27s body, as an object of one\u27s own consciousness, is a synthetic enrichment of this ego. This is taken up in detail in Being and Nothingness when, after examining the look, i.e., the experience of apprehending oneself as an object for another consciousness, Sartre distinguishes three ontological dimensions of the body: the body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and the body as it is experienced by oneself as an instrument or object for others. What commentators seem to miss is that the last of these is the Cartesian ego, now enriched by the sense of oneself-as-another which has been gained through the look. In addition to providing material for the apprehension of one\u27s own body, the Look is also essential to apprehension of other persons. In fact, apprehension of another person is apprehension of one\u27s body for others, now in tum enriched by apprehension of certain observable physical features. Sartre\u27s account of what is involved in the various levels of apprehension of oneself and others invites comparison with Strawson\u27 s analysis of the person as a basic particular to which M-predicates and P-predicates equally apply. While Sartre could agree that on the level at which one can think of a person as a subject to which both sorts of predicates apply, these predicates do apply equally, he would insist that in some sense a person is necessarily apprehended as a consciousness before being apprehended as a material object. This is true both of another person, who is first apprehended as a Look, and of oneself, whom one first apprehends as purely a relation to the world. That there are different types of awareness, and different levels of awareness, both of oneself and of other persons, is relevant to the question of what is involved in experiencing a person as extended in time. For instance, since the Look is involved in the experience of one\u27s body as an object, it is also involved in the experience of oneself as temporally extended. Prior to being apprehended as one\u27s body, however, the ego is experienced as temporally extended, although not in an entirely consistent manner. Finally, and more generally, I attempt to relate the constitutional relation that Sartre seems to intend with his talk about enrichment to more familiar talk about a possible variety of senses or references for the word I