Second-order sensitivity relations and regularity of the value function for Mayer's problem in optimal control

This paper investigates the value function, $V$, of a Mayer optimal control problem with the state equation given by a differential inclusion. First, we obtain an invariance property for the proximal and Fr\'echet subdifferentials of $V$ along optimal trajectories. Then, we extend the analysis to the sub/superjets of $V$, obtaining new sensitivity relations of second order. By applying sensitivity analysis to exclude the presence of conjugate points, we deduce that the value function is twice differentiable along any optimal trajectory starting at a point at which $V$ is proximally subdifferentiable. We also provide sufficient conditions for the local $C^2$ regularity of $V$ on tubular neighborhoods of optimal trajectories

Conjugate times and regularity of the minimum time function with differential inclusions

This paper studies the regularity of the minimum time function, $T(\cdot)$, for a control system with a general closed target, taking the state equation in the form of a differential inclusion. Our first result is a sensitivity relation which guarantees the propagation of the proximal subdifferential of $T$ along any optimal trajectory. Then, we obtain the local $C^2$ regularity of the minimum time function along optimal trajectories by using such a relation to exclude the presence of conjugate times

The institutional paradoxes of monetary orthodoxy: reflections on the political economy of central bank independence

There can be no doubting the increasing importance of central banks to processes of international economic management.1 Whilst the names of prominent central bankers may be less well known than those of politicians, and whilst the functions their banks perform receive scant public recognition, the decisions taken by central bankers have a significant bearing on the conduct of everyday life

Finance, Control, and Profitability: The Influence of German Banks

Bank intermediated finance has been cited frequently as the preferred means for channeling funds from savers to firms. Germany is the prototypical economy where universal banks allegedly exert substantial influence over firms. Despite frequent assertions about the considerable power of German banks and the advantages of a bank relation, empirical support is mixed. With a unique dataset and a focus on the fragility/sturdiness of inferences, this paper evaluates German bank influence in terms of three hypotheses: 1) do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs? [No]; 2) is bank influence a solution to control problems? [Yes]; 3) do bank influenced firms have higher profitability? [No]. Coupled with results about the control consequences of concentrated ownership, these results suggest that bank influence serves as a substitute control mechanism, one of several available for addressing corporate control problems.German banks, corporate finance and governance

Corporate Governance and Control

Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: regulation of large shareholder intervention may provide better protection to small shareholders; but such regulations may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse.

Perceiving Pain in Others: Automatic and Controlled Mechanisms

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