Second-order subdifferential calculus with applications to tilt stability in optimization

The paper concerns the second-order generalized differentiation theory of variational analysis and new applications of this theory to some problems of constrained optimization in finitedimensional spaces. The main attention is paid to the so-called (full and partial) second-order subdifferentials of extended-real-valued functions, which are dual-type constructions generated by coderivatives of frst-order subdifferential mappings. We develop an extended second-order subdifferential calculus and analyze the basic second-order qualification condition ensuring the fulfillment of the principal secondorder chain rule for strongly and fully amenable compositions. The calculus results obtained in this way and computing the second-order subdifferentials for piecewise linear-quadratic functions and their major specifications are applied then to the study of tilt stability of local minimizers for important classes of problems in constrained optimization that include, in particular, problems of nonlinear programming and certain classes of extended nonlinear programs described in composite terms

Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables

We consider generalized potential games, that constitute a fundamental subclass of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We propose different methods to compute solutions of generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, i.e., games in which some variables are continuous while the others are discrete. We investigate which types of equilibria of the game can be computed by minimizing a potential function over the common feasible set. In particular, for a wide class of generalized potential games, we characterize those equilibria that can be computed by minimizing potential functions as Pareto solutions of a particular multi-objective problem, and we show how different potential functions can be used to select equilibria. We propose a new Gauss–Southwell algorithm to compute approximate equilibria of any generalized potential game with mixed-integer variables. We show that this method converges in a finite number of steps and we also give an upper bound on this number of steps. Moreover, we make a thorough analysis on the behaviour of approximate equilibria with respect to exact ones. Finally, we make many numerical experiments to show the viability of the proposed approaches