Semi-Infinite Assignment Problems and Related Games

In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced assignment games associated to finite assignment problems in which two types of agents were involved and they proved that these games have a non-empty core. In this paper we look at the situation where the set of one type is infinite and investigatewhen the core of the associated game is non-empty. Two infinite programming problems arise here, which we tackle with the aid of finite approximations. We prove that there is no duality gap and we show that the core of the corresponding game is non-empty. Finally, the existence of optimal assignments is discussed.Infinite programs;assignment;cooperative games;balancedness

The approximate f-core and the utopia payoff for infinite assignment games

Assignment problems where both sets of agents are countably infinite, the so-called infinite assignment problems, are studied as well as the related assignment games. Further, two solutions for these games are studied. The first one is the approximate f-core for games with a finite value. This particular solution takes into account that due to organisational limitations only finite groups of agents can protest against proposals of profit distributions. Second, we study the utopia payoff, the perfect proposal in which each agent receives the maximal amount he can get. \u

Subsampling Mathematical Relaxations and Average-case Complexity

We initiate a study of when the value of mathematical relaxations such as linear and semidefinite programs for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) is approximately preserved when restricting the instance to a sub-instance induced by a small random subsample of the variables. Let $C$ be a family of CSPs such as 3SAT, Max-Cut, etc., and let $\Pi$ be a relaxation for $C$, in the sense that for every instance $P\in C$, $\Pi(P)$ is an upper bound the maximum fraction of satisfiable constraints of $P$. Loosely speaking, we say that subsampling holds for $C$ and $\Pi$ if for every sufficiently dense instance $P \in C$ and every $\epsilon>0$, if we let $P'$ be the instance obtained by restricting $P$ to a sufficiently large constant number of variables, then $\Pi(P') \in (1\pm \epsilon)\Pi(P)$. We say that weak subsampling holds if the above guarantee is replaced with $\Pi(P')=1-\Theta(\gamma)$ whenever $\Pi(P)=1-\gamma$. We show: 1. Subsampling holds for the BasicLP and BasicSDP programs. BasicSDP is a variant of the relaxation considered by Raghavendra (2008), who showed it gives an optimal approximation factor for every CSP under the unique games conjecture. BasicLP is the linear programming analog of BasicSDP. 2. For tighter versions of BasicSDP obtained by adding additional constraints from the Lasserre hierarchy, weak subsampling holds for CSPs of unique games type. 3. There are non-unique CSPs for which even weak subsampling fails for the above tighter semidefinite programs. Also there are unique CSPs for which subsampling fails for the Sherali-Adams linear programming hierarchy. As a corollary of our weak subsampling for strong semidefinite programs, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to certify that random geometric graphs (of the type considered by Feige and Schechtman, 2002) of max-cut value $1-\gamma$ have a cut value at most $1-\gamma/10$.Comment: Includes several more general results that subsume the previous version of the paper

On the Core of Semi-Infinite Transportation Games with Divisible Goods

AMS classifications: 90D12; 90C05; 90C34;cooperative games

The Algebraic Intersection Type Unification Problem

The algebraic intersection type unification problem is an important component in proof search related to several natural decision problems in intersection type systems. It is unknown and remains open whether the algebraic intersection type unification problem is decidable. We give the first nontrivial lower bound for the problem by showing (our main result) that it is exponential time hard. Furthermore, we show that this holds even under rank 1 solutions (substitutions whose codomains are restricted to contain rank 1 types). In addition, we provide a fixed-parameter intractability result for intersection type matching (one-sided unification), which is known to be NP-complete. We place the algebraic intersection type unification problem in the context of unification theory. The equational theory of intersection types can be presented as an algebraic theory with an ACI (associative, commutative, and idempotent) operator (intersection type) combined with distributivity properties with respect to a second operator (function type). Although the problem is algebraically natural and interesting, it appears to occupy a hitherto unstudied place in the theory of unification, and our investigation of the problem suggests that new methods are required to understand the problem. Thus, for the lower bound proof, we were not able to reduce from known results in ACI-unification theory and use game-theoretic methods for two-player tiling games