Static Analysis of Run-Time Errors in Embedded Real-Time Parallel C Programs

We present a static analysis by Abstract Interpretation to check for run-time errors in parallel and multi-threaded C programs. Following our work on Astr\'ee, we focus on embedded critical programs without recursion nor dynamic memory allocation, but extend the analysis to a static set of threads communicating implicitly through a shared memory and explicitly using a finite set of mutual exclusion locks, and scheduled according to a real-time scheduling policy and fixed priorities. Our method is thread-modular. It is based on a slightly modified non-parallel analysis that, when analyzing a thread, applies and enriches an abstract set of thread interferences. An iterator then re-analyzes each thread in turn until interferences stabilize. We prove the soundness of our method with respect to the sequential consistency semantics, but also with respect to a reasonable weakly consistent memory semantics. We also show how to take into account mutual exclusion and thread priorities through a partitioning over an abstraction of the scheduler state. We present preliminary experimental results analyzing an industrial program with our prototype, Th\'es\'ee, and demonstrate the scalability of our approach

Independence and concurrent separation logic

A compositional Petri net-based semantics is given to a simple language allowing pointer manipulation and parallelism. The model is then applied to give a notion of validity to the judgements made by concurrent separation logic that emphasizes the process-environment duality inherent in such rely-guarantee reasoning. Soundness of the rules of concurrent separation logic with respect to this definition of validity is shown. The independence information retained by the Petri net model is then exploited to characterize the independence of parallel processes enforced by the logic. This is shown to permit a refinement operation capable of changing the granularity of atomic actions

Declassification of Faceted Values in JavaScript

This research addresses the issues with protecting sensitive information at the language level using information flow control mechanisms (IFC). Most of the IFC mechanisms face the challenge of releasing sensitive information in a restricted or limited manner. This research uses faceted values, an IFC mechanism that has shown promising flexibility for downgrading the confidential information in a secure manner, also called declassification. In this project, we introduce the concept of first-class labels to simplify the declassification of faceted values. To validate the utility of our approach we show how the combination of faceted values and first-class labels can build various declassification mechanisms

Hybrid Information Flow Analysis for Programs with Arrays

Information flow analysis checks whether certain pieces of (confidential) data may affect the results of computations in unwanted ways and thus leak information. Dynamic information flow analysis adds instrumentation code to the target software to track flows at run time and raise alarms if a flow policy is violated; hybrid analyses combine this with preliminary static analysis. Using a subset of C as the target language, we extend previous work on hybrid information flow analysis that handled pointers to scalars. Our extended formulation handles arrays, pointers to array elements, and pointer arithmetic. Information flow through arrays of pointers is tracked precisely while arrays of non-pointer types are summarized efficiently. A prototype of our approach is implemented using the Frama-C program analysis and transformation framework. Work on a full machine-checked proof of the correctness of our approach using Isabelle/HOL is well underway; we present the existing parts and sketch the rest of the correctness argument.Comment: In Proceedings VPT 2016, arXiv:1607.0183

A Graph Model for Imperative Computation

Scott's graph model is a lambda-algebra based on the observation that continuous endofunctions on the lattice of sets of natural numbers can be represented via their graphs. A graph is a relation mapping finite sets of input values to output values. We consider a similar model based on relations whose input values are finite sequences rather than sets. This alteration means that we are taking into account the order in which observations are made. This new notion of graph gives rise to a model of affine lambda-calculus that admits an interpretation of imperative constructs including variable assignment, dereferencing and allocation. Extending this untyped model, we construct a category that provides a model of typed higher-order imperative computation with an affine type system. An appropriate language of this kind is Reynolds's Syntactic Control of Interference. Our model turns out to be fully abstract for this language. At a concrete level, it is the same as Reddy's object spaces model, which was the first "state-free" model of a higher-order imperative programming language and an important precursor of games models. The graph model can therefore be seen as a universal domain for Reddy's model

A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language

We propose an approach to quantify interference in a simple imperative language that includes a looping construct. In this paper we focus on a particular case of this definition of interference: leakage of information from private variables to public ones via a Trojan Horse attack. We quantify leakage in terms of Shannon's information theory and we motivate our definition by proving a result relating this definition of leakage and the classical notion of programming language interference. The major contribution of the paper is a quantitative static analysis based on this definition for such a language. The analysis uses some non-trivial information theory results like Fano's inequality and L1 inequalities to provide reasonable bounds for conditional statements. While-loops are handled by integrating a qualitative flow-sensitive dependency analysis into the quantitative analysis

Information Flow Control in WebKit's JavaScript Bytecode

Websites today routinely combine JavaScript from multiple sources, both trusted and untrusted. Hence, JavaScript security is of paramount importance. A specific interesting problem is information flow control (IFC) for JavaScript. In this paper, we develop, formalize and implement a dynamic IFC mechanism for the JavaScript engine of a production Web browser (specifically, Safari's WebKit engine). Our IFC mechanism works at the level of JavaScript bytecode and hence leverages years of industrial effort on optimizing both the source to bytecode compiler and the bytecode interpreter. We track both explicit and implicit flows and observe only moderate overhead. Working with bytecode results in new challenges including the extensive use of unstructured control flow in bytecode (which complicates lowering of program context taints), unstructured exceptions (which complicate the matter further) and the need to make IFC analysis permissive. We explain how we address these challenges, formally model the JavaScript bytecode semantics and our instrumentation, prove the standard property of termination-insensitive non-interference, and present experimental results on an optimized prototype