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A Rejection of Semantic Holism, Based on Linguistic Relativity and Determinism
In this paper, I will argue that semantic holism is, inherently, a false claim. Semantic holism, here, being defined as the meaning of a word or expression in a given language (λ) is constructed by its relation to other words and expressions in said given language (λ) and its role in said given language (λ). The following premises and examples within the premises support the refutability of semantic holism, including linguistic relativity, culture and linguistic determinism
Non-Holistic Meaning Anatomism and the No-Principled-Basis Consideration
Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1999/2002) frame the debate over meaning holism in terms of a distinction between meaning atomism and meaning anatomism. The former holds that the meaning of an expression E is determined by some relation between E and some extra-linguistic entity. The latter holds that the meaning of E is at least partly determined by some of Eâs âinwardâ relations (IRs) with other expressions in the very language. They (1992) argue that meaning anatomism inevitably collapses into meaning holism, which is the view that the meaning of E is determined by Eâs IRs with every other expression in the very language because there is no principled distinction for the anatomist to divide the meaning-determining IRs from the non-meaning-determining ones. In response, the non-holistic anatomist urges that Fodor and Leporeâs no-principled-basis consideration is groundless because the lack of a generally accepted criterion for such a distinction does not undermine the viability of the distinction itself. While this point is well taken, I think that Fodor and Lepore are onto an important question here. That is, what does it make non-holistic anatomism distinctive from its holistic counterpart if without a principled basis for the distinction among IRs? I look into this question and give an alternative argument from Fodor and Leporeâs to suggest that non-holistic anatomism cannot bypass the no-principled-basis consideration. The non-holistic anatomist will need a principled distinction in kind between IRs to back her point
Inferentialism
This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim
to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialistâs
standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and
placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2
focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case
for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case
of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical
inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider
a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential
and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandomâs
inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in
§4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible
responses on the inferentialistâs behalf
âDoes Epistemic Naturalism vindicate Semantic Externalism?â- An Episto-semantical Reviewâ
The paper concentrates on how the acceptance of radical naturalism
in Quineâs theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized
epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated by the evidential acquisition of
scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge plays a significant
role in his regimented naturalistic theory anchored in the scientific
framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to
language (semantic externalism).
The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external
that somehow pave the way for âsemantic holismâ, a thesis where the meaning
of a sentence is defined in turns to the totality of nodes and paths of its semantic
networks where the meaning of linguistic units depend upon the meaning of the
entire language. I would like to relook on Quineâs heart-throbbing claim about
the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that
point towards an affirmation of meaning holism and semantic externalism.
Besides, the knowledge of acquaintance that relinquishes the singular thought
from the account of psychological consideration and self-knowledge hypothesis
copes up with the testimonial and warrant knowledge entangling by the claims
of social knowledge as anticipated by Alvin Goldman. My conclusion would be
nearer to the stance of semantic externalism inculcated by the social knowledge
(in an epistemic sense) and semantic holism
The open-endedness objection against sophisticated dispositionalism
Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that
the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this
symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause
its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show
that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the
naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by sophisticated dispositionalism is not viable. My
goal in this paper is to argue that the open-endedness objection is flawed
Meaning postulates and deference
Fodor (1998) argues that most lexical concepts have no internal structure. He rejects what he calls Inferential Role Semantics (IRS), the view that primitive concepts are constituted by their inferential relations, on the grounds that this violates the compositionality constraint and leads to an unacceptable form of holism. In rejecting IRS, Fodor must also reject meaning postulates. I argue, contra Fodor, that meaning postulates must be retained, but that when suitably constrained they are not susceptible to his arguments against IRS. This has important implications for the view that certain of our concepts are deferential. A consequence of the arguments I present is that deference is relegated to a relatively minor role in what Sperber (1997) refers to as reflective concepts; deference has no important role to play in the vast majority of our intuitive concepts
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