The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law

The ambiguity of claim language is generally considered to be the most important problem in patent law today. Linguistic ambiguity is believed to cause tremendous uncertainty about patent rights. Scholars and judges have accordingly devoted enormous attention to developing better linguistic tools to help courts understand patent claims. In this article, we explain why this diagnosis is fundamentally wrong. Claims are not often ambiguous, and linguistic ambiguity is not a major cause of the uncertainty in patent law today. We shall explain what really causes the uncertainty in patent rights, how the erroneous diagnosis of linguistic ambiguity has led the literature off-track, and what will get us back on track to solving the uncertainty problem

Cellular automata with complicated dynamics

A subshift is a collection of bi-infinite sequences (configurations) of symbols where some finite patterns of symbols are forbidden to occur. A cellular automaton is a transformation that changes each configuration of a subshift into another one by using a finite look-up table that tells how any symbol occurring at any possible context is to be changed. A cellular automaton can be applied repeatedly on the configurations of the subshift, thus making it a dynamical system. This thesis focuses on cellular automata with complex dynamical behavior, with some different definitions of the word “complex”. First we consider a naturally occurring class of cellular automata that we call multiplication automata and we present a case study with the point of view of symbolic, topological and measurable dynamics. We also present an application of these automata to a generalized version of Mahler’s problem. For different notions of complex behavior one may also ask whether a given subshift or class of subshifts has a cellular automaton that presents this behavior. We show that in the class of full shifts the Lyapunov exponents of a given reversible cellular automaton are uncomputable. This means that in the dynamics of reversible cellular automata the long term maximal propagation speed of a perturbation made in an initial configuration cannot be determined in general from short term observations. In the last part we construct, on all mixing sofic shifts, diffusive glider cellular automata that can decompose any finite configuration into two distinct components that shift into opposing direction under repeated action of the automaton. This implies that every mixing sofic shift has a reversible cellular automaton all of whose directions are sensitive in the sense of the definition of Sablik. We contrast this by presenting a family of synchronizing subshifts on which all reversible cellular automata always have a nonsensitive direction

Enumerators in S’gaw Karen; A Compilation and Analysis

This thesis presents a compilation of numeral classifiers (which I will call enumerators) in S’gaw Karen, a Tibeto-Burman language in Southeast Asia, and provides a descriptive analysis of some of their syntactic distributions. Cross-linguistic accounts of enumerators often sub-categorize them by semantic function (Greenberg 1972; Aikhenvald 2000; Sneft 2000). This thesis argues that the common sub-categories of measure terms, mensural classifiers, and sortal classifiers also differ in their syntactic distributions in S’gaw Karen. In brief, only measure terms occur without a head noun and only sortal classifiers occur next to the head noun by means of a linker. This latter pattern is unattested in the literature, and the analysis of the morpheme Ɂa1 as linker is novel. Previous accounts present a similar morpheme under varied nomenclature (Jones 1961; Cervo 2011; Olson 2014). Analyzing Ɂa1 as a linker unifies these accounts and provides an explanation for this newly described distribution.Master of Art

Concept empiricism: vehicle, meaning and intentionality

In the following Magisterarbeit I am going to develop a Concept Empiricist model of conceptual thought, which is in its technical core primarily inspired and motivated by Larry Barsalou‘ s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory (PSST) (1999, 2008a). But it is not a theory of concepts in the genuine sense only, but it also expands naturally on related topics like the ontology of mind and the problem of intentionality. This is not arbitrarily chosen, but a natural consequence of any contemporary Concept Empiricist theory, for those theories are in kind direct outgrowths of an embodied approach to cognition which yields these consequences – the natural extension to related topics – as will be shown. The roadmap for the Magisterarbeit is going to look like this: First I will delineate the embodied cognition framework. Within embodied cognition there is a plethora of differing attempts at explaining the diverse phenomena of higher and lower cognition which differ in the meanwhile tremendously from each other. Therefore it will be very useful to set clear boundaries between the differing approaches, which range from strong neural embodiment on the one side to a very promiscuous extended mind hypothesis on the other side, in order to make a clear case for Concept Empiricism. It will be also very helpful to set my favoured version of grounded cognition off against classical attempts at the phenomena which are to be explained. Following that I am going to present Larry Barsalou‘s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory in more detail. I will do that to an extent which allows for an appropriate discussion of concept related phenomena, but which is not too lengthy. I will spare the reader with unnecessary psychological or neurobiological details as long as it is not really necessary for explaining or clarifying the phenomena with which I deal here. Having done this I will discuss at great length conceptual meaning. In doing so I will present a presentational theory of meaning which is anti-realist, internalist and imaginistic. In advertising for this theory I will recur to conceptual methods, intuition as well as to the empirical record. Next and related to this I will develop a resemblance based theory of intentionality which differs also widely from the already established theories of intentionality so far given. Indeed it possess a feature which makes it very distinct and this is, besides its reliance on pattern mapping, the statistical grounding of resemblance which allows a cognitive theory of resemblance which is definite and therefore not open to the counterarguments generally mashalled against related theories, which stress the importance of resemblance. A very distinctive feature of this theory of intentionality is additionally that intentionality is seen as a capacity which emerges naturally form the mental mechanism involved. As we will see, this is a distinctive advantage of it in comparison to other proposal in the field. A discussion of the ontology of mental states follows which is however primarily a discussion of mechanistic explanations and Bechtel‘s and McCauley‘s Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT). Those theories from philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive science do not only deliver models for the ontology of mental states, but also epistemic criteria for evaluating a theory as superior or inferior. Especially the idea of productive continuity plays a role of pivotal importance in my Magisterarbeit. It might be a bit unfortunate that that an important consideration is discussed nearly at the end of the Magisterarbeit, since I refer to it very often, however, I considered it as equally unfortunate to delay the discussion of meaning and intentionality, which is already protruded by the overview chapter and the more technical parts, even more. Therefore I plead the reader to refer to later parts of the Magisterarbeit when it is necessary in order to understand earlier parts. In the course of writing I have gotten second thoughts regarding the adequacy of an ontology of mental states altogether, especially from the background of the theory of meaning and intentionality delivered here. Therefore I tried to accommodate for ontological concepts by means of a tentative phenomenological interpretation of them. Similar ideas influenced my deliberations regarding meaning too. I hope that this transition towards Phenomenology runs smoothly and that the high level of coherence which is my primary concern and something which I always strive for first is preserved. Further, I have dedicated a main chapter of the Magisterarbeit for possible and actual critics of the ideas brought forth by me. Besides the more classic standard objections there you can find a recent critique of the authors on which I refer most often. Naturally I try to refute any single criticism brought forth and I hope that the reader will approve my objection to the objections. I will round off the Magisterarbeit with some concluding remarks and prospects for future research.In der hier vorliegenden Magisterhausarbeit entwickele ich eine Theorie von Begriffen und somit auch von Bedeutung und Intentionalität, die in dem Embodied and Embedded Mind Paradigma verankert ist. Dabei beziehe ich mich maßgeblich auf die Begriffstheorie von Lawrence Barsalou, die sogenannte Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie. Neben einer allgemeinen Darstellung des Paradigmas, stelle ich zu Beginn der Arbeit die Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie von Barsalou dar, sowie weitere begriffliche Werkzeuge, die es möglich machen, eine im Körper gegründete Begriffstheorie zu entwickeln: Simulation, Emulation und Neuronale Ausbeutung (neural exploitation). Dieser Teil ist primär darstellend. Der daraufhin folgenden Abschnitte der Magisterarbeit entwickeln primär eine Konzeption von Begriffsempirismus, so wie ich ihn mir vorstelle. Dabei diskutiere ich ausführlich das Phänomen "Bedeutung" und komme dabei zum Schluss, dass es sich bei Bedeutung um etwas handelt, das radikal verschieden von dem ist, wie es speziell die analytische Tradition in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie gezeichnet hat. Bedeutung ist demnach primär ein sensomotorisches Phänomen, dass für Handlungen evolvierte und dass auf quasi-imaginistischen Mechanismen ruht. Bedeutung ist primär weniger repräsentational als vielmehr phänomenal präsentational und internalistisch. Ich entwickele diese Theorie von Bedeutung vor dem Hintergrund von philosophischen Argumenten wie dem symbol grounding Argument oder dem chinese room argument als auch vor dem Hintergrund neuropsychologischer Theorien wie z.B. der mental imagery Theorie von Kosslyn oder der Begriffstheorie von Barsalou. Neben dem positiven Teil der Theorieentwicklung, diskutiere ich auch eine Vielzahl von Einwänden, die gegen klassische Theorien vorgebracht wurden, die teilweise größere Ähnlichkeit zu der hier entwickelten Theorie haben. Im Anschluss daran, versuche ich, eine Theorie von Intentionalität auszuarbeiten, die es ermöglicht, dass Intentionalität als quasi emergentes Phänomen entsteht und nicht, wie es üblich ist, durch umständliche und problematische ad hoc Erklärungen eingebracht wird. Dabei gehe ich davon aus, dass die biologischen Mechanismen, die auch Bedeutung erklären, größtenteils dazu beitragen, Intentionalität zu erklären, wobei Intentionalität eine konkrete Relation zwischen einem Ding in der Welt, einem Perzept und einem Begriff ist. Die stark objektivistische und metaphysisch realistische Tendenz klassischer Referenz und Intentionalitätstheorien wird dabei zurückgewiesen. Für die Kritik an klassischen Theorien arbeite ich 12 Punkte heraus, die es erlauben, schwere Zweifel hinsichtlich eben jener klassischen Theorien zu haben. Ich schließe die Intentionalitätsdiskussion mit einer Betrachtung des Pseudophänomens intentional-intensionaler Kontexte ab und schlage ein Modell vor, dass dieses Phänomen zurückweist. Daraufhin behandele ich ontologische Probleme hinsichtlich meiner Position. Ich gebe dabei praktisch zwei Lösungsvorschläge ab. Der eine ist maßgeblich durch das Mechanistische Paradigma und die Heuristische Identitätstheorie aus der Wissenschaftstheorie motiviert und setzt Phänomene und Mechanismen in ein enges Verhältnis. Der andere weist ontologische Fragestellungen zurück und bezieht sich dabei vor allem auf die phänomenologische Tradition. Den letzten großen Teil der Magisterhausarbeit macht eine Zurückweisung von konkreter Kritik am Begriffsempirismus aus. Dabei diskutiere ich neben der klassischen Kritik von Fodor und Pylsyshyn, die relativ generell ist, hauptsächlich Edouard Macherys Kritik, die sich konkret gegen Barsalou und Prinz richtet. Die Magisterhausarbeit schließt mit einem Resümee, das vor allem die Probleme, die sich aus meiner Position ergeben, darstellt und schildert, was zukünftig in den Fokus philosophischer Diskussion rücken sollte