Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)

We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4. Continuation of arXiv:1208.184

The prospects for mathematical logic in the twenty-first century

The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory, proof theory and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are discussed independently.Comment: Association for Symbolic Logi

Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page

Bernays and the completeness theorem

A well-known result in Reverse Mathematics is the equivalence of the formalized version of the Gödel completeness theorem [8] – i.e. every countable, consistent set of first-order sentences has a model – and Weak König's Lemma [WKL] – i.e. every infinite tree of 0-1 sequences contains an infinite path– over the base theory RCA0. It is less well known how the Completeness Theorem came to be studied in the setting of second-order arithmetic and computability theory. The first goal of this note will be to recount these developments against the backdrop of the latter phases of the Hilbert program, culminating in the publication of the second volume of Hilbert and Bernays’s [13] Grundlagen der Mathematiks in 1939. This work contains a detailed formalization of the Completeness Theorem in a system similar to first-order Peano arithmetic [PA] – a result which has come to be known as the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. Its second goal will be to illustrate how reflection on this result informed Bernays’s views about the philosophy of mathematics, in particular in regard to his engagement with the maxim “consistency implies existence”

Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?

The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status, and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open, modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and Alonso, E., 201

The modal logic of Reverse Mathematics

The implication relationship between subsystems in Reverse Mathematics has an underlying logic, which can be used to deduce certain new Reverse Mathematics results from existing ones in a routine way. We use techniques of modal logic to formalize the logic of Reverse Mathematics into a system that we name s-logic. We argue that s-logic captures precisely the "logical" content of the implication and nonimplication relations between subsystems in Reverse Mathematics. We present a sound, complete, decidable, and compact tableau-style deductive system for s-logic, and explore in detail two fragments that are particularly relevant to Reverse Mathematics practice and automated theorem proving of Reverse Mathematics results

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later