Online Shaming

Online shaming is a subject of import for social philosophy in the Internet age, and not simply because shaming seems generally bad. I argue that social philosophers are well-placed to address the imaginal relationships we entertain when we engage in social media; activity in cyberspace results in more relationships than one previously had, entailing new and more responsibilities, and our relational behaviors admit of ethical assessment. I consider the stresses of social media, including the indefinite expansion of our relationships and responsibilities, and the gap between the experiences of those shamed and the shamers’ appreciation of the magnitude of what they do when they shame; I connect these to the literature suggesting that some intuitions fail to guide our ethics. I conclude that we each have more power than we believe we do or than we think carefully about exerting in our online imaginal relations. Whether we are the shamers or the shamed, we are unable to control the extent to which intangible words in cyberspace take the form of imaginal relationships that burden or brighten our self-perceptions

Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they could do so without the recipient\u27s knowledge, individuals made uneven offers despite knowing that their behaviour was unfair

Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How the Tragedy of the Anticommons Emerges in Organizations

In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these literatures by conceptualizing a bottom-up behavioral process (in contrast to institutional allocation) of property distribution that leads to the emergence of the tragedy of the anticommons. The implications of this bottom-up behavioral process for property rights theory, territoriality theory, and the social dilemma paradigm are discussed

Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others

In this paper we present the results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient’s tokens, take more of them. They were also more likely to report believing that the recipient would accept a low price in exchange for a side payment; and selected larger numbers as their best guess of the likely proportion of recipients acting “unfairly”. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others.

The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior

We study how positive narratives (stories in favor of a prosocial action) and negative narratives (stories in favor of a selfish action) influence prosocial behavior in a series of lab and online experiments with more than 1500 subjects. We find that, both positive and negative narratives are effective at changing how actions are perceived. However, while positive narratives increase prosocial behavior, negative narratives do not move aggregate behavior and — if anything — lead to slightly more prosocial behavior. Our results indicate that this may be due to the fact that when following a negative narrative an individual is viewed as influenceable — something that appears to be undesirable. Taken together, our study suggests that positive and negative narratives are not just the flip sides of the same coin

Essays on Moral and Ethical Behavior in Experimental Economics

This dissertation investigates moral, ethical and normative behavior in economic contexts via experiments. The first chapter studies narratives and their effects on prosocial behavior. The second chapter provides a robustness check of a study by Di Tella et al. (2015), but fails to replicate their findings on self-serving beliefs. The third chapter shows that alongside social norms also personal norms are an important driver of economic behavior and studies their interaction with image concerns. The fourth chapter investigates whether asymmetric information can lead to more unethical behavior in team decision-making

A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust

Sage and Hammer use the analogy of Copernican astronomy to suggest that understanding the dramatic change wrought by managed care requires a conceptual reorientation regarding the meaning of competition in health care and its appropriate legal and regulatory oversight. Both share the belief that misperceiving the world limits potential for technical and social progress

Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?

The study reported here assessed the impact of managers\u27 philosophies of human nature on their reactions to influential academic claims and counter-claims of when human judgment is likely to stray from rational-actor standards and of how organizations can correct these biases. Managers evaluated scenarios that depicted decision-making processes at micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis: alleged cognitive biases of individuals, strategies of structuring and coping with accountability relationships between supervisors and employees, and strategies that corporate entities use to cope with accountability demands from the broader society. Political ideology and cognitive style emerged as consistent predictors of the value spins that managers placed on decisions at all three levels of analysis. Specifically, conservative managers with strong preferences for cognitive closure were most likely (a) to defend simple heuristic-driven errors such as overattribution and overconfidence and to warn of the mirror-image mistakes of failing to hold people accountable and of diluting sound policies with irrelevant side-objectives; (b) to be skeptical of complex strategies of structuring or coping with accountability and to praise those who lay down clear rules and take decisive stands; (c) to prefer simple philosophies of corporate governance (the shareholder over stakeholder model) and to endorse organizational norms such as hierarchical filtering that reduce cognitive overload on top management by short-circuiting unnecessary argumentation. Intuitive theories of good judgment apparently cut across levels of analysis and are deeply grounded in personal epistemologies and political ideologies