The Paradox of Observing, Autopoiesis, and the Future of Social Sciences

The current debates in social sciences show that the paradox of observing—the embeddedness of observer in the process of observing—is at the heart of the controversy about their cognitive status and future. Although the problem of observing has been addressed in numerous theoretical perspectives—some of which (Habermas, Leydesdorff, Maturana, and Luhmann) are examined in this article—the prospects for resolving this paradox remain problematic. Locating a point that allows reflection on the process of autopoiesis in general, not just the operation of a particular autopoietic system, may be one condition for resolving this paradox. Such point will offer reflection on all autopoietic systems, including the observer. The dynamic balance between equilibrium and disequilibrium is the mechanism which regulates the process of autopoiesis. Since the function of regulation is essentially a reflective function, this equilibrium between equilibrium and disequilibrium, which can be identified with the concept of homeorhesis introduced by Conrad Waddington, may offer a possibility to reflect on the process of observing

On Actualizing Public Reason

In this Essay, I examine some apparent difficulties with what I call the "actualization criterion" connected to Rawls's notion of public reason, that is, the criterion for determining when Rawlsian public reason is concretely actualized by citizens in their deliberating and deciding about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. While these apparent difficulties have led some commentators to reject Rawlsian public reason altogether, I offer an interpretation that might allow Rawlsian public reason to escape the difficulties. My reading involves the claim that Rawlsian public reason is to be understood essentially as an imperative or an ideal, and as not necessarily grounded in any stock of existing beliefs or opinions. I make this claim on the basis of the seemingly counterintuitive observation that it is possible for citizen-interlocutors to know that public reason has been violated without necessarily knowing who the violator is (and thus without being able to foreclose the possibility that the violator may even be oneself). This observation is based in turn on my analysis of the necessary reciprocity and self-referentiality built in to the very concept of public reason as such

Self-Referential Justifications in Epistemic Logic

This paper is devoted to the study of self-referential proofs and/or justifications, i.e.,valid proofs that prove statements about these same proofs. The goal is to investigate whether such self-referential justifications are present in the reasoning described by standard modal epistemic logics such as $\mathsf{S4}$ . We argue that the modal language by itself is too coarse to capture this concept of self-referentiality and that the language of justification logic can serve as an adequate refinement. We consider well-known modal logics of knowledge/belief and show, using explicit justifications, that $\mathsf{S4}$ , $\mathsf{D4}$ , $\mathsf{K4}$ , and $\mathsf{T}$ with their respective justification counterparts $\mathsf{LP}$ , $\mathsf{JD4}$ , $\mathsf{J4}$ , and $\mathsf{JT}$ describe knowledge that is self-referential in some strong sense. We also demonstrate that self-referentiality can be avoided for $\mathsf{K}$ and $\mathsf{D}$ . In order to prove the former result, we develop a machinery of minimal evidence functions used to effectively build models for justification logics. We observe that the calculus used to construct the minimal functions axiomatizes the reflected fragments of justification logics. We also discuss difficulties that result from an introduction of negative introspectio

Quantum Non-Objectivity from Performativity of Quantum Phenomena

We analyze the logical foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) by stressing non-objectivity of quantum observables which is a consequence of the absence of logical atoms in QM. We argue that the matter of quantum non-objectivity is that, on the one hand, the formalism of QM constructed as a mathematical theory is self-consistent, but, on the other hand, quantum phenomena as results of experimenter's performances are not self-consistent. This self-inconsistency is an effect of that the language of QM differs much from the language of human performances. The first is the language of a mathematical theory which uses some Aristotelian and Russellian assumptions (e.g., the assumption that there are logical atoms). The second language consists of performative propositions which are self-inconsistent only from the viewpoint of conventional mathematical theory, but they satisfy another logic which is non-Aristotelian. Hence, the representation of quantum reality in linguistic terms may be different: from a mathematical theory to a logic of performative propositions. To solve quantum self-inconsistency, we apply the formalism of non-classical self-referent logics

A Categorical Framework for Quantum Theory

Underlying any theory of physics is a layer of conceptual frames. They connect the mathematical structures used in theoretical models with physical phenomena, but they also constitute our fundamental assumptions about reality. Many of the discrepancies between quantum physics and classical physics (including Maxwell's electrodynamics and relativity) can be traced back to these categorical foundations. We argue that classical physics corresponds to the factual aspects of reality and requires a categorical framework which consists of four interdependent components: boolean logic, the linear-sequential notion of time, the principle of sufficient reason, and the dichotomy between observer and observed. None of these can be dropped without affecting the others. However, in quantum theory the reduction postulate also addresses the "status nascendi" of facts, i.e., their coming into being. Therefore, quantum phyics requires a different conceptual framework which will be elaborated in this article. It is shown that many of its components are already present in the standard formalisms of quantum physics, but in most cases they are highlighted not so much from a conceptual perspective but more from their mathematical structures. The categorical frame underlying quantum physics includes a profoundly different notion of time which encompasses a crucial role for the present.Comment: 35 pages, 1 figur

Thinking of a sub-field of strategic thinking from a pluralistic approach to knowledge-invention

This article elaborates on the need for a sub-field of ‘Strategic Thinking’ as the science exploring the hidden side of strategy emergence. The site of our exploration is the discourse. We will investigate the intersystemic link between self-reflection and communication embedded in discourses among strategists for paradigm deconstruction and reconstruction. The rationale for a sub-field of Strategic Thinking is related to applying new research ‘technologies’. By engaging in action-research, researchers can observe self-reflection as embedded participants and super-observers. A pluralist perspective on self-reflection, as well as transformative competencies and attitudes will allow intentionality to regain a foundational role in knowledge-invention

Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative

Of the theologians and philosophers now writing on biblical narrative, Hans Frei and Paul Ricoeur are probably the most prominent. It is significant that their views converge on important issues. Both are uncomfortable with hermeneutic theories that convert the text into an abstract philosophical system, an ideal typological structure, or a mere occasion for existential decision. Frei and Ricoeur seem knit together in a common enterprise; they appear to be building a single narrative theology. I argue that the appearance of symmetry is an illusion. There is a fundamental conflict between the ‘pure narrativism’ of Frei and the ‘impure narrativism’ of Ricoeur. I give reasons for thinking that Ricoeur’s is the stronger position

Complexity Issues in Justification Logic

Justification Logic is an emerging field that studies provability, knowledge, and belief via explicit proofs or justifications that are part of the language. There exist many justification logics closely related to modal epistemic logics of knowledge and belief. Instead of modality □ in pure justification logics, or in addition to modality □ in hybrid logics, which has an existential epistemic reading \u27there exists a proof of F,\u27 all justification logics use constructs t:F, where a justification term t represents a blueprint of a Hilbert-style proof of F. The first justification logic, LP, introduced by Sergei Artemov, was shown to be a justification counterpart of modal logic S4 and serves as a missing link between S4 and Peano arithmetic, thereby solving a long-standing problem of provability semantics for S4 and Int. The machinery of explicit justifications can be used to analyze well-known epistemic paradoxes, e.g. Gettier\u27s examples of justified true belief that can hardly be considered knowledge, and to find new approaches to the concept of common knowledge. Yet another possible application is the Logical Omniscience Problem, which reflects an undesirable property of knowledge as described by modality when an agent knows all the logical consequences of his/her knowledge. The language of justification logic opens new ways to tackle this problem. This thesis focuses on quantitative analysis of justification logics. We explore their decidability and complexity of Validity Problem for them. A closer analysis of the realization phenomenon in general and of one procedure in particular enables us to deduce interesting corollaries about self-referentiality for several modal logics. A framework for proving decidability of various justification logics is developed by generalizing the Finite Model Property. Limitations of the method are demonstrated through an example of an undecidable justification logic. We study reflected fragments of justification logics and provide them with an axiomatization and a decision procedure whose complexity (the upper bound) turns out to be uniform for all justification logics, both pure and hybrid. For many justification logics, we also present lower and upper complexity bounds

Constitutional Law and its Methods

The article critically reviews the book “ Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context ”, analysing the extensive use of the case approach made in the text and examining the creativ e nature of the Italian constitutional Court. The essay underli nes in particular the “style” adopted by the Italian Court, which, ac cording to the authors, is characterised by a principle of relatio nality with other institutional actors: Courts, judges, policies, and citizens