Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution

Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas

Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics. Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we show that this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initial conditions

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behavior in humans and social animals also compel to conformity on their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favor of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Society Interfac

Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium

Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.Comment: 14 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in European Physical Journal

Coupled dynamics of node and link states in complex networks: A model for language competition

Inspired by language competition processes, we present a model of coupled evolution of node and link states. In particular, we focus on the interplay between the use of a language and the preference or attitude of the speakers towards it, which we model, respectively, as a property of the interactions between speakers (a link state) and as a property of the speakers themselves (a node state). Furthermore, we restrict our attention to the case of two socially equivalent languages and to socially inspired network topologies based on a mechanism of triadic closure. As opposed to most of the previous literature, where language extinction is an inevitable outcome of the dynamics, we find a broad range of possible asymptotic configurations, which we classify as: frozen extinction states, frozen coexistence states, and dynamically trapped coexistence states. Moreover, metastable coexistence states with very long survival times and displaying a non-trivial dynamics are found to be abundant. Interestingly, a system size scaling analysis shows, on the one hand, that the probability of language extinction vanishes exponentially for increasing system sizes and, on the other hand, that the time scale of survival of the non-trivial dynamical metastable states increases linearly with the size of the system. Thus, non-trivial dynamical coexistence is the only possible outcome for large enough systems. Finally, we show how this coexistence is characterized by one of the languages becoming clearly predominant while the other one becomes increasingly confined to "ghetto-like" structures: small groups of bilingual speakers arranged in triangles, with a strong preference for the minority language, and using it for their intra-group interactions while they switch to the predominant language for communications with the rest of the population.Comment: 21 pages, 15 figure