13,835 research outputs found

    Understanding from Machine Learning Models

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    Simple idealized models seem to provide more understanding than opaque, complex, and hyper-realistic models. However, an increasing number of scientists are going in the opposite direction by utilizing opaque machine learning models to make predictions and draw inferences, suggesting that scientists are opting for models that have less potential for understanding. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic good when they choose a machine learning model? Or are the assumptions behind why minimal models provide understanding misguided? In this paper, using the case of deep neural networks, I argue that it is not the complexity or black box nature of a model that limits how much understanding the model provides. Instead, it is a lack of scientific and empirical evidence supporting the link that connects a model to the target phenomenon that primarily prohibits understanding

    Interpreting Deep Visual Representations via Network Dissection

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    The success of recent deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) depends on learning hidden representations that can summarize the important factors of variation behind the data. However, CNNs often criticized as being black boxes that lack interpretability, since they have millions of unexplained model parameters. In this work, we describe Network Dissection, a method that interprets networks by providing labels for the units of their deep visual representations. The proposed method quantifies the interpretability of CNN representations by evaluating the alignment between individual hidden units and a set of visual semantic concepts. By identifying the best alignments, units are given human interpretable labels across a range of objects, parts, scenes, textures, materials, and colors. The method reveals that deep representations are more transparent and interpretable than expected: we find that representations are significantly more interpretable than they would be under a random equivalently powerful basis. We apply the method to interpret and compare the latent representations of various network architectures trained to solve different supervised and self-supervised training tasks. We then examine factors affecting the network interpretability such as the number of the training iterations, regularizations, different initializations, and the network depth and width. Finally we show that the interpreted units can be used to provide explicit explanations of a prediction given by a CNN for an image. Our results highlight that interpretability is an important property of deep neural networks that provides new insights into their hierarchical structure.Comment: *B. Zhou and D. Bau contributed equally to this work. 15 pages, 27 figure

    Pragmatism and the pragmatic turn in cognitive science

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    This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and provides some of the conceptual background to the “pragmatic turn” currently underway in cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on cognition from a naturalistic perspective, and many of their views are compatible with contemporary pragmatist approaches such as enactivist, extended, and embodied-Bayesian approaches to cognition. Three principles of a pragmatic approach to cognition frame the discussion: First, thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability throughout the life cycle. Finally, inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritating doubts that arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference

    An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence

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    We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness
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