7,876 research outputs found
Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitionsâ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and âpotential stabilityâ of a number of coalitions which are âpotentially effectiveâ in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even âpotentially stableâ even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.Climate Policy, Climate Coalition, Game Theory, Free Riding
Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Algorithm for Computations
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making âwelfare optimal agreementsâ self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol
The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea â recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) â is based on the insight that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrettâs and Benedickâs conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation â without any commitment to emission control â may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Technological change, Policy
The Political Economy of Inclusive Growth
An Application of Political Settlements to the case of Thailan
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol
The present stalemate in climate negotiations between the US and the other Annex I countries has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes that may be applied after 2012. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea â recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) â is based on the insight that incentives to free ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the selfenforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled. The results of our analysis partly support Barrettâs and Benedickâs conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation â without any commitment to emission control â may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy
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