Artificial Identity: Representations of Robots and Cyborgs in Contemporary Anglo-American Science Fiction Films

The ‘human condition’ has traditionally been an area of study addressed primarily by philosophers concerned with the mind/body problem, rather than studied as a neuroscientific conundrum. However, contemporary developments in science and technology that afford us a greater knowledge of the human brain have resulted in an increased scientific focus on consciousness, emotion and personhood. This thesis argues that such explorations into consciousness and emotion as prerequisites of ‘artificial identity’ have entered the domain of contemporary cinema through the representations of robots and cyborgs. Despite the capacity for transhumanist practice and the creation of artificially intelligent automata that these developments have made possible, blurring the line between organic human and mechanical robots, it remains common for no distinctions to be made between the terms ‘human’ and ‘person’, which are used interchangeably to describe a member of the human race. Philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, though, has proposed a series of criteria for personhood that challenge the assumption that only humans can be considered persons. The application of his criteria to a series of key texts that highlight the relationships between humans and representations of automata - I, Robot (2004, Dir. Alex Proyas), Terminator Salvation (2009, Dir. McG) and Bicentennial Man (1999, Dir. Chris Columbus) – is central to this thesis. It explores the extent to which the representations of robots and cyborgs can be considered persons within utopian and dystopian narratives that have, at their core, a view of artificial identity as desirable or as nightmare. In conjunction with Dennett, the theories of neurologist and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio are applied, which explore both the biological means by which emotional (rather than solely physical) feelings are generated in humans, and the capacity of humans to simulate emotion. As Damasio argues that many of the central operations of the human central nervous and visceral systems are reducible to fundamental physics, the suggestion is that robots, too, could also ‘experience’ consciousness and emotion, being as they are very simplistic versions of humans. As such, the application of these theories suggests that the representations of robots and cyborgs in the key texts could be considered persons

Can Science Explain Consciousness?

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science

Science as systems learning. Some reflections on the cognitive and communicational aspects of science

This paper undertakes a theoretical investigation of the 'learning' aspect of science as opposed to the 'knowledge' aspect. The practical background of the paper is in agricultural systems research – an area of science that can be characterised as 'systemic' because it is involved in the development of its own subject area, agriculture. And the practical purpose of the theoretical investigation is to contribute to a more adequate understanding of science in such areas, which can form a basis for developing and evaluating systemic research methods, and for determining appropriate criteria of scientific quality. Two main perspectives on science as a learning process are explored: research as the learning process of a cognitive system, and science as a social, communicational system. A simple model of a cognitive system is suggested, which integrates both semiotic and cybernetic aspects, as well as a model of selfreflective learning in research, which entails moving from an inside 'actor' stance to an outside 'observer' stance, and back. This leads to a view of scientific knowledge as inherently contextual and to the suggestion of reflexive objectivity and relevance as two related key criteria of good science

Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

The sense of controlling one’s own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one’s own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another’s action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another’s action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other’s actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants’ actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world

A Self for robots: core elements and ascription by humans

Modern robotics is interested in developing humanoid robots with meta-cognitive capabilities in order to create systems that have the possibility of dealing efficiently with the presence of novel situations and unforeseen inputs. Given the relational nature of human beings, with a glimpse into the future of assistive robots, it seems relevant to start thinking about the nature of the interaction with such robots, increasingly human-like not only from the outside but also in terms of behavior. The question posed in this abstract concerns the possibility of ascribing the robot not only a mind but a more profound dimension: a Self

Perceiving Sociable Technology: Exploring the Role of Anthropomorphism and Agency Perception on Human-Computer Interaction (HCI)

With the arrival of personal assistants and other AI-enabled autonomous technologies, social interactions with smart devices have become a part of our daily lives. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to understand how these social interactions emerge, and why users appear to be influenced by them. For this reason, I explore questions on what the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon, known as anthropomorphism, are as described in the extant literature from fields ranging from information systems to social neuroscience. I critically analyze those empirical studies directly measuring anthropomorphism and those referring to it without a corresponding measurement. Through a grounded theory approach, I identify common themes and use them to develop models for the antecedents and consequences of anthropomorphism. The results suggest anthropomorphism possesses both conscious and non-conscious components with varying implications. While conscious attributions are shown to vary based on individual differences, non-conscious attributions emerge whenever a technology exhibits apparent reasoning such as through non-verbal behavior like peer-to-peer mirroring or verbal paralinguistic and backchanneling cues. Anthropomorphism has been shown to affect users’ self-perceptions, perceptions of the technology, how users interact with the technology, and the users’ performance. Examples include changes in a users’ trust on the technology, conformity effects, bonding, and displays of empathy. I argue these effects emerge from changes in users’ perceived agency, and their self- and social- identity similarly to interactions between humans. Afterwards, I critically examine current theories on anthropomorphism and present propositions about its nature based on the results of the empirical literature. Subsequently, I introduce a two-factor model of anthropomorphism that proposes how an individual anthropomorphizes a technology is dependent on how the technology was initially perceived (top-down and rational or bottom-up and automatic), and whether it exhibits a capacity for agency or experience. I propose that where a technology lays along this spectrum determines how individuals relates to it, creating shared agency effects, or changing the users’ social identity. For this reason, anthropomorphism is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to support future interactions with smart technologies

Chapter 1 Affect theory and performance intention

"Forms of Emotion analyses how drama, theatre and contemporary performance present emotion and its human and nonhuman diversity. This book explores the emotions, emotional feelings, mood, and affect, which make up a spectrum of ‘emotion’, to illuminate theatrical knowledge and practice and reflect the distinctions and debates in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and other disciplines. This study asserts that specific forms of emotion are intentionally unified in drama, theatre, and performance to convey meaning, counteract separation and subversively champion emotional freedom. The book progressively shows that the dramatic and theatrical representation of the nonhuman reveals how human dominance is offset by emotional connection with birds, animals, and the natural environment. This book will be of great interest to students and researchers interested in the emotions and affect in dramatic literature, theatre studies, performance studies, psychology, and philosophy as well as artists working with emotionally expressive performance.

The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address Corporate Remote Interference

Thanks to the proliferation of internet-connected devices that constitute the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), companies can now remotely and automatically alter or deactivate household items. In addition to empowering industry at the expense of individuals, this remote interference can cause property damage and bodily injury when an otherwise operational car, alarm system, or implanted medical device abruptly ceases to function. Even as the potential for harm escalates, contract and tort law work in tandem to shield IoT companies from liability. Exculpatory clauses limit civil remedies, IoT devices’ bundled object/service nature thwarts implied warranty claims, and contractual notice of remote interference precludes common law tort suits. Meanwhile, absent a better understanding of how IoT-enabled injuries operate and propagate, judges are likely to apply products liability and negligence standards narrowly, in ways that curtail corporate liability. But this is hardly the first time a new technology has altered social and power relations between industries and individuals, creating a potential liability inflection point. As before, we must decide what to incentivize and who to protect, with an awareness that the choices we make now will shape future assumptions about IoT companies’ obligations and consumer rights. Accordingly, this Article proposes reforms to contract and tort law to expand corporate liability and minimize foreseeable consumer injury

Chapter 1 Affect theory and performance intention

"Forms of Emotion analyses how drama, theatre and contemporary performance present emotion and its human and nonhuman diversity. This book explores the emotions, emotional feelings, mood, and affect, which make up a spectrum of ‘emotion’, to illuminate theatrical knowledge and practice and reflect the distinctions and debates in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and other disciplines. This study asserts that specific forms of emotion are intentionally unified in drama, theatre, and performance to convey meaning, counteract separation and subversively champion emotional freedom. The book progressively shows that the dramatic and theatrical representation of the nonhuman reveals how human dominance is offset by emotional connection with birds, animals, and the natural environment. This book will be of great interest to students and researchers interested in the emotions and affect in dramatic literature, theatre studies, performance studies, psychology, and philosophy as well as artists working with emotionally expressive performance.