Communication channels and induced behavior

This paper reports recent findings on the effects of cheap talk communication on behavior. It exemplifies how different communication channels influence decisions in various games and information environments and addresses possible consequences for the design of real-world economic environments.communication, economic experiment, bargaining, public good

Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?

According to a standard principle in free speech law, the remedy for falsehoods is "more speech," not enforced silence. But empirical research demonstrates that corrections of falsehoods can actually backfire, by increasing people’s commitment to their inaccurate beliefs, and that presentation of balanced information can promote polarization, thus increasing preexisting social divisions. We attempt to explain these apparently puzzling phenomena by reference to what we call Asymmetric Bayesianism: purported corrections may be taken to establish the truth of the proposition that is being denied, and the same information can have diametrically opposite effects if those who receive it have opposing antecedent convictions. In our primary model, recipients whose beliefs are buttressed by the message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that it is true, while recipients whose beliefs are at odds with that message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that the message is false (and may reflect desperation). We also show that the same information can activate radically different memories and associated convictions, thus producing polarized responses to that information, or what we call a memory boomerang. These explanations help account for the potential influence of "surprising validators." Because such validators are credible to the relevant audience, they can reduce the likelihood of Asymmetric Bayesianism, thus ensuring that corrections are persuasive and also promoting agreement

The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment

The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a road map for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, it concludes with some open questions.National Science Foundation (U.S.

Selective developments in choice analysis and a reminder about the dimensionality of behavioural analysis

Developments in data and modeling paradigms in choice analysis are occurring at a fast pace. A review of activity leading up to each IATBR conference shows progress on many fronts. This paper takes a selective view of some of these developments, especially those that have been close to the research program of the authors. We focus on four broad themes – information processing strategies, especially in the context of stated choice studies; agency interdependency (with a strong applied focus), developments in the design of choice experiments, and a smorgasbord of themes centered on expanding the behavioral capabilities (and longer term forecasting accuracy) of discrete choice models, especially in terms of their recognition of ways of accommodating the other themes in the paper

A Wedding Toast Is Not a State of the Union Address: Other-Regarding and Others’ Opinions Regarding Preferences As Relevant Factors in Shaping Human Preferences

This paper describes using current literature and research a problem that has plagued social scientists for centuries, see that of „moral sentiments?. Human beings are inherently social by nature and hold certain regard for others? opinions (esteem preferences) as well as for others generally (altruism). It is argued in the article that such preferences may in fact be consistent with a core rational human agent. It is furthermore argued that the lack of regard for such preferences in social sciences research (and particularly within the domain of economics) severely weakens models and theories in the respective disciplines. A few potential avenues for including social preferences writ large into social science (read: economic) modeling are outlined