Discovering Valuable Items from Massive Data

Suppose there is a large collection of items, each with an associated cost and an inherent utility that is revealed only once we commit to selecting it. Given a budget on the cumulative cost of the selected items, how can we pick a subset of maximal value? This task generalizes several important problems such as multi-arm bandits, active search and the knapsack problem. We present an algorithm, GP-Select, which utilizes prior knowledge about similarity be- tween items, expressed as a kernel function. GP-Select uses Gaussian process prediction to balance exploration (estimating the unknown value of items) and exploitation (selecting items of high value). We extend GP-Select to be able to discover sets that simultaneously have high utility and are diverse. Our preference for diversity can be specified as an arbitrary monotone submodular function that quantifies the diminishing returns obtained when selecting similar items. Furthermore, we exploit the structure of the model updates to achieve an order of magnitude (up to 40X) speedup in our experiments without resorting to approximations. We provide strong guarantees on the performance of GP-Select and apply it to three real-world case studies of industrial relevance: (1) Refreshing a repository of prices in a Global Distribution System for the travel industry, (2) Identifying diverse, binding-affine peptides in a vaccine de- sign task and (3) Maximizing clicks in a web-scale recommender system by recommending items to users

Sequential item pricing for unlimited supply

We investigate the extent to which price updates can increase the revenue of a seller with little prior information on demand. We study prior-free revenue maximization for a seller with unlimited supply of n item types facing m myopic buyers present for k < log n days. For the static (k = 1) case, Balcan et al. [2] show that one random item price (the same on each item) yields revenue within a \Theta(log m + log n) factor of optimum and this factor is tight. We define the hereditary maximizers property of buyer valuations (satisfied by any multi-unit or gross substitutes valuation) that is sufficient for a significant improvement of the approximation factor in the dynamic (k > 1) setting. Our main result is a non-increasing, randomized, schedule of k equal item prices with expected revenue within a O((log m + log n) / k) factor of optimum for private valuations with hereditary maximizers. This factor is almost tight: we show that any pricing scheme over k days has a revenue approximation factor of at least (log m + log n) / (3k). We obtain analogous matching lower and upper bounds of \Theta((log n) / k) if all valuations have the same maximum. We expect our upper bound technique to be of broader interest; for example, it can significantly improve the result of Akhlaghpour et al. [1]. We also initiate the study of revenue maximization given allocative externalities (i.e. influences) between buyers with combinatorial valuations. We provide a rather general model of positive influence of others' ownership of items on a buyer's valuation. For affine, submodular externalities and valuations with hereditary maximizers we present an influence-and-exploit (Hartline et al. [13]) marketing strategy based on our algorithm for private valuations. This strategy preserves our approximation factor, despite an affine increase (due to externalities) in the optimum revenue.Comment: 18 pages, 1 figur

Interactive Submodular Set Cover

We introduce a natural generalization of submodular set cover and exact active learning with a finite hypothesis class (query learning). We call this new problem interactive submodular set cover. Applications include advertising in social networks with hidden information. We give an approximation guarantee for a novel greedy algorithm and give a hardness of approximation result which matches up to constant factors. We also discuss negative results for simpler approaches and present encouraging early experimental results.Comment: 15 pages, 1 figur