12 research outputs found
Applications of network optimization
Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-48).Ravindra K. Ahuja ... [et al.]
An updated annotated bibliography on arc routing problems
The number of arc routing publications has increased significantly in the last decade. Such an increase justifies a second annotated bibliography, a sequel to Corberán and Prins (Networks 56 (2010), 50–69), discussing arc routing studies from 2010 onwards. These studies are grouped into three main sections: single vehicle problems, multiple vehicle problems and applications. Each main section catalogs problems according to their specifics. Section 2 is therefore composed of four subsections, namely: the Chinese Postman Problem, the Rural Postman Problem, the General Routing Problem (GRP) and Arc Routing Problems (ARPs) with profits. Section 3, devoted to the multiple vehicle case, begins with three subsections on the Capacitated Arc Routing Problem (CARP) and then delves into several variants of multiple ARPs, ending with GRPs and problems with profits. Section 4 is devoted to applications, including distribution and collection routes, outdoor activities, post-disaster operations, road cleaning and marking. As new applications emerge and existing applications continue to be used and adapted, the future of arc routing research looks promising.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Continuous Patrolling Games
The continuous patrolling game studied here was first proposed in Alpern et
al. (2011), which studied a discrete time game where facilities to be protected
were modeled as the nodes of a graph. Here we consider protecting roads or
pipelines, modeled as the arcs of a continuous network . The Attacker
chooses a point of to attack during a chosen time interval of fixed
duration (the attack time, ). The Patroller chooses a unit speed path
on and intercepts the attack (and wins) if she visits the attacked point
during the attack time interval. Solutions to the game have previously been
given in certain special cases. Here, we analyze the game on arbitrary
networks. Our results include the following: (i) a solution to the game for any
network , as long as is sufficiently short, generalizing the known
solutions for circle or Eulerian networks and the network with two nodes joined
by three arcs; (ii) a solution to the game for all tree networks that satisfy a
condition on their extremities. We present a conjecture on the solution of the
game for arbitrary trees and establish it in certain cases
Continuous patrolling games
We study a patrolling game played on a network Q, considered as a metric space. The Attacker chooses a point of Q (not necessarily a node) to attack during a chosen time interval of fixed duration. The Patroller chooses a unit speed path on Q and intercepts the attack (and wins) if she visits the attacked point during the attack time interval. This zero-sum game models the problem of protecting roads or pipelines from an adversarial attack. The payoff to the maximizing Patroller is the probability that the attack is intercepted. Our results include the following: (i) a solution to the game for any network Q, as long as the time required to carry out the attack is sufficintly short, (ii) a solution to the game for all tree networks that satisfy a certain condition on their extremities, and (iii) a solution to the game for any attack duration for stars with one long arc and the remaining arcs equal in length. We present a conjecture on the solution of the game
for arbitrary trees and establish it in certain cases
Coordinated defender strategies for border patrols
International audienceAn effective patrol of a large area can require the coordinated action of diverse security resources. In this work we formulate a Stackelberg Security game that coordinates such resources in a border patrol problem. In this security domain, resources from different precincts have to be paired to conduct patrols in the border due to logistic constraints. Given this structure the set of pure defender strategies is of exponential size. We describe the set of mixed strategies using a polynomial number of variables but exponentially many constraints that come from the matching polytope. We then include this description in a mixed integer formulation to compute the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium efficiently with a branch and cut scheme. Since the optimal patrol solution is a probability distribution over the set of exponential size, we also introduce an efficient sampling method that can be used to deploy the security resources every shift. Our computational results evaluate the efficiency of the branch and cut scheme developed and the accuracy of the sampling method. We show the applicability of the methodology by solving a real world border patrol problem
Game theoretic models of networks security
Decision making in the context of crime execution and crime prevention can be successfully investigated with the implementation of game-theoretic tools. Evolutionary and mean-field game theory allow for the consideration of a large number of interacting players organized in social and behavioural structures, which typically characterize this context. Alternatively, `traditional' game-theoretic approaches can be applied for studying the security of an arbitrary network on a two player non-cooperative game. Theoretically underpinned by these instruments, in this thesis we formulate and analyse game-theoretic models of inspection, corruption, counter- terrorism, patrolling, and similarly interpreted paradigms. Our analysis suggests optimal strategies for the involved players, and illustrates the long term behaviour of the introduced systems. Our contribution is towards the explicit formulation and the thorough analysis of real life scenaria involving the security in network structures