1,113 research outputs found
Security of Polynomial Transformations of the Diffie--Hellman Key
D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan have recently proposed an approachto proving that a reasonably small portions of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure the the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. E. Shparlinski. E. R. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the case of Diffie--Hellman keys in extensions of finite fields, when an oracle is given to compute a certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background field. Here we obtain some new results in this direction concerning the case of so-called unreliable oracles
Stream cipher based on quasigroup string transformations in
In this paper we design a stream cipher that uses the algebraic structure of
the multiplicative group \bbbz_p^* (where p is a big prime number used in
ElGamal algorithm), by defining a quasigroup of order and by doing
quasigroup string transformations. The cryptographical strength of the proposed
stream cipher is based on the fact that breaking it would be at least as hard
as solving systems of multivariate polynomial equations modulo big prime number
which is NP-hard problem and there are no known fast randomized or
deterministic algorithms for solving it. Unlikely the speed of known ciphers
that work in \bbbz_p^* for big prime numbers , the speed of this stream
cipher both in encryption and decryption phase is comparable with the fastest
symmetric-key stream ciphers.Comment: Small revisions and added reference
On the key exchange with new cubical maps based on graphs
Families of edge transitive algebraic graphs Fn(K), over the commutative ring K were used for the graph based cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a key exchange protocol defined in terms of bipartite graph An(K), n ≥ 2 with point set Pn and line set Ln isomorphic to n-dimensional free module Kn. Graphs A(n, K) are not vertex and edge transitive. There is a well defined projective limit lim A(n, K) = A(K), n → ∞ which is an infinite bipatrtite graph with point set P = lim Pn and line set L = limLn. Let K be a commutative ring contain at least 3 regular elements (not zero divisors). For each pair of (n, d), n ≥ 2, n ≥ 1 and sequence of elements α1, α2, …, α2d, such that α1, αi+αi+1, i = 1, 2, …, 2d, i = 1, 2, … 2d-1 and α2d+α1 are regular elements of the ring K. We define polynomial automorphism hn = hn (d, α1, α2, …, α2d) of variety Ln (or Pn). The existence of projective limit lim An(K) guarantees the existence of projective limit h = h(d, α1, α2, …, α2d) = lim hn, n → ∞ which is cubical automorphism of infinite dimensional varieties L (or P). We state that the order of h is an infinity. There is a constant n0 such that hn, n ≥ n0 is a cubical map. Obviously the order of hn is growing with the growth of n and the degree of polynomial map (hn)k from the Cremona group of all polynomial automorphisms of free module Kn with operation of composition is bounded by 3. Let τ be affine automorphism of Kn i.e. the element of Cremona group of degree 1. We suggest symbolic Diffie Hellman key exchange with the use of cyclic subgroup of Cremona group generated by τ-1hnτ. In the case of K = Fp, p is prime, the order of hn is the power of p. So the order is growing with the growth of p. We use computer simulation to evaluate the orders in some cases of K = Zm, where m is a composite integer.Show Reference
Post-Quantum Key Exchange Protocols
If an eavesdropper Eve is equipped with quantum computers, she can easily
break the public key exchange protocols used today. In this paper we will
discuss the post-quantum Diffie-Hellman key exchange and private key exchange
protocols.Comment: 11 pages, 2 figures. Submitted to SPIE DSS 2006; v2 citation typos
fixed; v3 appendix typos correcte
On non-abelian homomorphic public-key cryptosystems
An important problem of modern cryptography concerns secret public-key
computations in algebraic structures. We construct homomorphic cryptosystems
being (secret) epimorphisms f:G --> H, where G, H are (publically known) groups
and H is finite. A letter of a message to be encrypted is an element h element
of H, while its encryption g element of G is such that f(g)=h. A homomorphic
cryptosystem allows one to perform computations (operating in a group G) with
encrypted information (without knowing the original message over H).
In this paper certain homomorphic cryptosystems are constructed for the first
time for non-abelian groups H (earlier, homomorphic cryptosystems were known
only in the Abelian case). In fact, we present such a system for any solvable
(fixed) group H.Comment: 15 pages, LaTe
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