Enabling Secure Database as a Service using Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Challenges and Opportunities

The database community, at least for the last decade, has been grappling with querying encrypted data, which would enable secure database as a service solutions. A recent breakthrough in the cryptographic community (in 2009) related to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) showed that arbitrary computation on encrypted data is possible. Successful adoption of FHE for query processing is, however, still a distant dream, and numerous challenges have to be addressed. One challenge is how to perform algebraic query processing of encrypted data, where we produce encrypted intermediate results and operations on encrypted data can be composed. In this paper, we describe our solution for algebraic query processing of encrypted data, and also outline several other challenges that need to be addressed, while also describing the lessons that can be learnt from a decade of work by the database community in querying encrypted data

The Value of User-Visible Internet Cryptography

Cryptographic mechanisms are used in a wide range of applications, including email clients, web browsers, document and asset management systems, where typical users are not cryptography experts. A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that explicit, user-visible cryptographic mechanisms are not widely used by non-expert users, and as a result arguments have been made that cryptographic mechanisms need to be better hidden or embedded in end-user processes and tools. Other mechanisms, such as HTTPS, have cryptography built-in and only become visible to the user when a dialogue appears due to a (potential) problem. This paper surveys deployed and potential technologies in use, examines the social and legal context of broad classes of users, and from there, assesses the value and issues for those users

Deterministic, Stash-Free Write-Only ORAM

Write-Only Oblivious RAM (WoORAM) protocols provide privacy by encrypting the contents of data and also hiding the pattern of write operations over that data. WoORAMs provide better privacy than plain encryption and better performance than more general ORAM schemes (which hide both writing and reading access patterns), and the write-oblivious setting has been applied to important applications of cloud storage synchronization and encrypted hidden volumes. In this paper, we introduce an entirely new technique for Write-Only ORAM, called DetWoORAM. Unlike previous solutions, DetWoORAM uses a deterministic, sequential writing pattern without the need for any "stashing" of blocks in local state when writes fail. Our protocol, while conceptually simple, provides substantial improvement over prior solutions, both asymptotically and experimentally. In particular, under typical settings the DetWoORAM writes only 2 blocks (sequentially) to backend memory for each block written to the device, which is optimal. We have implemented our solution using the BUSE (block device in user-space) module and tested DetWoORAM against both an encryption only baseline of dm-crypt and prior, randomized WoORAM solutions, measuring only a 3x-14x slowdown compared to an encryption-only baseline and around 6x-19x speedup compared to prior work

Reliability and Security - Convergence or Divergence

Reliability, as every technical field, must adapt to the new demands imposed by reality. Started initially as a field designed to control and ensure the smooth functionality of an element or technical system, reliability has reached the stage where the discussion is about the reliability management, similar to the other top-level fields. Security has its own contribution to the reliability of a system; a reliable system is a system with reliable security. In order for a system to be reliable, that means clear and safe, all its components must be reliable. In the following pages we will talk about the two main facts - reliability and security - to determine both the convergence and the divergence points.Reliability, Security, Failure, Threat, Redundancy, Costs, Investment

Trust economics feasibility study

We believe that enterprises and other organisations currently lack sophisticated methods and tools to determine if and how IT changes should be introduced in an organisation, such that objective, measurable goals are met. This is especially true when dealing with security-related IT decisions. We report on a feasibility study, Trust Economics, conducted to demonstrate that such methodology can be developed. Assuming a deep understanding of the IT involved, the main components of our trust economics approach are: (i) assess the economic or financial impact of IT security solutions; (ii) determine how humans interact with or respond to IT security solutions; (iii) based on above, use probabilistic and stochastic modelling tools to analyse the consequences of IT security decisions. In the feasibility study we apply the trust economics methodology to address how enterprises should protect themselves against accidental or malicious misuse of USB memory sticks, an acute problem in many industries