The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th Edition

Now in its 11th edition, The Global Risks Report 2016 draws attention to ways that global risks could evolve and interact in the next decade. The year 2016 marks a forceful departure from past findings, as the risks about which the Report has been warning over the past decade are starting to manifest themselves in new, sometimes unexpected ways and harm people, institutions and economies. Warming climate is likely to raise this year's temperature to 1° Celsius above the pre-industrial era, 60 million people, equivalent to the world's 24th largest country and largest number in recent history, are forcibly displaced, and crimes in cyberspace cost the global economy an estimated US$445 billion, higher than many economies' national incomes. In this context, the Reportcalls for action to build resilience – the "resilience imperative" – and identifies practical examples of how it could be done.The Report also steps back and explores how emerging global risks and major trends, such as climate change, the rise of cyber dependence and income and wealth disparity are impacting already-strained societies by highlighting three clusters of risks as Risks in Focus. As resilience building is helped by the ability to analyse global risks from the perspective of specific stakeholders, the Report also analyses the significance of global risks to the business community at a regional and country-level

Secured Transactions and Financial Stability: Regulatory Challenges

Although secured transactions traditionally are regulated to protect transacting parties and to make the transactions themselves more efficient, the financial crisis has revealed that regulation should also protect the stability of the financial system. This raises numerous future challenges. For example, regulation to control moral hazard in secured loan origination faces the challenge that the relevant market failure is less likely to be asymmetric information than mutual misinformation. Because of its impact on home ownership, the regulation of collateralization levels and interconnectedness faces fundamentally different challenges than those underlying the (technically) analogous post-Depression regulation of margin lending. Non-traditional secured transactions, including securitization and other forms of structured finance, raise innovative regulatory challenges concerning complexity and the limits of disclosure. The potential for the widening gap between the rich and the poor to undermine stability also raises the challenge (which is itself partly informed by the UCC’s innovative disentanglement of commercial and property law) of whether to recognize de facto rights, in order to enable the poor to use their homes and other commonly held assets as collateral to raise capital

How do Financial Institutions in China Mitigate Risks in Securitization Markets?

Asset securitization as the essential financial tool has increased the liquidity of underlying assets and promoted rapid economic development. In 2008, the outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis that brought by the collapse of securitization triggered the U.S. securitization market to realize the risks involved in structured financial products, and thus facilitated the development of risk controlling tools. Through the analysis of securitization process, drivers, and credit rating agencies, the study concentrates on the formation of risks and modeling evaluation with evidence in both China and the U.S. markets. Statistical analysis was conducted on Chinese securitized products combining with risk management models built in the U.S. market. The results not only show risk evaluation tools that could improve the market maturity but also reveals the lack of information disclosure in China with the limited access to historical data. The paper attempts to address policy recommendations on mitigating potential risks and promoting financial developments in the China securitization market

Patent collateral, investor commitment, and the market for venture lending

This paper investigates the market for lending to technology startups (i.e., venture lending) and examines two mechanisms that may facilitate trade within it: (1) the ‘salability’ of patent collateral; and (2) the credible commitment of existing equity investors. We find that intensified trading in the secondary patent market is strongly related to the annual rate of startup lending, particularly for startups with more redeployable patent assets. Moreover, we show that the credibility of venture capitalist commitments to reinvest in their startups’ next round of financing can be critical for startup debt provision. Utilizing the crash of 2000 as a severe and unexpected capital supply shock for VCs, we show that lenders continue to finance startups with recently funded investors better able to credibly commit to refinance their portfolio companies, but withdraw from otherwise-promising projects that may have needed their funds the most. The findings are consistent with predictions of incomplete contracting and financial intermediation theory.Accepted manuscrip

Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield and Engel

User trust is an essential resource for the information economy. Without it, users would not provide their personal information and digital businesses could not operate. Digital companies do not protect this trust sufficiently. Instead, many take advantage of it for short-term gain. They act in ways that, over time, will undermine user trust. In so doing, they act against their own best interest. This Article shows that companies behave this way because they face a tragedy of the commons. When a company takes advantage of user trust for profit, it appropriates the full benefit of this action. However, it shares the cost with all other companies that rely on the wellspring of user trust. Each company, acting rationally, has an incentive to appropriate as much of the trust resource as it can. That is why such companies collect, analyze, and “monetize” our personal information in such an unrestrained way. This behavior poses a longer term risk. User trust is like a fishery. It can withstand a certain level of exploitation and renew itself. But over-exploitation can cause it to collapse. Were digital companies collectively to undermine user trust this would not only hurt the users, it would damage the companies themselves. This Article explores commons-management theory for potential solutions to this impending tragedy of the trust commons