33,671 research outputs found
XONN: XNOR-based Oblivious Deep Neural Network Inference
Advancements in deep learning enable cloud servers to provide
inference-as-a-service for clients. In this scenario, clients send their raw
data to the server to run the deep learning model and send back the results.
One standing challenge in this setting is to ensure the privacy of the clients'
sensitive data. Oblivious inference is the task of running the neural network
on the client's input without disclosing the input or the result to the server.
This paper introduces XONN, a novel end-to-end framework based on Yao's Garbled
Circuits (GC) protocol, that provides a paradigm shift in the conceptual and
practical realization of oblivious inference. In XONN, the costly
matrix-multiplication operations of the deep learning model are replaced with
XNOR operations that are essentially free in GC. We further provide a novel
algorithm that customizes the neural network such that the runtime of the GC
protocol is minimized without sacrificing the inference accuracy.
We design a user-friendly high-level API for XONN, allowing expression of the
deep learning model architecture in an unprecedented level of abstraction.
Extensive proof-of-concept evaluation on various neural network architectures
demonstrates that XONN outperforms prior art such as Gazelle (USENIX
Security'18) by up to 7x, MiniONN (ACM CCS'17) by 93x, and SecureML (IEEE
S&P'17) by 37x. State-of-the-art frameworks require one round of interaction
between the client and the server for each layer of the neural network,
whereas, XONN requires a constant round of interactions for any number of
layers in the model. XONN is first to perform oblivious inference on Fitnet
architectures with up to 21 layers, suggesting a new level of scalability
compared with state-of-the-art. Moreover, we evaluate XONN on four datasets to
perform privacy-preserving medical diagnosis.Comment: To appear in USENIX Security 201
Hyp3rArmor: reducing web application exposure to automated attacks
Web applications (webapps) are subjected constantly to automated, opportunistic attacks from autonomous robots (bots) engaged in reconnaissance to discover victims that may be vulnerable to specific exploits. This is a typical behavior found in botnet recruitment, worm propagation, largescale fingerprinting and vulnerability scanners. Most anti-bot techniques are deployed at the application layer, thus leaving the network stack of the webapp’s server exposed. In this paper we present a mechanism called Hyp3rArmor, that addresses this vulnerability by minimizing the webapp’s attack surface exposed to automated opportunistic attackers, for JavaScriptenabled web browser clients. Our solution uses port knocking to eliminate the webapp’s visible network footprint. Clients of the webapp are directed to a visible static web server to obtain JavaScript that authenticates the client to the webapp server (using port knocking) before making any requests to the webapp. Our implementation of Hyp3rArmor, which is compatible with all webapp architectures, has been deployed and used to defend single and multi-page websites on the Internet for 114 days. During this time period the static web server observed 964 attempted attacks that were deflected from the webapp, which was only accessed by authenticated clients. Our evaluation shows that in most cases client-side overheads were negligible and that server-side overheads were minimal. Hyp3rArmor is ideal for critical systems and legacy applications that must be accessible on the Internet. Additionally Hyp3rArmor is composable with other security tools, adding an additional layer to a defense in depth approach.This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) awards #1430145, #1414119, and #1012798
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