7,094 research outputs found
A trust-driven privacy architecture for vehicular ad-hoc networks
Vehicular Ad-Hoc NETworks (VANETs) are an emerging technology which aims to improve road safety by preventing and reducing traffic accidents. While VANETs offer a great variety of promising applications, such as, safety-related and infotainment applications, they remain a number of security and privacy related research challenges that must be addressed.
A common approach to security issues widely adopted in VANETs is the use of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and digital certificates in order to enable authentication, authorization and confidentiality. These approaches usually rely on a large set of regional Certification Authorities (CAs). Despite the advantages of PKI-based approaches, there are two main problems that arise, i) the secure interoperability among the different and usually unknown- issuing CAs, and ii) the sole use of PKI in a VANET environment cannot prevent privacy related attacks, such as, linking a vehicle with an identifier, tracking vehicles ¿big brother scenario" and user profiling. Additionally, since vehicles in VANETs will be able to store great amounts of information including private information, unauthorized access to such information should be carefully considered. This thesis addresses authentication and interoperability issues in vehicular communications, considering an inter-regional scenario where mutual authentication between nodes is needed. To provide interoperability between vehicles and services among different domains, an Inter-domain Authentication System (AS) is proposed. The AS supplies vehicles with a trusted set of authentication credentials by implementing a near real-time certificate status service. The proposed AS also implements a mechanism to quantitatively evaluate the trust level of a CA, in order to decide on-the-y if an interoperability relationship can be created. This research work also contributes with a Privacy Enhancing Model (PEM) to deal with important privacy issues in VANETs. The PEM consists of two PKI-based privacy protocols: i) the Attribute-Based Privacy (ABP) protocol, and ii) the Anonymous Information Retrieval (AIR) protocol. The ABP introduces Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) to provide conditional anonymity and minimal information disclosure, which overcome with the privacy issues related to linkability (linking a vehicle with an identifier) and vehicle tracking (big brother scenario). The AIR protocol addresses user profiling when querying Service Providers (SPs), by relying in a user collaboration privacy protocol based on query forgery and permutation; and assuming that neither participant nodes nor SPs could be completely trusted.
Finally, the Trust Validation Model (TVM) is proposed. The TVM supports decision making by evaluating entities trust based on context information, in order to provide i) access control to driver and vehicle's private information, and ii) public information trust validation
Emerging privacy challenges and approaches in CAV systems
The growth of Internet-connected devices, Internet-enabled services and Internet of Things systems continues at a rapid pace, and their application to transport systems is heralded as game-changing. Numerous developing CAV (Connected and Autonomous Vehicle) functions, such as traffic planning, optimisation, management, safety-critical and cooperative autonomous driving applications, rely on data from various sources. The efficacy of these functions is highly dependent on the dimensionality, amount and accuracy of the data being shared. It holds, in general, that the greater the amount of data available, the greater the efficacy of the function. However, much of this data is privacy-sensitive, including personal, commercial and research data. Location data and its correlation with identity and temporal data can help infer other personal information, such as home/work locations, age, job, behavioural features, habits, social relationships. This work categorises the emerging privacy challenges and solutions for CAV systems and identifies the knowledge gap for future research, which will minimise and mitigate privacy concerns without hampering the efficacy of the functions
Evaluating On-demand Pseudonym Acquisition Policies in Vehicular Communication Systems
Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a consensus towards
using a special-purpose Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcoming
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. However, there are still several
technical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an important yet open
challenge is the acquisition of shortterm credentials, pseudonym: how should
each vehicle interact with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long?
Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime? Answering these
questions is far from trivial. Each choice can affect both the user privacy and
the system performance and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper,
we make a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted question. We
craft three generally applicable policies and experimentally evaluate the VPKI
system performance, leveraging two large-scale mobility datasets. We consider
the most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisition policies; we
find that within this class of policies, the most promising policy in terms of
privacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in all
cases, this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that the
state-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with modest computing
resources.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figures, IoV-VoI'1
Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Implementation, Performance, and Research Challenges
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the verge of practical
deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the
problems that have been addressed only recently. In order to show the
feasibility of secure VC, certain implementations are required. In [1] we
discuss the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the
European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss various issues
related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems.
Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues that will
arise as VC systems develop from today's simple prototypes to full-fledged
systems
Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols
Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of
security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both
security and privacy. Typically, the security analysis of these proposals has
largely been informal. However, formal analysis can be used to expose flaws and
ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols.
This paper focusses on the formal analysis of a particular element of
security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals: the revocation of
malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their
credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for
vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their
pseudonyms. The REWIRE scheme by Forster et al. and its subschemes BASIC and
RTOKEN aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and
trusted hardware.
Formal analysis using the TAMARIN prover identifies two flaws with some of
the functional correctness and authentication properties in these schemes. We
then propose Obscure Token (OTOKEN), an extension of REWIRE to enable
revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the
functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair,
which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of
vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover OTOKEN is the first
V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a formal model.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figure
MARINE: Man-in-the-middle attack resistant trust model IN connEcted vehicles
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET), a novel technology holds a paramount importance within the transportation domain due to its abilities to increase traffic efficiency and safety. Connected vehicles propagate sensitive information which must be shared with the neighbors in a secure environment. However, VANET may also include dishonest nodes such as Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attackers aiming to distribute and share malicious content with the vehicles, thus polluting the network with compromised information. In this regard, establishing trust among connected vehicles can increase security as every participating vehicle will generate and propagate authentic, accurate and trusted content within the network. In this paper, we propose a novel trust model, namely, Man-in-the-middle Attack Resistance trust model IN connEcted vehicles (MARINE), which identifies dishonest nodes performing MiTM attacks in an efficient way as well as revokes their credentials. Every node running MARINE system first establishes trust for the sender by performing multi-dimensional plausibility checks. Once the receiver verifies the trustworthiness of the sender, the received data is then evaluated both directly and indirectly. Extensive simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance and accuracy of MARINE rigorously across three MiTM attacker models and the bench-marked trust model. Simulation results show that for a network containing 35% MiTM attackers, MARINE outperforms the state of the art trust model by 15%, 18%, and 17% improvements in precision, recall and F-score, respectively.N/A
Security Analysis of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET)
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) has mostly gained the attention of today's
research efforts, while current solutions to achieve secure VANET, to protect
the network from adversary and attacks still not enough, trying to reach a
satisfactory level, for the driver and manufacturer to achieve safety of life
and infotainment. The need for a robust VANET networks is strongly dependent on
their security and privacy features, which will be discussed in this paper. In
this paper a various types of security problems and challenges of VANET been
analyzed and discussed; we also discuss a set of solutions presented to solve
these challenges and problems.Comment: 6 pages; 2010 Second International Conference on Network
Applications, Protocols and Service
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