Keyword-Based Delegable Proofs of Storage

Cloud users (clients) with limited storage capacity at their end can outsource bulk data to the cloud storage server. A client can later access her data by downloading the required data files. However, a large fraction of the data files the client outsources to the server is often archival in nature that the client uses for backup purposes and accesses less frequently. An untrusted server can thus delete some of these archival data files in order to save some space (and allocate the same to other clients) without being detected by the client (data owner). Proofs of storage enable the client to audit her data files uploaded to the server in order to ensure the integrity of those files. In this work, we introduce one type of (selective) proofs of storage that we call keyword-based delegable proofs of storage, where the client wants to audit all her data files containing a specific keyword (e.g., "important"). Moreover, it satisfies the notion of public verifiability where the client can delegate the auditing task to a third-party auditor who audits the set of files corresponding to the keyword on behalf of the client. We formally define the security of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol. We construct such a protocol based on an existing proof-of-storage scheme and analyze the security of our protocol. We argue that the techniques we use can be applied atop any existing publicly verifiable proof-of-storage scheme for static data. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of our construction.Comment: A preliminary version of this work has been published in International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2018

A Secure and Verifiable Computation for k-Nearest Neighbor Queries in Cloud

The popularity of cloud computing has increased significantly in the last few years due to scalability, cost efficiency, resiliency, and quality of service. Organizations are more interested in outsourcing the database and DBMS functionalities to the cloud owing to the tremendous growth of big data and on-demand access requirements. As the data is outsourced to untrusted parties, security has become a key consideration to achieve the confidentiality and integrity of data. Therefore, data owners must transform and encrypt the data before outsourcing. In this paper, we focus on a Secure and Verifiable Computation for k-Nearest Neighbor (SVC-kNN) problem. The existing verifiable computation approaches for the kNN problem delegate the verification task solely to a single semi-trusted party. We show that these approaches are unreliable in terms of security, as the verification server could be either dishonest or compromised. To address these issues, we propose a novel solution to the SVC-kNN problem that utilizes the random-splitting approach in conjunction with the homomorphic properties under a two-cloud model. Specifically, the clouds generate and send verification proofs to end-users, allowing them to verify the computation results efficiently. Our solution is highly efficient from the data owner and query issuers’ perspective as it significantly reduces the encryption cost and pre-processing time. Furthermore, we demonstrated the correctness of our solution using Proof by Induction methodology to prove the Euclidean Distance Verification

Preserving Both Privacy and Utility in Network Trace Anonymization

As network security monitoring grows more sophisticated, there is an increasing need for outsourcing such tasks to third-party analysts. However, organizations are usually reluctant to share their network traces due to privacy concerns over sensitive information, e.g., network and system configuration, which may potentially be exploited for attacks. In cases where data owners are convinced to share their network traces, the data are typically subjected to certain anonymization techniques, e.g., CryptoPAn, which replaces real IP addresses with prefix-preserving pseudonyms. However, most such techniques either are vulnerable to adversaries with prior knowledge about some network flows in the traces, or require heavy data sanitization or perturbation, both of which may result in a significant loss of data utility. In this paper, we aim to preserve both privacy and utility through shifting the trade-off from between privacy and utility to between privacy and computational cost. The key idea is for the analysts to generate and analyze multiple anonymized views of the original network traces; those views are designed to be sufficiently indistinguishable even to adversaries armed with prior knowledge, which preserves the privacy, whereas one of the views will yield true analysis results privately retrieved by the data owner, which preserves the utility. We present the general approach and instantiate it based on CryptoPAn. We formally analyze the privacy of our solution and experimentally evaluate it using real network traces provided by a major ISP. The results show that our approach can significantly reduce the level of information leakage (e.g., less than 1\% of the information leaked by CryptoPAn) with comparable utility