Data Integrity Protection For Security in Industrial Networks

Modern industrial systems are increasingly based on computer networks. Network- based control systems connect the devices at the field level of industrial environments together and to the devices at the upper levels for monitoring, configuration and management purposes. Contrary to traditional industrial networks which axe con­ sidered stand-alone and proprietary networks, modern industrial networks are highly connected systems which use open protocols and standards at different levels. This new structure of industrial systems has made them vulnerable to security attacks. Among various security needs of computer networks, data integrity protection is the major issue in industrial networks. Any unauthorized modification of information during transmission could result in significant damages in industrial environments. In this thesis, the security needs of industrial environments are considered first. The need for security in industrial systems, challenges of security in these systems and security status of protocols used in industrial networks are presented. Furthermore, the hardware implementation of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) which is used in security protocols for data integrity protection is the main focus of this thesis. A scheme has been proposed for the implementation of the SHA-1 and SHA-512 hash functions on FPGAs with fault detection capability. The proposed scheme is based on time redundancy and pipelining and is capable of detecting permanent as well as transient faults. The implementation results of the proposed scheme on Xilinx FPGAs show small area and timing overhead compared to the original implementation without fault detection. Moreover, the implementation of SHA-1 and SHA-512 on Wireless Sensor Boards has been presented taking into account their memory usage and execution time. There is an improvement in the execution time of the proposed implementation compared to the previous works

A Novel Approach to Determining Real-Time Risk Probabilities in Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems

Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems are substantially different from their more common and ubiquitous information technology system counterparts. Industrial control systems, such as distributed control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are used for controlling the power grid, were not originally designed with security in mind. Geographically dispersed distribution, an unfortunate reliance on legacy systems and stringent availability requirements raise significant cybersecurity concerns regarding electric reliability while constricting the feasibility of many security controls. Recent North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards heavily emphasize cybersecurity concerns and specifically require entities to categorize and identify their Bulk Electric System cyber systems; and, have periodic vulnerability assessments performed on those systems. These concerns have produced an increase in the need for more Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems specific cybersecurity research. Industry stakeholders have embraced the development of a large-scale test environment through the Department of Energy’s National Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Test-bed program; however, few individuals have access to this program. This research developed a physical industrial control system test-bed on a smaller-scale that provided an environment for modeling a simulated critical infrastructure sector performing a set of automated processes for the purpose of exploring solutions and studying concepts related to compromising control systems by way of process-tampering through code exploitation, as well as, the ability to passively and subsequently identify any risks resulting from such an event. Relative to the specific step being performed within a production cycle, at a moment in time when sensory data samples were captured and analyzed, it was possible to determine the probability of a real-time risk to a mock Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System by comparing the sample values to those derived from a previously established baseline. This research achieved such a goal by implementing a passive, spatial and task-based segregated sensor network, running in parallel to the active control system process for monitoring and detecting risk, and effectively identified a real-time risk probability within a Critical Infrastructure Industrial Control System Test-bed. The practicality of this research ranges from determining on-demand real-time risk probabilities during an automated process, to employing baseline monitoring techniques for discovering systems, or components thereof, exploited along the supply chain

A Review of Testbeds on SCADA Systems with Malware Analysis

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are among the major types of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and are responsible for monitoring and controlling essential infrastructures such as power generation, water treatment, and transportation. Very common and with high added-value, these systems have malware as one of their main threats, and due to their characteristics, it is practically impossible to test the security of a system without compromising it, requiring simulated test platforms to verify their cyber resilience. This review will discuss the most recent studies on ICS testbeds with a focus on cybersecurity and malware impact analysis

LICSTER -- A Low-cost ICS Security Testbed for Education and Research

Unnoticed by most people, Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) control entire productions and critical infrastructures such as water distribution, smart grid and automotive manufacturing. Due to the ongoing digitalization, these systems are becoming more and more connected in order to enable remote control and monitoring. However, this shift bears significant risks, namely a larger attack surface, which can be exploited by attackers. In order to make these systems more secure, it takes research, which is, however, difficult to conduct on productive systems, since these often have to operate twenty-four-seven. Testbeds are mostly very expensive or based on simulation with no real-world physical process. In this paper, we introduce LICSTER, an open-source low-cost ICS testbed, which enables researchers and students to get hands-on experience with industrial security for about 500 Euro. We provide all necessary material to quickly start ICS hacking, with the focus on low-cost and open-source for education and research