Freedom of expression, the media and journalists : case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

This e-book (also available in a printed version) offers a structured insight into the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms has been a widely appreciated. It is presented as a vade mecum on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The target group includes lawyers, judges, law- and policy-makers, civil society actors, journalists and other media actors, academics, students, and indeed everyone with an interest in its subject matter. This revised edition contains summaries of over 315 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court’s online case-law database). It can be read in various ways: for initial orientation in the steadily growing Article 10 case-law; for refreshing one’s knowledge of that case-law; for quick reference and checking, as well as for substantive research. The structure of the e-book is as follows: 1. Table of cases: an overview of all the cases summarised, including bibliographic data, keywords, hyperlinks to the individual summaries and hyperlinks to the full texts of the judgments or decisions. 2. Introduction by Dirk Voorhoof to trends and developments in the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the period 1994-2019. 3. Compilation of case-law summaries. 4. Appendices

Pediatric Patients with Diabetes Transition to Adult Care

The purpose of this study was to identify the optimal age to target transition to adult care education for adolescent and young adults (AYA) with Type 1 and Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (DM) as they transition from pediatric endocrinology providers to adult DM providers. A secondary purpose of this study was to identify if there was a relationship between attendance rate, age, gender, years diagnosed with DM, ethnicity, insurance type, Type of DM, and current county of residence with control of diabetes, measured by glycosylated hemoglobin (HgbA1c). A quantitative study through chart audits was conducted at Valley Children’s Healthcare, VCH, pediatric endocrinology practice, in Madera, California. Patients with the diagnosis of Type 1 or Type 2 DM born been 1997-1999, aged eighteen to twenty-one years old seen for at least one provider visit in 2017, were audited. The data was analyzed for Chi-Square Test of Independence to identify if attendance rate to appointments between 2014-2017 has a relationship to patients year of birth and to determine if the average HgbA1c in 2017 has a relationship to patient demographics. The research instrument was an excel work sheet used to analyze collected data. Data was collected by manual chart audits and analyzed with SPSS soft wear. Current literature lacks conclusive data of when transition to adult care skills should be taught to AYAs with DM and how it impacts diabetic control in adolescents and young adults with DM. In addition, unique factors that have not been previously studied in the population seen at VCH are that eighty percent of patients have Medi-Cal California Children Services insurance indicating the majority of the population lives below the federal poverty level; the practice is a regional center for over twelve counties in California; and sixty-five percent of children in this region are from Hispanic origin

FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998

This manual defines and describes the technical intelligence mission. It names the key technical intelligence organizations involved at the national level and their interrelationships and responsibilities. The manual describes in detail the technical intelligence organizations and operations in a US command in the field. It discusses at length the responsibilities on the key staff sections in the command. It has extensive appendices explaining forms and procedures used by forces in the field. It has an excellent list of acronyms and glossary. Comment by the depositor A clear understanding of the evolution of technical intelligence may not be needed by the intended audience of this manual, and as far as I know, no comprehensive history exists. However, supposed historical facts included in an official manual ought to be true. This manual fails in that respect. For example, this paragraph on Page 1-5 is utter nonsense: Following the Korean War, the United States did not disband its TECHINT capability completely, as had been done at the conclusion of all previous hostilities. But neither did we maintain it at its wartime level. Three small TECHINT detachments remained in place at the Army\u27s research and development centers. By 1962 two of the detachments merged to form the Army\u27s Foreign Science and Technology Center. The third detachment established the Missile Intelligence Agency at Redstone Arsenal. The Surgeon General also operated a Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, MD. At the end of World War II, technical intelligence staffs remained in the offices of the heads of the seven Army Technical Services. Between then and the creation of the Army Foreign Science and Technical Center, many of those staffs were converted into special purpose intelligence agencies as is documented by DA General Orders. The first such agency, the Signal Corps Intelligence Agency was established at Washington, DC, according to Sec. IV, DA GO 39, 18 Aug 49, before the beginning of the Korean War. Paragraph VIII of DA GO 57, 1962, established the Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and transferred the functions, personnel, records, and equipment of the Chemical Corps, Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps, and Quartermaster intelligence agencies to it. In addition Corps of Engineer technical intelligence activities which had been housed in the Army Map Service were transferred to it. The intelligence section in the office of the commanding general of the Army Missile Command was not recognized as an official intelligence production agency until much later in the 1960s. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency, which was not at Ft Detrick, was not affected by the reorganization of the Army intelligence activities outlined in Department of the Army Reorganization Planning Directive 381-2, 18 May 1962, which is available in the UNL Digital Commons at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usarmyresearch/169/ In fact, the intelligence organization which was formed in the Office of the Surgeon General went through a complicated series of reorganizations before it became the National Center for Medical Intelligence at Ft Detrick. Robert L Bolin, Associate Professor Emeritus, UNL Librarie

Special Libraries, February 1957

Volume 48, Issue 2https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1957/1001/thumbnail.jp

Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict

A Re-evaluation of the Revisionist - Status Quo Dichotomy in Interwar Turkish Foreign Policy, 1936-1939

Turkish history during the interwar period (1918-1939) has been described in terms which place it on a dichotomy best used to analyse the actions of the eventual belligerents in World War II. This dichotomy describes the eventual defeated Axis countries as revisionist and the victorious Allies as status quo nations in the interwar period. The contention is that this distinction, taking as its basis the actions of belligerents, is unhelpful in analysing the foreign policy of a non-belligerent state in WWII.Three case studies are examined through the secondary literature as well as archival sources to show that notions of Turkey as either status quo or revisionist are not entirely accurate. This is because Turkish foreign policy can be classified as either or both, thus diminishing the terms’ explanatory utility. Three case studies are; the Montreux Straits Convention (1936), the Saadabad Pact (1937) and the Sanjak dispute of Alexandretta (1936-39). A reading of history which assumes macro level (1914-1945) superiority based on Great Power interests and actions undermines the complexity of Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s. By extension, the practice of subsuming the actions of smaller states under terminology which was intended for Great Powers is challenged.