71 research outputs found
Information-Theoretic Timed-Release Security: Key-Agreement, Encryption, and Authentication Codes
In this paper, we study timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. As fundamental cryptographic primitives with information-theoretic security, we can consider key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes. Therefore, in this paper we deal with information-theoretic timed-release security for all those primitives.
Specifically, we propose models and formalizations of security for information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes; we also derive tight lower bounds on entities\u27 memory-sizes required for all those ones; and we show optimal constructions of all those ones. Furthermore, we investigate a relationship of mechanisms between information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement and information-theoretic key-insulated key-agreement. It turns out that there exists a simple algorithm which converts the former into the latter, and vice versa. In the sense, we conclude that these two mechanisms are essentially close
Π’Π΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎ-ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ Π²Π°ΡΠ°
The most difficult task of secure telecommunication systems using symmetric encryption, due to the need for preliminary and resource-intensive organization of secret channels for delivering keys to network correspondents, is key management. An alternative is the generating keys methods through open communication channels. In information theory, it is shown that these methods are implemented under the condition that the channel information rate of correspondents exceeds the rate of the intruder interception channel. The search for methods that provide the informational advantage of correspondents is being updated. The goal is to determine the information-theoretical conditions for the formation of a virtual network and an interception channel, for which the best ratio of information speeds for correspondents is provided compared to the ratio of the original network and interception channel. The paper proposes an information transfer model that includes a connectivity model and an information transfer method for asymptotic lengths of code words. The model includes three correspondents and is characterized by the introduction of an ideal broadcast channel in addition to an errored broadcast channel. The model introduces a source of "noisy" information, which is transmitted over the channel with errors, so the transmission of code words using the known method of random coding is carried out over the channel without errors. For asymptotic lengths of code words, all actions of correspondents in processing and transmitting information in the model are reduced to the proposed method of transmitting information. The use of the method by correspondents within the framework of the transmission model makes it possible to simultaneously form for them a new virtual broadcast channel with information rate as in the original channel with errors, and for the intruder a new virtual broadcast interception channel with a rate lower than the information rate of the initial interception channel. The information-theoretic conditions for deterioration of the interception channel are proved in the statement. The practical significance of the results obtained lies in the possibility of using the latter to assess the information efficiency of open network key formation in the proposed information transfer model, as well as in the development of well-known scientific achievements of open key agreement. The proposed transmission model can be useful for researching key management systems and protecting information transmitted over open channels. Further research is related to the information-theoretic assessment of the network key throughput, which is the potential information-theoretic speed of network key formation.Π‘Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ½Π΅ΠΉΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ, ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΠΈΠΌΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅, Π² ΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ Ρ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ±Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π²Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΌΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΎΡΠ³Π°Π½ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ² Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°Π²ΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΡΠΌ ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ°ΠΌ, ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ. ΠΠ»ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Π²ΡΡΡΡΠΏΠ°ΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΡΠΌ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π°ΠΌ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ. Π ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π½ΠΎ, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΡΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² Π½Π°Π΄ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ° Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»Ρ. ΠΠΊΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠΈΡΠΊ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ², ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΈΠΌΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ². Π¦Π΅Π»Ρ Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎ-ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ°, Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ
ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π»ΡΡΡΠ΅Π΅ Ρ ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΡΠ°Π²Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Ρ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ°. Π ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, Π²ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π°ΡΠΈΠΌΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π΄Π»ΠΈΠ½ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ². ΠΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ Π²ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Ρ
ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π²Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° Π² Π΄ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Ρ Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ±ΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ. Π ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π²Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊ Β«Π·Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ»ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΉΒ» ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠ°Ρ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Ρ Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ±ΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ, ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ² Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Π° ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΠΉΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Ρ Π±Π΅Π· ΠΎΡΠΈΠ±ΠΎΠΊ. ΠΠ»Ρ Π°ΡΠΈΠΌΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π΄Π»ΠΈΠ½ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ² Π²ΡΠ΅ Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π² ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½Ρ Π² ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΠΌΡΠΉ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ. ΠΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ Π΄Π»Ρ Π½ΠΈΡ
Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΉ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π» Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈ Π² ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ½Π°ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π΅ Ρ ΠΎΡΠΈΠ±ΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ, Π° Π΄Π»Ρ Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»Ρ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΉ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΉ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π» ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ° ΡΠΎ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ½Π°ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ°. Π’Π΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎ-ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡ ΡΡ
ΡΠ΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π²Π°ΡΠ° Π΄ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΡΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ. ΠΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠ°Ρ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΎΠ² Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΡ
Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π² ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π² ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π½Π°ΡΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΠΌΠ°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ Π±ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π΅Π·Π½ΠΎΠΉ Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ ΠΈ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Π°Π²Π°Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΎΡΠΊΡΡΡΡΠΌ ΠΊΠ°Π½Π°Π»Π°ΠΌ. ΠΠ°Π»ΡΠ½Π΅ΠΉΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²ΡΠ·Π°Π½Ρ Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎ-ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΡΡΠΊΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠΎ-ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°
Simultaneous Secrecy and Reliability Amplification for a General Channel Model
We present a general notion of channel for cryptographic purposes, which can model either a (classical) physical channel or the consequences of a cryptographic protocol, or any hybrid. We consider {\em simultaneous secrecy and reliability amplification} for such channels. We show that simultaneous secrecy and reliability amplification is not possible for the most general model of channel, but, at least for some values of the parameters, it is possible for a restricted class of channels that still includes both standard information-theoretic channels and keyless cryptographic protocols.
Even in the restricted model, we require that for the original channel, the failure chance for the attacker must be a factor more than that for the intended receiver. We show that for any , there is a one-way protocol (where the sender sends information to the receiver only) which achieves simultaneous secrecy and reliability. From results of Holenstein and Renner (\emph{CRYPTO\u2705}), there are no such one-way protocols for , there are two-way protocols that achieve simultaneous secrecy and reliability.
We propose using similar models to address other questions in the theory of cryptography, such as using noisy channels for secret agreement, trade-offs between reliability and secrecy, and the equivalence of various notions of oblivious channels and secure computation
Distributed Source Coding with Encryption Using Correlated Keys
We pose and investigate the distributed secure source coding based on the
common key cryptosystem. This cryptosystem includes the secrecy amplification
problem for distributed encrypted sources with correlated keys using
post-encryption-compression, which was posed investigated by Santoso and
Oohama. In this paper we propose another new security criterion which is
generally more strict compared to the commonly used security criterion which is
based on the upper-bound of mutual information between the plaintext and the
ciphertext. Under this criterion, we establish the necessary and sufficient
condition for the secure transmission of correlated sources.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figure. The short version was submitted to ISIT 2021. We
have some typos in the short version. Those are fixed in this version. arXiv
admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1801.0492
A Reflection on the Security of Two-Party Key Establishment Protocols
Two-party key establishment has been a very fruitful research area
in cryptography, with many security models and numerous protocols
proposed. In this paper, we take another look at the YAK protocol
and the HMQV protocols and present some extended analysis. Motivated
by our analysis, we reflect on the security properties that are
desired by two-party key establishment protocols, and their
formalizations. In particular, we take into account the interface
between a key establishment protocol and the applications which may
invoke it, and emphasize the concept of session and the usage
of session identifier. Moreover, we show how to design a
two-party key establishment protocol to achieve both key
authentication and entity authentication properties in our security
model
FRAMEWORK FOR ANONYMIZED COVERT COMMUNICATIONS: A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PROOF-OF-CONCEPT
In this dissertation, we present an information hiding approach incorporating anonymity that builds on existing classical steganographic models. Current security definitions are not sufficient to analyze the proposed information hiding approach as steganography offers data privacy by hiding the existence of data, a property that is distinct from confidentiality (data existence is known but access is restricted) and authenticity (data existence is known but manipulation is restricted). Combinations of the latter two properties are common in analyses, such as Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), yet there is a lack of research on combinations with steganography. This dissertation also introduces the security definition of Authenticated Stegotext with Associated Data (ASAD), which captures steganographic properties even when there is contextual information provided alongside the hidden data. We develop a hierarchical framework of ASAD variants, corresponding to different channel demands. We present a real-world steganographic embedding scheme, Authenticated SteGotex with Associated tRansaction Data (ASGARD), that leverages a blockchain-based application as a medium for sending hidden data. We analyze ASGARD in our framework and show that it meets Level-4 ASAD security. Finally, we implement ASGARD on the Ethereum platform as a proof-of-concept and analyze some of the ways an adversary might detect our embedding activity by analyzing historical Ethereum data.Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited
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