132 research outputs found

    HMOG: New Behavioral Biometric Features for Continuous Authentication of Smartphone Users

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    We introduce hand movement, orientation, and grasp (HMOG), a set of behavioral features to continuously authenticate smartphone users. HMOG features unobtrusively capture subtle micro-movement and orientation dynamics resulting from how a user grasps, holds, and taps on the smartphone. We evaluated authentication and biometric key generation (BKG) performance of HMOG features on data collected from 100 subjects typing on a virtual keyboard. Data were collected under two conditions: 1) sitting and 2) walking. We achieved authentication equal error rates (EERs) as low as 7.16% (walking) and 10.05% (sitting) when we combined HMOG, tap, and keystroke features. We performed experiments to investigate why HMOG features perform well during walking. Our results suggest that this is due to the ability of HMOG features to capture distinctive body movements caused by walking, in addition to the hand-movement dynamics from taps. With BKG, we achieved the EERs of 15.1% using HMOG combined with taps. In comparison, BKG using tap, key hold, and swipe features had EERs between 25.7% and 34.2%. We also analyzed the energy consumption of HMOG feature extraction and computation. Our analysis shows that HMOG features extracted at a 16-Hz sensor sampling rate incurred a minor overhead of 7.9% without sacrificing authentication accuracy. Two points distinguish our work from current literature: 1) we present the results of a comprehensive evaluation of three types of features (HMOG, keystroke, and tap) and their combinations under the same experimental conditions and 2) we analyze the features from three perspectives (authentication, BKG, and energy consumption on smartphones)

    Accelerometer-Based Key Generation and Distribution Method for Wearable IoT Devices

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    Secure and Privacy Enhanced Gait Authentication on Smart Phone

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    Smart environments established by the development of mobile technology have brought vast benefits to human being. However, authentication mechanisms on portable smart devices, particularly conventional biometric based approaches, still remain security and privacy concerns. These traditional systems are mostly based on pattern recognition and machine learning algorithms, wherein original biometric templates or extracted features are stored under unconcealed form for performing matching with a new biometric sample in the authentication phase. In this paper, we propose a novel gait based authentication using biometric cryptosystem to enhance the system security and user privacy on the smart phone. Extracted gait features are merely used to biometrically encrypt a cryptographic key which is acted as the authentication factor. Gait signals are acquired by using an inertial sensor named accelerometer in the mobile device and error correcting codes are adopted to deal with the natural variation of gait measurements. We evaluate our proposed system on a dataset consisting of gait samples of 34 volunteers. We achieved the lowest false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) of 3.92% and 11.76%, respectively, in terms of key length of 50 bits

    Privacy in Biometric Systems

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    Biometrics are physiological and/or behavioral characteristics of a person that have been used to provide an automatic proof of identity in a growing list of applications including crime/terrorism fighting, forensics, access and border control, securing e-/m-commerce transactions and service entitlements. In recent years, a great deal of research into a variety of new and traditional biometrics has widened the scope of investigations beyond improving accuracy into mechanisms that deal with serious concerns raised about the potential misuse of collected biometric data. Despite the long list of biometrics’ benefits, privacy concerns have become widely shared due to the fact that every time the biometric of a person is checked, a trace is left that could reveal personal and confidential information. In fact, biometric-based recognition has an inherent privacy problem as it relies on capturing, analyzing, and storing personal data about us as individuals. For example, biometric systems deal with data related to the way we look (face, iris), the way we walk (gait), the way we talk (speaker recognition), the way we write (handwriting), the way we type on a keyboard (keystroke), the way we read (eye movement), and many more. Privacy has become a serious concern for the public as biometric systems are increasingly deployed in many applications ranging from accessing our account on a Smartphone or computer to border control and national biometric cards on a very large scale. For example, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has issued 56 million biometric cards as of January 2014 [1], where each biometric card holds templates of the 10 fingers, the two irises and the face. An essential factor behind the growing popularity of biometrics in recent years is the fact that biometric sensors have become a lot cheaper as well as easier to install and handle. CCTV cameras are installed nearly everywhere and almost all Smartphones are equipped with a camera, microphone, fingerprint scanner, and probably very soon, an iris scanner

    Secure Authentication for Mobile Users

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    RÉSUMÉ :L’authentification biométrique telle que les empreintes digitales et la biométrie faciale a changé la principale méthode d’authentification sur les appareils mobiles. Les gens inscrivent facilement leurs modèles d’empreintes digitales ou de visage dans différents systèmes d’authentification pour profiter de leur accès facile au smartphone sans avoir besoin de se souvenir et de saisir les codes PIN/mots de passe conventionnels. Cependant, ils ne sont pas conscients du fait qu’ils stockent leurs caractéristiques physiologiques ou comportementales durables sur des plates-formes non sécurisées (c’est-à-dire sur des téléphones mobiles ou sur un stockage en nuage), menaçant la confidentialité de leurs modèles biométriques et de leurs identités. Par conséquent, un schéma d’authentification est nécessaire pour préserver la confidentialité des modèles biométriques des utilisateurs et les authentifier en toute sécurité sans compter sur des plates-formes non sécurisées et non fiables.La plupart des études ont envisagé des approches logicielles pour concevoir un système d’authentification sécurisé. Cependant, ces approches ont montré des limites dans les systèmes d’authentification sécurisés. Principalement, ils souffrent d’une faible précision de vérification, en raison des transformations du gabarit (cancelable biometrics), de la fuite d’informations (fuzzy commitment schemes) ou de la réponse de vérification non en temps réel, en raison des calculs coûteux (homomorphic encryption).---------- ABSTRACT: Biometric authentication such as fingerprint and face biometrics has changed the main authentication method on mobile devices. People easily enroll their fingerprint or face template on different authentication systems to take advantage of their easy access to the smartphone with no need to remember and enter the conventional PINs/passwords. However, they are not aware that they store their long-lasting physiological or behavioral characteristics on insecure platforms (i.e., on mobile phones or on cloud storage), threatening the privacy of their biometric templates and their identities. Therefore, an authentication scheme is required to preserve the privacy of users’ biometric templates and securely authenticate them without relying on insecure and untrustworthy platforms. Most studies have considered software-based approaches to design a privacy-reserving authentication system. However, these approaches have shown limitations in secure authentication systems. Mainly, they suffer from low verification accuracy, due to the template transformations (in cancelable biometrics), information leakage (in fuzzy commitment schemes), or non real-time verification response, due to the expensive computations (in homomorphic encryption)
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