42 research outputs found
Boomerang Connectivity Table:A New Cryptanalysis Tool
A boomerang attack is a cryptanalysis framework that regards a block cipher as the composition of two sub-ciphers and builds a particular characteristic for with probability by combining differential characteristics for and with probability and , respectively.
Crucially the validity of this figure is under the assumption that the characteristics for and can be chosen independently. Indeed, Murphy has shown that independently chosen characteristics may turn out to be incompatible. On the other hand, several researchers observed that the probability can be improved to or around the boundary between and by considering a positive dependency of the two characteristics, e.g.~the ladder switch and S-box switch by Biryukov and Khovratovich.
This phenomenon was later formalised by Dunkelman et al.~as a sandwich attack that regards as , where satisfies some differential propagation among four texts with probability , and the entire probability is .
In this paper, we revisit the issue of dependency of two characteristics in , and propose a new tool called Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT), which evaluates in a systematic and easy-to-understand way when is composed of a single S-box layer. With the BCT, previous observations on the S-box including the incompatibility, the ladder switch and the S-box switch are represented in a unified manner. Moreover, the BCT can detect a new switching effect, which shows that the probability around the boundary may be even higher than or .
To illustrate the power of the BCT-based analysis, we improve boomerang attacks against Deoxys-BC, and disclose the mechanism behind an unsolved probability amplification for generating a quartet in SKINNY. Lastly, we discuss the issue of searching for S-boxes having good BCT and extending the analysis to modular addition
Lightweight Authenticated Encryption Mode Suitable for Threshold Implementation
This paper proposes tweakable block cipher (TBC) based modes and that are efficient in threshold implementations (TI). Let be an algebraic degree of a target function, e.g.~ (resp.~) for linear (resp.~non-linear) function. The -th order TI encodes the internal state into shares. Hence, the area size increases proportionally to the number of shares. This implies that TBC based modes can be smaller than block cipher (BC) based modes in TI because TBC requires -bit block to ensure -bit security, e.g. \textsf{PFB} and \textsf{Romulus}, while BC requires -bit block. However, even with those TBC based modes, the minimum we can reach is 3 shares of -bit state with and the first-order TI ().
Our first design aims to break the barrier of the -bit state in TI. The block size of an underlying TBC is bits and the output of TBC is linearly expanded to bits. This expanded state requires only 2 shares in the first-order TI, which makes the total state size bits. We also provide rigorous security proof of . Our second design further increases a parameter : a ratio of the security level to the block size of an underlying TBC. We prove security of for any under some assumptions for an underlying TBC and for parameters used to update a state. Next, we show a concrete instantiation of for 128-bit security. It requires a TBC with 64-bit block, 128-bit key and 128-bit tweak, while no existing TBC can support it. We design a new TBC by extending \textsf{SKINNY} and provide basic security evaluation. Finally, we give hardware benchmarks of in the first-order TI to show that TI of is smaller than that of \textsf{PFB} by more than one thousand gates and is the smallest within the schemes having 128-bit security
Finding All Impossible Differentials When Considering the DDT
Impossible differential (ID) cryptanalysis is one of the most important attacks on block ciphers.
The Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model is a popular method to determine whether a specific difference pair is an ID.
Unfortunately, due to the huge search space (approximately for a cipher with a block size bits), we cannot leverage this technique to exhaust all difference pairs, which is a well-known long-standing problem.
In this paper, we propose a systematic method to find all IDs for SPN block ciphers.
The idea is to partition the whole difference pair space into lots of small disjoint sets, each of which has a representative difference pair.
All difference pairs in one small set are possible if its representative pair is possible, and this can be conveniently checked by the MILP model.
In this way, the overall search space is drastically reduced to a practical size by excluding the sets containing no IDs.
We then examine the remaining difference pairs to identify all IDs (if some IDs exist).
If our method cannot find any ID, the target cipher is proved free of ID distinguishers.
Our method works especially well for SPN ciphers with block size 64.
We apply our method to SKINNY-64 and successfully find all 432 and 12 truncated IDs (we find all IDs but all of them can be assembled into certain truncated IDs) for 11 and 12 rounds, respectively.
We also prove, for the first time, that 13-round SKINNY-64 is free of ID distinguishers even when considering the differential transitions through the Difference Distribution Table (DDT).
Similarly, we find all 12 truncated IDs (all IDs are assembled into 12 truncated IDs) for 13-round CRAFT and prove there is no ID for 14 rounds.
For SbPN cipher GIFT-64, we prove that there is no ID for 8 rounds.
For SPN ciphers with larger block sizes, we show that our idea is also useful to strengthen the current search methods.
For example, if we consider the Sbox to be ideal and only
consider the branch number information of the diffusion matrix, we can find all 6,750 truncated IDs for 6-round Rijndael-192 in 1 second and
prove that there is no truncated ID for 7 rounds.
Previously, we need to solve approximately MILP models to achieve the same goal.
For GIFT-128, we exhausted all difference patterns that have an active superbox in the plaintext and ciphertext and proved there is no ID of such patterns for 8 rounds.
Although we have searched for a larger or even full space for IDs, no longer ID distinguishers have been found.
This implies the reasonableness of the intuition that a small number (usually one or two) of active bits/words at the beginning and end of an ID will be the longest
Automated Search Oriented to Key Recovery on Ciphers with Linear Key Schedule
Automatic modelling to search distinguishers with high probability covering as many rounds as possible, such as MILP, SAT/SMT, CP models, has become a very popular cryptanalysis topic today. In those models, the optimizing objective is usually the probability or the number of rounds of the distinguishers. If we want to recover the secret key for a round-reduced block cipher, there are usually two phases, i.e., finding an efficient distinguisher and performing key-recovery attack by extending several rounds before and after the distinguisher. The total number of attacked rounds is not only related to the chosen distinguisher, but also to the extended rounds before and after the distinguisher. In this paper, we try to combine the two phases in a uniform automatic model.
Concretely, we apply this idea to automate the related-key rectangle attacks on SKINNY and ForkSkinny. We propose some new distinguishers with advantage to perform key-recovery attacks. Our key-recovery attacks on a few versions of round-reduced SKINNY and ForkSkinny cover 1 to 2 more rounds than the best previous attacks
Single Tweakey Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SKINNY-64
Skinny is a lightweight tweakable block cipher which received a great deal of
cryptanalytic attention following its elegant structure and efficiency. Inspired
by the Skinny competitions, multiple attacks on it were reported in different
settings (e.g. single vs. related-tweakey) using different techniques
(impossible differentials, meet-in-the-middle, etc.). In this paper we revisit
some of these attacks, identify issues with several of them, and offer a series
of improved attacks which were experimentally verified. Our best attack can
attack up to 18 rounds using chosen ciphertexts data, time, and
memory
Improved Rectangle Attacks on SKINNY and CRAFT
The boomerang and rectangle attacks are adaptions of differential cryptanalysis that regard the target cipher E as a composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e., E = E1 ∘ E0, to construct a distinguisher for E with probability p2q2 by concatenating two short differential trails for E0 and E1 with probability p and q respectively. According to the previous research, the dependency between these two differential characteristics has a great impact on the probability of boomerang and rectangle distinguishers. Dunkelman et al. proposed the sandwich attack to formalise such dependency that regards E as three parts, i.e., E = E1 ∘ Em ∘ E0, where Em contains the dependency between two differential trails, satisfying some differential propagation with probability r. Accordingly, the entire probability is p2q2r. Recently, Song et al. have proposed a general framework to identify the actual boundaries of Em and systematically evaluate the probability of Em with any number of rounds, and applied their method to accurately evaluate the probabilities of the best SKINNY’s boomerang distinguishers. In this paper, using a more advanced method to search for boomerang distinguishers, we show that the best previous boomerang distinguishers for SKINNY can be significantly improved in terms of probability and number of rounds. More precisely, we propose related-tweakey boomerang distinguishers for up to 19, 21, 23, and 25 rounds of SKINNY-64-128, SKINNY-128-256, SKINNY-64-192 and SKINNY-128-384 respectively, which improve the previous boomerang distinguishers of these variants of SKINNY by 1, 2, 1, and 1 round respectively. Based on the improved boomerang distinguishers for SKINNY, we provide related-tweakey rectangle attacks on 23 rounds of SKINNY-64-128, 24 rounds of SKINNY-128-256, 29 rounds of SKINNY-64-192, and 30 rounds of SKINNY-128-384. It is worth noting that our improved related-tweakey rectangle attacks on SKINNY-64-192, SKINNY-128-256 and SKINNY-128-384 can be directly applied for the same number of rounds of ForkSkinny-64-192, ForkSkinny-128-256 and ForkSkinny-128-384 respectively. CRAFT is another SKINNY-like tweakable block cipher for which we provide the security analysis against rectangle attack for the first time. As a result, we provide a 14-round boomerang distinguisher for CRAFT in the single-tweak model based on which we propose a single-tweak rectangle attack on 18 rounds of this cipher. Moreover, following the previous research regarding the evaluation of switching in multiple rounds of boomerang distinguishers, we also introduce new tools called Double Boomerang Connectivity Table (DBCT), LBCT⫤, and UBCT⊨ to evaluate the boomerang switch through the multiple rounds more accurately
Forkcipher: A New Primitive for Authenticated Encryption of Very Short Messages
This is an extended version of the article with the same title accepted at Asiacrypt 2019.International audienceHighly efficient encryption and authentication of short messages is an essential requirement for enabling security in constrained scenarios such as the CAN FD in automotive systems (max. message size 64 bytes), massive IoT, critical communication domains of 5G, and Narrowband IoT, to mention a few. In addition, one of the NIST lightweight cryptography project requirements is that AEAD schemes shall be “optimized to be efficient for short messages (e.g., as short as 8 bytes)”. In this work we introduce and formalize a novel primitive in symmetric cryptography called a forkcipher. A forkcipher is a keyed function expanding a fixed-length input to a fixed-length output. We define its security as indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack. We give a generic construction validation via the new iterate-fork-iterate design paradigm. We then propose ForkSkinny as a concrete forkcipher instance with a public tweak and based on SKINNY: a tweakable lightweight block cipher constructed using the TWEAKEY framework. We conduct extensive cryptanalysis of ForkSkinny against classical and structure-specific attacks. We demonstrate the applicability of forkciphers by designing three new provably-secure, nonce-based AEAD modes which offer performance and security tradeoffs and are optimized for efficiency of very short messages. Considering a reference block size of 16 bytes, and ignoring possible hardware optimizations, our new AEAD schemes beat the best SKINNY-based AEAD modes. More generally, we show forkciphers are suited for lightweight applications dealing with predominantly short messages, while at the same time allowing handling arbitrary messages sizes. Furthermore, our hardware implementation results show that when we exploit the inherent parallelism of ForkSkinny we achieve the best performance when directly compared with the most efficient mode instantiated with the SKINNY block cipher
Cryptanalysis of Reduced round SKINNY Block Cipher
SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers designed to have the smallest hardware footprint. In this paper, we present zero-correlation linear approximations and the related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics for different versions of SKINNY .We utilize Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to search all zero-correlation linear distinguishers for all variants of SKINNY, where the longest distinguisher found reaches 10 rounds. Using a 9-round characteristic, we present 14 and 18-round zero correlation attacks on SKINNY-64-64 and SKINNY- 64-128, respectively. Also, for SKINNY-n-n and SKINNY-n-2n, we construct 13 and 15-round related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics, respectively. Utilizing these characteristics, we propose 23-round related-tweakey impossible differential cryptanalysis by applying the key recovery attack for SKINNY-n-2n and 19-round attack for SKINNY-n-n. To the best of our knowledge, the presented zero-correlation characteristics in this paper are the first attempt to investigate the security of SKINNY against this attack and the results on the related-tweakey impossible differential attack are the best reported ones
Secret Can Be Public: Low-Memory AEAD Mode for High-Order Masking
We propose a new AEAD mode of operation for an efficient countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Our mode achieves the smallest memory with high-order masking, by minimizing the states that are duplicated in masking. An -bit key-dependent state is necessary for achieving -bit security, and the conventional schemes always protect the entire bits with masking. We reduce the protected state size by introducing an unprotected state in the key-dependent state: we protect only a half and give another half to a side-channel adversary. Ensuring independence between the unprotected and protected states is the key technical challenge since mixing these states reveals the protected state to the adversary. We propose a new mode that achieves -bit security using a tweakable block cipher with the -bit block size. We also propose a new primitive for instantiating with by extending the SKINNY tweakable block cipher to a 64-bit plaintext block, a 128-bit key, and a -bit tweak. We make hardware performance evaluation by implementing with high-order masking for . For any , outperforms the current state-of-the-art by reducing the circuit area larger than that of the entire S-box