Secure neighbor discovery in wireless sensor networks using range-free localization techniques

Si una red inalámbrica de sensores se implementa en un entorno hostil, las limitaciones intrínsecas a los nodos conllevan muchos problemas de seguridad. En este artículo se aborda un ataque particular a los protocolos de localización y descubrimiento de vecinos, llevada a cabo por dos nodos que actúan en connivencia y establecen un "agujero de gusano" para tratar de engañar a un nodo aislado, haciéndole creer que se encuentra en la vecindad de un conjunto de nodos locales. Para contrarrestar este tipo de amenazas, se presenta un marco de actuación genéricamente denominado "detection of wormhole attacks using range-free methods" (DWARF) dentro del cual derivamos dos estrategias para de detección de agujeros de gusano: el primer enfoque (DWARFLoc) realiza conjuntamente la localización y la detección de ataques, mientras que el otro (DWARFTest) valida la posición estimada por el nodo una vez finalizado el protocolo de localización. Las simulaciones muestran que ambas estrategias son eficaces en la detección de ataques tipo "agujero de gusano", y sus prestaciones se comparan con las de un test convencional basado en la razón de verosimilitudes

Secure location-aware communications in energy-constrained wireless networks

Wireless ad hoc network has enabled a variety of exciting civilian, industrial and military applications over the past few years. Among the many types of wireless ad hoc networks, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has gained popularity because of the technology development for manufacturing low-cost, low-power, multi-functional motes. Compared with traditional wireless network, location-aware communication is a very common communication pattern and is required by many applications in WSNs. For instance, in the geographical routing protocol, a sensor needs to know its own and its neighbors\u27 locations to forward a packet properly to the next hop. The application-aware communications are vulnerable to many malicious attacks, ranging from passive eavesdropping to active spoofing, jamming, replaying, etc. Although research efforts have been devoted to secure communications in general, the properties of energy-constrained networks pose new technical challenges: First, the communicating nodes in the network are always unattended for long periods without physical maintenance, which makes their energy a premier resource. Second, the wireless devices usually have very limited hardware resources such as memory, computation capacity and communication range. Third, the number of nodes can be potentially of very high magnitude. Therefore, it is infeasible to utilize existing secure algorithms designed for conventional wireless networks, and innovative mechanisms should be designed in a way that can conserve power consumption, use inexpensive hardware and lightweight protocols, and accommodate with the scalability of the network. In this research, we aim at constructing a secure location-aware communication system for energy-constrained wireless network, and we take wireless sensor network as a concrete research scenario. Particularly, we identify three important problems as our research targets: (1) providing correct location estimations for sensors in presence of wormhole attacks and pollution attacks, (2) detecting location anomalies according to the application-specific requirements of the verification accuracy, and (3) preventing information leakage to eavesdroppers when using network coding for multicasting location information. Our contributions of the research are as follows: First, we propose two schemes to improve the availability and accuracy of location information of nodes. Then, we study monitoring and detection techniques and propose three lightweight schemes to detect location anomalies. Finally, we propose two network coding schemes which can effectively prevent information leakage to eavesdroppers. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes in enhancing security of the system. Compared to previous works, our schemes are more lightweight in terms of hardware cost, computation overhead and communication consumptions, and thus are suitable for energy-constrained wireless networks

Secure localization against wormhole attacks using conflicting sets

2010-2011 > Academic research: refereed > Refereed conference paperAccepted ManuscriptPublishe

Routing Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks: Attacks and Defenses

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are rapidly emerging as an important new area in wireless and mobile computing research. Applications of WSNs are numerous and growing, and range from indoor deployment scenarios in the home and office to outdoor deployment scenarios in adversary's territory in a tactical battleground (Akyildiz et al., 2002). For military environment, dispersal of WSNs into an adversary's territory enables the detection and tracking of enemy soldiers and vehicles. For home/office environments, indoor sensor networks offer the ability to monitor the health of the elderly and to detect intruders via a wireless home security system. In each of these scenarios, lives and livelihoods may depend on the timeliness and correctness of the sensor data obtained from dispersed sensor nodes. As a result, such WSNs must be secured to prevent an intruder from obstructing the delivery of correct sensor data and from forging sensor data. To address the latter problem, end-to-end data integrity checksums and post-processing of senor data can be used to identify forged sensor data (Estrin et al., 1999; Hu et al., 2003a; Ye et al., 2004). The focus of this chapter is on routing security in WSNs. Most of the currently existing routing protocols for WSNs make an optimization on the limited capabilities of the nodes and the application-specific nature of the network, but do not any the security aspects of the protocols. Although these protocols have not been designed with security as a goal, it is extremely important to analyze their security properties. When the defender has the liabilities of insecure wireless communication, limited node capabilities, and possible insider threats, and the adversaries can use powerful laptops with high energy and long range communication to attack the network, designing a secure routing protocol for WSNs is obviously a non-trivial task.Comment: 32 pages, 5 figures, 4 tables 4. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1011.152

Designing Robust Collaborative Services in Distributed Wireless Networks

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a popular class of distributed collaborative networks finding suitability from medical to military applications. However, their vulnerability to capture, their "open" wireless interfaces, limited battery life, all result in potential vulnerabilities. WSN-based services inherit these vulnerabilities. We focus on tactical environments where sensor nodes play complex roles in data sensing, aggregation and decision making. Services in such environments demand a high level of reliability and robustness. The first problem we studied is robust target localization. Location information is important for surveillance, monitoring, secure routing, intrusion detection, on-demand services etc. Target localization means tracing the path of moving entities through some known surveillance area. In a tactical environment, an adversary can often capture nodes and supply incorrect surveillance data to the system. In this thesis we create a target localization protocol that is robust against large amounts of such falsified data. Location estimates are generated by a Bayesian maximum-likelihood estimator. In order to achieve improved results with respect to fraudulent data attacks, we introduce various protection mechanisms. Further, our novel approach of employing watchdog nodes improves our ability to detect anomalies reducing the impact of an adversarial attack and limiting the amount of falsified data that gets accepted into the system. By concealing and altering the location where data is aggregated, we restrict the adversary to making probabilistic "guess" attacks at best, and increase robustness further. By formulating the problem of robust node localization under adversarial settings and casting it as a multivariate optimization problem, we solve for the system design parameters that correspond to the optimal solution. Together this results in a highly robust protocol design. In order for any collaboration to succeed, collaborating entities must have the same relative sense of time. This ensures that any measurements, surveillance data, mission commands, etc will be processed in the same epoch they are intended to serve. In most cases, data disseminated in a WSN is transient in nature, and applies for a short period of time. New data routinely replaces old data. It is imperative that data be placed in its correct time context; therefore..

A novel secure localization approach in wireless sensor networks

2010-2011 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalVersion of RecordPublishe

A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in the research community due their wide range of applications. Due to distributed nature of these networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical applications such as in a tactical battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios. Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. This paper discusses the current state of the art in security mechanisms for WSNs. Various types of attacks are discussed and their countermeasures presented. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.Comment: 24 pages, 4 figures, 2 table

Secure Neighbor Discovery and Ranging in Wireless Networks

This thesis addresses the security of two fundamental elements of wireless networking: neighbor discovery and ranging. Neighbor discovery consists in discovering devices available for direct communication or in physical proximity. Ranging, or distance bounding, consists in measuring the distance between devices, or providing an upper bound on this distance. Both elements serve as building blocks for a variety of services and applications, notably routing, physical access control, tracking and localization. However, the open nature of wireless networks makes it easy to abuse neighbor discovery and ranging, and thereby compromise overlying services and applications. To prevent this, numerous works proposed protocols that secure these building blocks. But two aspects crucial for the security of such protocols have received relatively little attention: formal verification and attacks on the physical-communication-layer. They are precisely the focus of this thesis. In the first part of the thesis, we contribute a formal analysis of secure communication neighbor discovery protocols. We build a formal model that captures salient characteristics of wireless systems such as node location, message propagation time and link variability, and we provide a specification of secure communication neighbor discovery. Then, we derive an impossibility result for a general class of protocols we term "time-based protocols", stating that no such protocol can provide secure communication neighbor discovery. We also identify the conditions under which the impossibility result is lifted. We then prove that specific protocols in the time-based class (under additional conditions) and specific protocols in a class we term "time- and location-based protocols," satisfy the neighbor discovery specification. We reinforce these results by mechanizing the model and the proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle. In the second part of the thesis, we explore physical-communication-layer attacks that can seemingly decrease the message arrival time without modifying its content. Thus, they can circumvent time-based neighbor discovery protocols and distance bounding protocols. (Indeed, they violate the assumptions necessary to prove protocol correctness in the first part of the thesis.) We focus on Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband, a physical layer technology particularly well suited for implementing distance bounding, thanks to its ability to perform accurate indoor ranging. First, we adapt physical layer attacks reported in prior work to IEEE 802.15.4a, the de facto standard for Impulse Radio, and evaluate their performance. We show that an adversary can achieve a distance-decrease of up to hundreds of meters with an arbitrarily high probability of success, with only a minor cost in terms of transmission power (few dB). Next, we demonstrate a new attack vector that disrupts time-of-arrival estimation algorithms, in particular those designed to be precise. The distance-decrease achievable by this attack vector is in the order of the channel spread (order of 10 meters in indoor environments). This attack vector can be used in previously reported physical layer attacks, but it also creates a new type of external attack based on malicious interference. We demonstrate that variants of the malicious interference attack are much easier to mount than the previously reported external attack. We also provide design guidelines for modulation schemes and devise receiver algorithms that mitigate physical layer attacks. These countermeasures allow the system designer to trade off security, ranging precision and cost in terms of transmission power and packet length