How to Specify and How to Prove Correctness of Secure Routing Protocols for MANET

Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently, yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper, we are concerned with this problem, how to specify and how to prove the correctness of a secure routing protocol. We provide a definition of what a protocol is expected to achieve independently of its functionality, as well as communication and adversary models. This way, we enable formal reasoning on the correctness of secure routing protocols. We demonstrate this by analyzing two protocols from the literature

Review of Basic Secure Routing Protocols for MANETs

A Mobile ad hoc networks faces challenges in secure communications. The resource constraints on nodes in MANETs limit the cryptographic measures used to secure messages. Thus it is susceptible to link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active impersonation, message replay and message distortion. Secure routing in MANETs is one of the most emerging areas of research. Designing a foolproof secure routing protocol is a challenging task due to its unique network characteristics. Number of secure routing protocols already developed but these are not work under different attacks.Availability of network services, confidentiality and integrity of the data can be achieved by ensuring that security issues have been met. In this paper the basic secured routing protocols used for MANETs are reviewed. Further this study will help the researchers to get an overview of the existing secure routing protocols and suggest which protocols may perform better with respect to varying network scenarios under different attacks

Formal verification of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols using deductive model-checking

Ad-hoc networks do not rely on a pre-installed infrastructure, but they are formed by end-user devices in a self-organized manner. A consequence of this principle is that end-user devices must also perform routing functions. However, end-user devices can easily be compromised, and they may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. Such compromised and misbehaving nodes can disrupt routing, and hence, disable the operation of the network. In order to cope with this problem, several secured routing protocols have been proposed for ad-hoc networks. However, many of them have design flaws that still make them vulnerable to attacks mounted by compromised nodes. In this paper, we propose a formal verification method for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols that helps increasing the confidence in a protocol by providing an analysis framework that is more systematic, and hence, less error-prone than the informal analysis. Our approach is based on a new process calculus that we specifically developed for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols and a deductive proof technique. The novelty of this approach is that contrary to prior attempts to formal verification of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols, our verification method can be made fully automated

Routing and Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) consists of a set of nodes which can form a network among themselves. MANETs have applications in areas such as military, disaster rescue operations, monitoring animal habitats, etc. where establishing fixed communication infrastructure is not feasible. Routing protocols designed for MANETs can be broadly classified as position-based (geographic), topology-based and hybrid. Geographic routing uses location information of nodes to route messages. Topology-based routing uses network state information for route discovery and maintenance. Hybrid routing protocols use features in both position-based and topology-based approaches. Position-based routing protocols route packets towards the destination using greedy forwarding (i.e., an intermediate node forwards packets to a neighbor that is closer to the destination than itself). If a node has no neighbor that is closer to the destination than itself, greedy forwarding fails. In this case, we say there is void. Different position-based routing protocols use different methods for dealing with voids. Topology-based routing protocols can be classified into on-demand (reactive) routing protocols and proactive routing protocols. Generally, on-demand routing protocols establish routes when needed by flooding route requests throughout the entire network, which is not a scalable approach. Reactive routing protocols try to maintain routes between every pair of nodes by periodically exchanging messages with each other which is not a scalable approach also. This thesis addresses some of these issues and makes the following contribution. First, we present a position-based routing protocol called Greedy Routing Protocol with Backtracking (GRB) which uses a simple backtracking technique to route around voids, unlike existing position-based routing protocols which construct planarized graph of the local network to route around voids. We compare the performance of our protocol with the well known Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol and the Ad-Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol as well as the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. Performance evaluation shows that our protocol has less control overhead than those of DSR, AODV, and GPSR. Performance evaluation also shows that our protocol has a higher packet-delivery ratio, lower end-to-end delay, and less hop count, on average, compared to AODV, DSR and GPSR. We then present an on-demand routing protocol called ``Hybrid On-demand Greedy Routing Protocol with Backtracking for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks which uses greedy approach for route discovery. This prevents flooding route requests, unlike the existing on-demand routing protocols. This approach also helps in finding routes that have lower hop counts than AODV and DSR. Our performance evaluation confirms that our protocol performs better than AODV and DSR, on average, with respect to hop count, packet-delivery ratio and control overhead. In MANETs, all nodes need to cooperate to establish routes. Establishing secure and valid routes in the presence of adversaries is a challenge in MANETs. Some of the well-known source routing protocols presented in the literature (e.g., Ariadne and endairA) which claim to establish secure routes are susceptible to hidden channel attacks. We address this issue and present a secure routing protocol called SAriadne, based on sanitizable signatures. We show that our protocol detects and prevents hidden channel attacks