Security Proof for Password Authentication in TLS-Verifier-based Three-Party Group Diffie-Hellman

The internet has grown greatly in the past decade, by some numbers exceeding 47 million active web sites and a total aggregate exceeding100 million web sites. What is common practice today on the Internet is that servers have public keys, but clients are largely authenticated via short passwords. Protecting these passwords by not storing them in the clear on institutions's servers has become a priority. This paper develops password-based ciphersuites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that are: (1) resistant to server compromise; (2) provably secure; (3) believed to be free from patent and licensing restrictions based on an analysis of relevant patents in the area

Wireless LAN security.

Chan Pak To Patrick.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-86).Abstracts in English and Chinese.Abstract --- p.iAcknowledgement --- p.iiiContents --- p.ivList of Figures --- p.viiList of Tables --- p.viiiChapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation --- p.1Chapter 1.2 --- The Problems --- p.3Chapter 1.3 --- My Contribution --- p.4Chapter 1.4 --- Thesis Organization --- p.5Chapter 2 --- Wireless LAN Security Model --- p.6Chapter 2.1 --- Preliminary Definitions on WLAN --- p.6Chapter 2.2 --- Security Model --- p.7Chapter 2.2.1 --- Security Attributes --- p.7Chapter 2.2.2 --- Security Threats in WLAN --- p.8Chapter 2.2.3 --- Attacks on Authentication Scheme --- p.10Chapter 2.2.4 --- Attacks on Keys --- p.10Chapter 2.3 --- Desired Properties of WLAN Authentication --- p.11Chapter 2.3.1 --- Security Requirements of WLAN Authentication --- p.11Chapter 2.3.2 --- Security Requirements of Session Keys --- p.12Chapter 2.3.3 --- Other Desired Properties of WLAN Authentication --- p.12Chapter 3 --- Cryptography --- p.14Chapter 3.1 --- Overview on Cryptography --- p.14Chapter 3.2 --- Symmetric-key Encryption --- p.15Chapter 3.2.1 --- Data Encryption Standard (DES) --- p.15Chapter 3.2.2 --- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) --- p.15Chapter 3.2.3 --- RC4 --- p.16Chapter 3.3 --- Public-key Cryptography --- p.16Chapter 3.3.1 --- RSA Problem and Related Encryption Schemes --- p.17Chapter 3.3.2 --- Discrete Logarithm Problem and Related Encryption Schemes --- p.18Chapter 3.3.3 --- Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems --- p.19Chapter 3.3.4 --- Digital Signature --- p.19Chapter 3.4 --- Public Key Infrastructure --- p.20Chapter 3.5 --- Hash Functions and Message Authentication Code --- p.21Chapter 3.5.1 --- SHA-256 --- p.22Chapter 3.5.2 --- Message Authentication Code --- p.22Chapter 3.6 --- Entity Authentication --- p.23Chapter 3.6.1 --- ISO/IEC 9798-4 Three-pass Mutual --- p.23Chapter 3.6.2 --- ISO/IEC 9798-4 One-pass Unilateral --- p.24Chapter 3.7 --- Key Establishment --- p.24Chapter 3.7.1 --- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange --- p.24Chapter 3.7.2 --- Station-to-Station Protocol --- p.25Chapter 3.8 --- Identity-Based Cryptography --- p.25Chapter 3.8.1 --- The Boneh-Franklin Encryption Scheme --- p.26Chapter 3.8.2 --- Au and Wei's Identification Scheme and Signature Scheme --- p.27Chapter 4 --- Basics of WLAN Security and WEP --- p.29Chapter 4.1 --- Basics of WLAN Security --- p.29Chapter 4.1.1 --- "Overview on ""Old"" WLAN Security" --- p.29Chapter 4.1.2 --- Some Basic Security Measures --- p.29Chapter 4.1.3 --- Virtual Private Network (VPN) --- p.30Chapter 4.2 --- WEP --- p.31Chapter 4.2.1 --- Overview on Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) --- p.31Chapter 4.2.2 --- Security Analysis on WEP --- p.33Chapter 5 --- IEEE 802.11i --- p.38Chapter 5.1 --- Overview on IEEE 802.11i and RSN --- p.38Chapter 5.2 --- IEEE 802.1X Access Control in IEEE 802.11i --- p.39Chapter 5.2.1 --- Participants --- p.39Chapter 5.2.2 --- Port-based Access Control --- p.40Chapter 5.2.3 --- EAP and EAPOL --- p.40Chapter 5.2.4 --- RADIUS --- p.41Chapter 5.2.5 --- Authentication Message Exchange --- p.41Chapter 5.2.6 --- Security Analysis --- p.41Chapter 5.3 --- RSN Key Management --- p.43Chapter 5.3.1 --- RSN Pairwise Key Hierarchy --- p.43Chapter 5.3.2 --- RSN Group Key Hierarchy --- p.43Chapter 5.3.3 --- Four-way Handshake and Group Key Handshake --- p.44Chapter 5.4 --- RSN Encryption and Data Integrity --- p.45Chapter 5.4.1 --- TKIP --- p.45Chapter 5.4.2 --- CCMP --- p.46Chapter 5.5 --- Upper Layer Authentication Protocols --- p.47Chapter 5.5.1 --- Overview on the Upper Layer Authentication --- p.47Chapter 5.5.2 --- EAP-TLS --- p.48Chapter 5.5.3 --- Other Popular ULA Protocols --- p.50Chapter 6 --- Proposed IEEE 802.11i Authentication Scheme --- p.52Chapter 6.1 --- Proposed Protocol --- p.52Chapter 6.1.1 --- Overview --- p.52Chapter 6.1.2 --- The AUTHENTICATE Protocol --- p.56Chapter 6.1.3 --- The RECONNECT Protocol --- p.59Chapter 6.1.4 --- Packet Format --- p.61Chapter 6.1.5 --- Ciphersuites Negotiation --- p.64Chapter 6.1.6 --- Delegation --- p.64Chapter 6.1.7 --- Identity Privacy --- p.68Chapter 6.2 --- Security Considerations --- p.68Chapter 6.2.1 --- Security of the AUTHENTICATE protocol --- p.68Chapter 6.2.2 --- Security of the RECONNECT protocol --- p.69Chapter 6.2.3 --- Security of Key Derivation --- p.70Chapter 6.2.4 --- EAP Security Claims and EAP Methods Requirements --- p.72Chapter 6.3 --- Efficiency Analysis --- p.76Chapter 6.3.1 --- Overview --- p.76Chapter 6.3.2 --- Bandwidth Performance --- p.76Chapter 6.3.3 --- Computation Speed --- p.76Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.79Chapter 7.1 --- Summary --- p.79Chapter 7.2 --- Future Work --- p.80Bibliography --- p.8

Efficient Implementation of Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE and Post-Quantum TLS

Two post-quantum password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols were proposed at CT-RSA 2017. Following this work, we give much more efficient and portable C++ implementation of these two protocols. We also choose more compact parameters providing 200-bit security. Compared with original implementation, we achieve 21.5x and 18.5x speedup for RLWE-PAK and RLWE-PPK respectively. Compare with quantum-vulnerable J-PAKE protocol, we achieve nearly 8x speedup. We also integrate RLWE-PPK into TLS to construct a post-quantum TLS ciphersuite. This allows simpler key management, mutual authentication and resistant to phishing attack. Benchmark shows that our ciphersuite is indeed practical