190 research outputs found

    Secure Code Updates for Smart Embedded Devices based on PUFs

    Get PDF
    Code update is a very useful tool commonly used in low-end embedded devices to improve the existing functionalities or patch discovered bugs or vulnerabilities. If the update protocol itself is not secure, it will only bring new threats to embedded systems. Thus, a secure code update mechanism is required. However, existing solutions either rely on strong security assumptions, or result in considerable storage and computation consumption, which are not practical for resource-constrained embedded devices (e.g., in the context of Internet of Things). In this work, we propose to use intrinsic device characteristics (i.e., Physically Unclonable Functions or PUF) to design a practical and lightweight secure code update scheme. Our scheme can not only ensure the freshness, integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of code update, but also verify that the update is installed correctly on a specific device without any malicious software. Cloned or counterfeit devices can be excluded as the code update is bound to the unpredictable physical properties of underlying hardware. Legitimate devices in an untrustworthy software state can be restored by filling suspect memory with PUF-derived random numbers. After update installation, the initiator of the code update is able to obtain the verifiable software state from device, and the device can maintain a sustainable post-update secure check by enforcing a secure call sequence. To demonstrate the practicality and feasibility, we also implement the proposed scheme on a low-end MCU platform (TI MSP430) by using onboard SRAM and Flash resources

    Investigating SRAM PUFs in large CPUs and GPUs

    Get PDF
    Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide data that can be used for cryptographic purposes: on the one hand randomness for the initialization of random-number generators; on the other hand individual fingerprints for unique identification of specific hardware components. However, today's off-the-shelf personal computers advertise randomness and individual fingerprints only in the form of additional or dedicated hardware. This paper introduces a new set of tools to investigate whether intrinsic PUFs can be found in PC components that are not advertised as containing PUFs. In particular, this paper investigates AMD64 CPU registers as potential PUF sources in the operating-system kernel, the bootloader, and the system BIOS; investigates the CPU cache in the early boot stages; and investigates shared memory on Nvidia GPUs. This investigation found non-random non-fingerprinting behavior in several components but revealed usable PUFs in Nvidia GPUs.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figures. Code in appendi

    SecuCode: Intrinsic PUF Entangled Secure Wireless Code Dissemination for Computational RFID Devices

    Full text link
    The simplicity of deployment and perpetual operation of energy harvesting devices provides a compelling proposition for a new class of edge devices for the Internet of Things. In particular, Computational Radio Frequency Identification (CRFID) devices are an emerging class of battery-free, computational, sensing enhanced devices that harvest all of their energy for operation. Despite wireless connectivity and powering, secure wireless firmware updates remains an open challenge for CRFID devices due to: intermittent powering, limited computational capabilities, and the absence of a supervisory operating system. We present, for the first time, a secure wireless code dissemination (SecuCode) mechanism for CRFIDs by entangling a device intrinsic hardware security primitive Static Random Access Memory Physical Unclonable Function (SRAM PUF) to a firmware update protocol. The design of SecuCode: i) overcomes the resource-constrained and intermittently powered nature of the CRFID devices; ii) is fully compatible with existing communication protocols employed by CRFID devices in particular, ISO-18000-6C protocol; and ii) is built upon a standard and industry compliant firmware compilation and update method realized by extending a recent framework for firmware updates provided by Texas Instruments. We build an end-to-end SecuCode implementation and conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate standards compliance, evaluate performance and security.Comment: Accepted to the IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computin

    Remote attestation mechanism for embedded devices based on physical unclonable functions

    Get PDF
    Remote attestation mechanisms are well studied in the high-end computing environments; however, the same is not true for embedded devices-especially for smart cards. With ever changing landscape of smart card technology and advancements towards a true multi-application platform, verifying the current state of the smart card is significant to the overall security of such proposals. The initiatives proposed by GlobalPlatform Consumer Centric Model (GP-CCM) and User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) enables a user to download any application as she desire-depending upon the authorisation of the application provider. Before an application provider issues an application to a smart card, verifying the current state of the smart card is crucial to the security of the respective application. In this paper, we analyse the rationale behind the remote attestation mechanism for smart cards, and the fundamental features that such a mechanism should possess. We also study the applicability of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for the remote attestation mechanism and propose two algorithms to achieve the stated features of remote attestation. The proposed algorithms are implemented in a test environment to evaluate their performance. © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved

    An Efficient Authentication Protocol for Smart Grid Communication Based on On-Chip-Error-Correcting Physical Unclonable Function

    Full text link
    Security has become a main concern for the smart grid to move from research and development to industry. The concept of security has usually referred to resistance to threats by an active or passive attacker. However, since smart meters (SMs) are often placed in unprotected areas, physical security has become one of the important security goals in the smart grid. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been largely utilized for ensuring physical security in recent years, though their reliability has remained a major problem to be practically used in cryptographic applications. Although fuzzy extractors have been considered as a solution to solve the reliability problem of PUFs, they put a considerable computational cost to the resource-constrained SMs. To that end, we first propose an on-chip-error-correcting (OCEC) PUF that efficiently generates stable digits for the authentication process. Afterward, we introduce a lightweight authentication protocol between the SMs and neighborhood gateway (NG) based on the proposed PUF. The provable security analysis shows that not only the proposed protocol can stand secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) adversary model but also provides additional security features. Also, the performance evaluation demonstrates the significant improvement of the proposed scheme in comparison with the state-of-the-art

    AUTHENTICATED KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL FOR CONSTRAINED SMART HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS BASED ON PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION

    Get PDF
    Smart healthcare systems are one of the critical applications of the internet of things. They benefit many categories of the population and provide significant improvement to healthcare services. Smart healthcare systems are also susceptible to many threats and exploits because they run without supervision for long periods of time and communicate via open channels. Moreover, in many implementations, healthcare sensor nodes are implanted or miniaturized and are resource-constrained. The potential risks on patients/individuals’ life from the threats necessitate that securing the connections in these systems is of utmost importance. This thesis provides a solution to secure end-to-end communications in such systems by proposing an authenticated key establishment protocol. The main objective of the protocol is to examine how physical unclonable functions could be utilized as a lightweight root of trust. The protocol’s design is based on rigid security requirements and inspired by the vulnerability of physical unclonable function to machine learning modeling attacks as well as the use of a ratchet technique. The proposed protocol verification and analysis revealed that it is a suitable candidate for resource-constrained smart healthcare systems. The proposed protocol’s design also has an impact on other important aspects such as anonymity of sensor nodes and gateway-lose scenario
    corecore