Cross-enterprise access control security for electronic health records: Technical, practical and legislation impact

In this thesis we investigate the relationship of security, privacy, legislation, computational power in relation to Cross-Enterprise User Assertions (XUA), which allows us to develop the recommendations for the appropriate, architecture, functionality, cryptographic algorithms, and key lengths. The evolution of health records from paper to electronic media promises to be an important part of improving the quality of health care. The diversity of organizations, systems, geography,laws and regulations create a significant challenge for ensuring the privacy of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), while maintaining availability. XUA is a technology that attempts to address the problem of sharing EHRs across enterprise boundaries. We rely on NSA suite B cryptography to provide the fundamental framework of the minimum security requirements at the 128 bit security level. We also recommend the use of the National Institute of Standards and Technologys (NIST) FIPS 140-2 specification to establish confidence in the software\u27s security features

The development and use of the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol on the internet

While still in its infancy, Electronic Commerce is growing at an exponential rate each year (Walson, 1997. p.53). Although few doubt that such growth will only continue in years to come, many people still have serious reservations about the levels of security offered by currently available applications for conducting such trade. This thesis identifies some of the key areas of concern regarding Electronic Commerce on the lnternet, and looks at the ways in which the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) model, proposed by Mastercard and Visa, succeeds or fails in addressing these concerns. It identifies and describes the key dements and primary functions of the SET protocols in a manner that will enable students and other interested parties to understand these protocols quickly and easily

Biometrics & [and] Security:Combining Fingerprints, Smart Cards and Cryptography

Since the beginning of this brand new century, and especially since the 2001 Sept 11 events in the U.S, several biometric technologies are considered mature enough to be a new tool for security. Generally associated to a personal device for privacy protection, biometric references are stored in secured electronic devices such as smart cards, and systems are using cryptographic tools to communicate with the smart card and securely exchange biometric data. After a general introduction about biometrics, smart cards and cryptography, a second part will introduce our work with fake finger attacks on fingerprint sensors and tests done with different materials. The third part will present our approach for a lightweight fingerprint recognition algorithm for smart cards. The fourth part will detail security protocols used in different applications such as Personal Identity Verification cards. We will discuss our implementation such as the one we developed for the NIST to be used in PIV smart cards. Finally, a fifth part will address Cryptography-Biometrics interaction. We will highlight the antagonism between Cryptography – determinism, stable data – and Biometrics – statistical, error-prone –. Then we will present our application of challenge-response protocol to biometric data for easing the fingerprint recognition process

Eesti elektrooniline ID-kaart ja selle turvaväljakutsed

Eesti elektrooniline isikutunnistust (ID-kaart) on üle 18 aasta pakkunud turvalist elektroonilist identiteeti Eesti kodanikele. Avaliku võtme krüptograafia ja kaardile talletatud privaatvõti võimaldavad ID-kaardi omanikel juurde pääseda e-teenustele, anda juriidilist jõudu omavaid digiallkirju ning elektrooniliselt hääletada. Käesolevas töös uuritakse põhjalikult Eesti ID-kaarti ning sellega seotud turvaväljakutseid. Me kirjeldame Eesti ID-kaarti ja selle ökosüsteemi, seotud osapooli ja protsesse, ID-kaardi elektroonilist baasfunktsionaalsust, seotud tehnilisi ja juriidilisi kontseptsioone ning muid seotud küsimusi. Me tutvustame kõiki kasutatud kiipkaardiplatforme ja nende abil väljastatud isikutunnistuste tüüpe. Iga platformi kohta esitame me detailse analüüsi kasutatava asümmeetrilise krüptograafia funktsionaalsusest ning kirjeldame ja analüüsime ID-kaardi kauguuendamise lahendusi. Lisaks esitame me süstemaatilise uurimuse ID-kaardiga seotud turvaintsidentidest ning muudest sarnastest probleemidest läbi aastate. Me kirjeldame probleemide tehnilist olemust, kasutatud leevendusmeetmeid ning kajastust ajakirjanduses. Käesoleva uurimustöö käigus avastati mitmeid varem teadmata olevaid turvaprobleeme ning teavitati nendest seotud osapooli. Käesolev töö põhineb avalikult kättesaadaval dokumentatsioonil, kogutud ID-kaartide sertifikaatide andmebaasil, ajakirjandusel,otsesuhtlusel seotud osapooltega ning töö autori analüüsil ja eksperimentidel.For more than 18 years, the Estonian electronic identity card (ID card) has provided a secure electronic identity for Estonian residents. The public-key cryptography and private keys stored on the card enable Estonian ID card holders to access e-services, give legally binding digital signatures and even cast an i-vote in national elections. This work provides a comprehensive study on the Estonian ID card and its security challenges. We introduce the Estonian ID card and its ecosystem by describing the involved parties and processes, the core electronic functionality of the ID card, related technical and legal concepts, and the related issues. We describe the ID card smart card chip platforms used over the years and the identity document types that have been issued using these platforms. We present a detailed analysis of the asymmetric cryptography functionality provided by each ID card platform and present a description and security analysis of the ID card remote update solutions that have been provided for each ID card platform. As yet another contribution of this work, we present a systematic study of security incidents and similar issues the Estonian ID card has experienced over the years. We describe the technical nature of the issue, mitigation measures applied and the reflections on the media. In the course of this research, several previously unknown security issues were discovered and reported to the involved parties. The research has been based on publicly available documentation, collection of ID card certificates in circulation, information reflected in media, information from the involved parties, and our own analysis and experiments performed in the field.https://www.ester.ee/record=b541416

Encaminhamento e segurança em redes veiculares

Mestrado em Engenharia Electrónica e TelecomunicaçõesThe growing research in vehicular network solutions provided the rise of interaction in these highly dynamic environments in the market. The developed architectures do not usually focus, however, in security aspects. Common security strategies designed for the Internet require IP. Since nodes' addresses in a vehicular network are too dynamic, such solutions would require cumbersome negotiations, which would make them unsuitable to these environments. The objective of this dissertation is to develop, and test a scalable, lightweight, layer 3 security protocol for vehicular networks, in which nodes of the network are able to set up long-term security associations with a Home Network, avoiding session renegotiations due to lack of connectivity and reduce the protocol stacking. This protocol allows to provide security independent of the nodes (vehicles) position, of its addressing and of the established path to access the Internet, allowing the mobility of vehicles and of its active sessions seamlessly without communication failures.O crescimento da investigação em redes veiculares provocou o aumento da interação nestes ambientes muito dinâmicos no mercado. As arquiteturas desenvolvidas não se focam, no entanto, na segurança. Estratégias comuns de segurança para a Internet, requerem sessões baseadas no IP. Como os endereços dos nós numa rede veicular, e a sua localização e caminhos até à Internet, são muito dinâmicos, as soluções já desenvolvidas para outro tipo de redes iriam requerer renegociações que teriam um grande impacto no desempenho destes ambientes. O objetivo desta dissertação será, portanto, desenvolver e testar um protocolo de segurança implementado na camada 3 para redes veiculares, que seja escalável e leve, em que os nós da rede conseguirão estabelecer associações de segurança de longa duração com a Home Network, evitando renegociações devidas à falta de conectividade, e reduzir o overhead devido ao empilhamento protocolar. Este protocolo permite ter segurança independentemente da posição dos nós (os veículos), do seu endereçamento e do caminho estabelecido para o acesso à Internet, permitindo assim mobilidade dos veículos e das sessões ativas de forma transparente sem falhas na comunicação

The Cryptographic Security of the German Electronic Identity Card

In November 2010, the German government started to issue the new electronic identity card (eID) to its citizens. Besides its original utilization as a ’visual’ identification document, the eID card can be used by the cardholder to prove one’s identity at border control and to enhance security of authentication processes over the Internet, with the eID card serving as a token to reliably transmit personal data to service providers or terminals, respectively. To this end, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) proposed several cryptographic protocols now deployed on the eID card. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol secures the wireless communication between the eID card and the user’s local card reader, based on a cryptographically weak password like the PIN chosen by the card owner. Subsequently, the Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol is executed by the chip and the service provider to mutually authenticate and agree on a shared secret session key. This key is then used in the secure channel protocol, called Secure Messaging (SM). Finally, an optional protocol, called Restricted Identification (RI), provides a method to use pseudonyms such that they can be linked by individual service providers, but not across different service providers (even not by malicious ones). This thesis consists of two parts. First, we present the above protocols and provide a rigorous analysis on their security from a cryptographic point of view. We show that the Germen eID card provides reasonable security for authentication and exchange of sensitive information allaying concerns regarding its usage. In the second part of this thesis, we introduce two possible modifications to enhance the security of these protocols even further. Namely, we show how to (a) add to PACE an additional efficient chip authentication step, and (b) augment RI to allow also for signatures under pseudonyms