A New Prototype for Intelligent Visual Fraud Detection in Agent-Based Auditing Framework

While US. Sarbanes Oxley act has been viewed by most as an onerous and expensive requirement; it is having a positive impact on driving appropriate levels of investment in IT security, controls, and transactional systems. This paper introduces a new secure solution for auditing and accounting based on artificial intelligence technology. These days, security is a big issue among regulatory firms. Big companies are concerned about their data to be disseminated to their competitors; this high risk prevents them to provide full information to the regulatory firms. This solution not only significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized access to the company’s information but also facilitate a framework for controlling the flow of disseminating information in a risk free method. Managing security is performed by a network of mobile agents in a pyramid structure among regulatory organization like securities and exchanges commissions, stock exchanges in top of this pyramid to the companies in the button. Because of security considerations, our strategy is to delegate all fraud detection algorithms to Intelligent Mobile Auditing Agent and web service undertake all inter communicational activity. Web services can follow auditing actives in predefined framework and they can act based on permitted security allowance to auditors. The current solution is designed based on Java-based mobile agents. Such design reaps strong mobility and security benefits. This new prototyped solution could be a framework for strengthening security for future development in this area. An insider trading case study is used to demonstrate and evaluate the approach

The culpability of accounting practice in promoting bribery and corruption in developing countries

Bribery and corruption are increasing in the developing countries. It has been estimated that some $400 billion of bribe is paid to political elite in developing countries. Such huge amounts of money cannot be successfully executed without the active involvement of multinational companies (MNCs) from the Western countries. This paper examines the processes involved in the misapplication of accounting practice from the perspective of anti-social criminal practices. It analyses the implication of accounting practice in the construction of MNCs bribery and corruption activities. The paper locates MNCs enterprise culture and accounting practice within the broader dynamics of global capitalism to argue that the drive for higher profit at almost any cost is not constrained by accounting rules, laws and even periodic regulatory actions. The paper uses publicly available evidence to illuminate the role of accounting technology in concealing and facilitates MNCs corrupt practices in developing countries. Evidence is provided to show that to secure and retain business in developing countries and to gain competitive advantages MNCs have engaged in bribery and corruption. The paper also makes suggestions for reform

What Is Fraud and Who Is Responsible?

Research shows that fraudulent activity affecting the financial statements is more prevalent than ever despite the increased attention devoted to the prevention and detection of fraud by companies and professional accountants. Fraud is a critical issue for preparers and users of financial statements, as well as auditors. Each group’s association and involvement with the financial statements is from a slightly different perspective. Even though all individuals in the financial reporting process share the responsibility for the integrity of the financial statements, different perspectives of fraud can and do affect each group’s interpretation of fraudulent activity and responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud. Accordingly, two questions must be asked: What constitutes fraud, and who is responsible for the detection of fraud? This paper examines the similarities and differences in the definition of fraud, as documented by ten professional organizations, as well as who is responsible for fraud detection

A multi-agent architecture for electronic payment

The Internet has brought about innumerable changes to the way enterprises do business. An essential problem to be solved before the widespread commercial use of the Internet is to provide a trustworthy solution for electronic payment. We propose a multi-agent mediated electronic payment architecture in this paper. It is aimed at providing an agent-based approach to accommodate multiple e-payment schemes. Through a layered design of the payment structure and a well-defined uniform payment interface, the architecture shows good scalability. When a new e-payment scheme or implementation is available, it can be plugged into the framework easily. In addition, we construct a framework allowing multiple agents to work cooperatively to realize automation of electronic payment. A prototype has been built to illustrate the functionality of this design. Finally we discuss the security issues

Characteristics of the Audit Processes for Distributed Informatics Systems

The paper contains issues regarding: main characteristics and examples of the distributed informatics systems and main difference categories among them, concepts, principles, techniques and fields for auditing the distributed informatics systems, concepts and classes of the standard term, characteristics of this one, examples of standards, guidelines, procedures and controls for auditing the distributed informatics systems. The distributed informatics systems are characterized by the following issues: development process, resources, implemented functionalities, architectures, system classes, particularities. The audit framework has two sides: the audit process and auditors. The audit process must be led in accordance with the standard specifications in the IT&C field. The auditors must meet the ethical principles and they must have a high-level of professional skills and competence in IT&C field.informatics audit, characteristic, distributed informatics system, standard

Audit report on the North Iowa Juvenile Detention Services Commission for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the North Iowa Juvenile Detention Services Commission for the year ended June 30, 201

Iowa Egg Council, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2004 & 2005

State Audit Report

Audit report on the Iowa Egg Council for the years ended June 30, 2011 and 2010

Audit report on the Iowa Egg Council for the years ended June 30, 2011 and 201