Individual differences and basic logic ability

The study of reasoning and information processing in cognitive science has often used problems derived from classical propositional logic inference rules in order to see how people make decisions, often comparing the qualities of those that can and cannot successfully complete these tasks. However, the majority of research that has been done has only focused on one inference rule: the material conditional. This narrow focus does not allow for inferences to be made about the role of logical ability simpliciter in cognitive science research. In order to better understand the relationship between cognitive ability and successfully completing tasks based on four binary logical connectives (conjunction, disjunction, material implication, and biconditional), 338 participants were given the Propositional Logic Test (PLT), a N-Back task, a Belief Bias Syllogisms Task, and the Cognitive Reflection Test, that latter two of which have been used in support of a dual-process theory of reasoning. Because no previous research exists examining the dimensionality of the PLT, multiple confirmatory factory analyses (CFA) were performed on the PLT to determine its factor structure. The best fitting model was a 2-factor model with a disjunction factor and conditionals factor, indicating that the PLT is multi-dimensional and there are limitations on its use as a summed score. Multiple regression analyses were then performed on the PLT and the two factors present to reveal what differences between participants may be masked by using the PLT as a summed score. The results indicate that ability to properly make the deductive inferences on the PLT is strongly associated with measures of Type 2 thinking and moderately associated with general intelligence. Furthermore, the disjunction factor was moderately related to both traditional measures of cognitive ability and Type 2 processing, and the conditionals factor was strongly related to the ability to engage in Type 2 processing and only weakly related to traditional measures of cognitive ability. Thus, the ability to engage in specific types of deductive inferences requires different cognitive abilities, and the ability to engage in basic logical reasoning is significantly predicted by measures of general intelligence, but this alone is not sufficient

Understanding counterfactuality:A review of experimental evidence for the dual meaning of counterfactuals

Cognitive and linguistic theories of counterfactual language comprehension assume that counterfactuals convey a dual meaning. Subjunctive-counterfactual conditionals (e.g., ‘If Tom had studied hard, he would have passed the test’) express a supposition while implying the factual state of affairs (Tom has not studied hard and failed). The question of how counterfactual dual meaning plays out during language processing is currently gaining interest in psycholinguistics. Whereas numerous studies using offline measures of language processing consistently support counterfactual dual meaning, evidence coming from online studies is less conclusive. Here, we review the available studies that examine online counterfactual language comprehension through behavioural measurement (self-paced reading times, eye-tracking) and neuroimaging (electroencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging). While we argue that these studies do not offer direct evidence for the online computation of counterfactual dual meaning, they provide valuable information about the way counterfactual meaning unfolds in time and influences successive information processing. Further advances in research on counterfactual comprehension require more specific predictions about how counterfactual dual meaning impacts incremental sentence processing

Proceedings of the Conference "sub8 - Sinn und Bedeutung" : 8th annual meeting of the Gesellschaft für Semantik

The volume is a collection of papers given at the conference “sub8 -- Sinn und Bedeutung”, the eighth annual conference of the Gesellschaft für Semantik, held at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt (Germany) in September 2003. During this conference, experts presented ­ and discussed ­ various aspects of semantics. The very different topics included in this book provide insight into fields of ongoing Semantics research.Mit dem vorliegenden Band halten Sie eine Sammlung von Aufsätzen in Händen, die bei "Sinn und Bedeutung VIII", der Jahrestagung der "Gesellschaft für Semantik" in der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main, im September 2003 vorgestellt worden sind. Die Beiträge umfassen verschiedenste Aspekte aktueller Semantik-Forschung und lassen sich inhaltlich den folgenden Kategorien zuordnen: (i) Semantik von Topic und Focus [Ebert / Endriss, Gyuris, Kaiser / Trueswell, Lee, Umbach, Wedgewood]; (ii) Semantik und Pragmatik von Fragen [Beck, Benz, Dekker]; (iii) Semantik von Tense und Voice [Fernando, Lekaku, Sailer]; (iv) Das Syntax-Semantik Interface [Kobuchi-Philip, Stateva, Zeijlstra], (v) Modalität [van Rooy, Copley] und (vi) Semantik [Aksan, Nicolas, Schäfer, Schlücker, Seong, Zwarts]

Swahili conditional constructions in embodied Frames of Reference: Modeling semantics, pragmatics, and context-sensitivity in UML mental spaces

Studies of several languages, including Swahili [swa], suggest that realis (actual, realizable) and irrealis (unlikely, counterfactual) meanings vary along a scale (e.g., 0.0–1.0). T-values (True, False) and P-values (probability) account for this pattern. However, logic cannot describe or explain (a) epistemic stances toward beliefs, (b) deontic and dynamic stances toward states-of-being and actions, and (c) context-sensitivity in conditional interpretations. (a)–(b) are deictic properties (positions, distance) of ‘embodied’ Frames of Reference (FoRs)—space-time loci in which agents perceive and from which they contextually act (Rohrer 2007a, b). I argue that the embodied FoR describes and explains (a)–(c) better than T-values and P-values alone. In this cognitive-functional-descriptive study, I represent these embodied FoRs using Unified Modeling Language (UML) mental spaces in analyzing Swahili conditional constructions to show how necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions obtain on the embodied FoR networks level

Swahili conditional constructions in embodied Frames of Reference: Modeling semantics, pragmatics, and context-sensitivity in UML mental spaces

Studies of several languages, including Swahili [swa], suggest that realis (actual, realizable) and irrealis (unlikely, counterfactual) meanings vary along a scale (e.g., 0.0–1.0). T-values (True, False) and P-values (probability) account for this pattern. However, logic cannot describe or explain (a) epistemic stances toward beliefs, (b) deontic and dynamic stances toward states-of-being and actions, and (c) context-sensitivity in conditional interpretations. (a)–(b) are deictic properties (positions, distance) of ‘embodied’ Frames of Reference (FoRs)—space-time loci in which agents perceive and from which they contextually act (Rohrer 2007a, b). I argue that the embodied FoR describes and explains (a)–(c) better than T-values and P-values alone. In this cognitive-functional-descriptive study, I represent these embodied FoRs using Unified Modeling LanguageTM (UML) mental spaces in analyzing Swahili conditional constructions to show how necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions obtain on the embodied FoR networks level.Swahili, conditional constructions, UML, mental spaces, Frames of Reference, epistemic stance, deontic stance, dynamic stance, context-sensitivity, non-monotonic logi

An explanation of or-deletions and other paradoxical disjunctive inferences

Some inferences of the sort: A or B; therefore A, which are invalid in standard logics, are sensible in life: You can enter now or later; therefore, you can enter now. That these "or-deletions" follow necessarily or only possibly is a by-product of a theory of mental models. Its semantics for "or" refers to conjunctions of possibilities holding in default of knowledge to the contrary. It predicts new sorts of or-deletion, such as: He likes to drink red wine or white wine. So, he likes to drink red wine. and: You are permitted to do only one of the following: You can enter now. You can enter later. Therefore, you are permitted to enter now. They are invalid in standard logics, and neither previous pragmatic nor semantic theories predicted them. Four experiments corroborated their occurrence.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia - FCTinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Proceedings of the 2010 Annual Conference of the Gesellschaft für Semantik

Sinn & Bedeutung - the annual conference of the Gesellschaft für Semantik - aims to bring together both established researchers and new blood working on current issues in natural language semantics, pragmatics, the syntax-semantics interface, the philosophy of language or carrying out psycholinguistic studies related to meaning. Every year, the conference moves to a different location in Europe. The 2010 conference - Sinn & Bedeutung 15 - took place on September 9 - 11 at Saarland University, Saarbrücken, organized by the Department for German Studies