Predicting utility under satiation and habituation

We introduce a modification of the discounted utility model that accounts for both habituation and satiation in intertemporal choice. Habituation level and satiation level are state variables that induce changes in preferences as those states vary. We examine several properties of our model, discuss willingness to pay for an additional unit of consumption, and characterize the optimal consumption path. Predicted utility under projection bias and narrow bracketing is compared to actual realized utility. We argue that projection bias and narrow bracketing successfully explain the hedonic treadmill in the research area of happiness and life satisfaction.Time preference; discounted utility; habituation; satiation; local substitution; well-being; life satisfaction;

How uncertain are the welfare costs of inflation?

This paper quantifies some of the general equilibrium costs of inflation for the UK using a shopping-time model. It tests whether money balances tend to a finite number as nominal interest rates tend to zero, and explores how uncertainties about the shape of the money demand curve translate into uncertainties about these welfare costs of inflation. A key uncertainty is the existence of a satiation point for money balances. We show that without observations at nominal interest rates close to zero, the power of satiation tests can be low.

Achievable Outcomes in Smooth Dynamic Contribution Games

This paper studies a class of dynamic voluntary contribution games in a setting with discounting and neoclassical payoffs (differentiable, strictly concave in the public good, and quasilinear in the private good). An achievable profile is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path -- the ultimate cumulative contribution vector of the players. A profile is shown to be achievable only if it is in the undercore of the underlying coalitional game, i.e., the profile cannot be blocked by a coalition using a component-wise smaller profile. Conversely, if free-riding incentives are strong enough that contributing zero is a dominant strategy in the stage games, then any undercore profile is the limit of achievable profiles as the period length shrinks. Thus, in this case when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable contributions does not depend on whether the players can move simultaneously or only in a round-robin fashion; (ii) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core of the underlying coalitional game; and (iii) any achievable profile can be achieved almost instantly.dynamic games, monotone games, core, public goods, voluntary contribution, gradualism

Inflation targeting in a St. Louis model of the 21st century

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ; Inflation (Finance)

Does more money buy you more happiness?

Why do we believe that more money will buy us more happiness (when in fact it does not)? In this paper, we propose a model to explain this puzzle. The model incorporates both adaptation and social comparison. A rational person who fully accounts for the dynamics of these factors would indeed buy more happiness with money. We argue that projection bias, that is, the tendency to project into the future our current reference levels, precludes subjects from correctly calculating the utility obtained from consumption. Projection bias has two effects. First, it makes people overrate the happiness that they will obtain from money. Second, it makes people misallocate the consumption budget by consuming too much at the beginning of the planning horizon, or consuming too much of adaptive goods.Happiness; Life Satisfaction; Social Comparison; Consumer Life-Cycle Planning; Projection Bias;

On the Microeconomics of Diversification under Uncertainty and Learning

This paper investigates the microeconomics of diversification, based on a two-period model of an owner-managed firm facing uncertainty. The analysis utilizes a general state-contingent representation of uncertainty and learning. Economies of diversification are defined based on a certainty equivalent, which has three components: expected profit, the risk premium (measuring the cost of risk aversion), and the value of information associated with learning. The influence of scale effects, "trans-ray concavity" effects, and income effects on economies of diversification are examined in detail. We argue that, while scope economies and risk aversion can provide general incentives for diversification, information and learning can have the opposite effect. By integrating scope, risk, and the role of information, our analysis provides new insights on existing economic tradeoffs between firm diversification and specialization.

Deflationary Bubbles

We analyse deflationary bubbles in a model where money is the only financial asset. We show that such bubbles are consistent with the household's transversality condition if and only if the nominal money stock is falling. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in several prominent contributions to the literature, where deflationary bubbles are ruled out by appealing to a non-standard transversality condition, originally due to Brock. This condition, which we dub the GABOR condition, states that the consumer must be indifferent between reducing his money holdings by one unit and leaving them unchanged and enjoying the discounted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money forever. We show that the GABOR condition is not part of the necessary and sufficient conditions for household optimality nor is it sufficient to rule out deflationary bubbles. Moreover, it rules out Friedman's optimal quantity of money equilibrium and, when the nominal money stock is falling, it rules out deflationary bubbles that are consistent with household optimality. We also consider economies with real and nominal government debt and small open economies where private agents can lend to and borrow from abroad. In these cases, deflationary bubbles may be possible, even when the nominal money stock is rising. Their existence is shown to depend on the rules governing the issuance of government debt.

The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions

The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as means to reduce government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter the marginal benefit of the public good is sufficiently high. The results hold when politicians seek re-election because of exogenous benefits of holding office. By contrast, when politicians hold office only to extract rents, tax competition is harmful if politicians are sufficiently patient.Tax competition; welfare effects; comparative politics approach

Money as a mechanism in a Bewley economy

We study what features an economic environment might possess, such that it would be Pareto efficient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money. We prove a conjecture that is essentially due to Bewley [1980,1983]. Monetary spot trading is nearly efficient when there is only a single perishable good (or a composite commodity) at each date and state of the world; random shocks are idiosyncratic, privately observed, and temporary; markets are competitive; and the agents are very patient. This result is a fairly close analogue, for trade using outside, fiat money, of a recent characterization by Levine and Zame [2002] of environments in which spot trade using inside money, in the form of one-period debt payable in a commodity, is nearly Pareto efficient. We also study a example where expansionary monetary mechanism Pareto dominates laissez-faire or contractionary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient agents.Money ; Monetary theory

Thinness and Obesity: A Model of Food Consumption, Health Concerns, and Social Pressure

The increasing concern of the policy maker about eating behavior has focused on thespread of obesity and on the evidence of a consistent number of individuals dietingdespite being underweight. As the latter behavior is often attributed to the socialpressure to be thin, some governments have already taken actions to ban ultra-thinideals and testimonials. Assuming that people are heterogeneous in their healthyweights, but are exposed to the same ideal body weight, this paper proposes atheoretical framework to assess whether increasing the ideal body weight is sociallydesirable, both from a welfare and from a health point of view. If being overweightis the average condition and the ideal body weight is thin, increasing the ideal bodyweight may increase welfare by reducing social pressure. By contrast, health is onaverage reduced, since people depart even further from their healthy weight. Giventhat in the US and in Europe people are on average overweight, we conclude thatthese policies, even when are welfare improving, may foster the obesity epidemic.Body Weight, Diet, Obesity, Social Pressure, Underweight.