Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality

We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this super- majority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high

Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records

The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.

Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records

In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This paper presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters' past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers.

Elemental Tests of the Traditional Rational Voting Model

A simple, robust, quasi-linear, structural general equilibrium rational voting model indicates turnout by voters motivated by the possibility of deciding the outcome is bellcurved in the ex-post winning margin and inversely proportional to electorate size. Applying this model to a large set of union certification elections, which often end in ties, yields exacting, lucid tests of the theory. Voter turnout is strongly related to election closeness, but not in the way predicted by the theory. Thus, this relation is generated by some other mechanism, which is indeterminate, as no existing theory explains the nonlinear patterns of turnout in the data.

False Consensus Voting and Welfare Reducing Polls

We consider a process of costly majority voting where people anticipate that others have similar preferences. This perceived consensus of opinion is the outcome of a fully rational Bayesian updating process where individuals consider their own tastes as draws from a population. We show that the correlation in preferences lowers expected turnout. The intuition is that votes have a positive externality on those who don’t participate, which reduces incentives to participate. We study the effects of the public release of information (“polls”) on participation levels. We find that polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they stimulate the “wrong” group to participate. As a result, polls frequently predict the wrong outcome. While this lack of prediction power is usually attributed to an imperfect polling technology, we show it may result from the reaction of rational voters to the poll’s accurate information.Majority Voting; Correlated Preferences; False Consensus; Pre-election Polls

Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the `worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d smaller than n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d `ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d=1 and 2.

The Effects of a Provision Rule in Choice Modelling

This research report investigates the effects of including a provision rule in choice modelling non-market valuation studies. Split samples with and without a provision rule were used to test for differences in household willingness-to-pay for improvements in environmental quality in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment. Local/rural and distant/urban sub-samples of residents were selected. The results of the study show that the inclusion of a provision rule had an effect on preferences in the distant/urban communities; however, the impact of a provision rule in the local/rural community sub-samples was negligible.Choice modelling, incentive comparability, provision rule, non-market valuation, environment, Environmental Economics and Policy, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

Framing for incentive compatibility in choice modelling

The incentives that motivate respondents to reveal their preferences truthfully have been a long-standing area of research in the non-market valuation literature. A number of studies have been undertaken to investigate incentive compatibility in nonmarket valuation. Most of these used laboratory environments rather than field surveys (e.g. Carson and Burton, 2008, Harrison, 2007, Lusk and Schroeder, 2004, Racevskis and Lupi, 2008). Only a few studies investigating incentive compatibility have considered multi-attribute public goods with an explicit provision rule in a choice experiment (Carson and Groves, 2007, Collins and Vossler, 2009, Carson and Burton, 2008). The design of a choice modelling study that avoids strategic behaviour has proven particularly difficult because of multiple choices and difficulties in developing a majority voting provision rule. This study investigates the impact of the inclusion of a framing statement for incentive compatibility in a field survey choice modelling study. An incentive compatible statement (provision rule) that sets out to respondents the rule relating to when the good under consideration will be provided was employed. The impact of a provision rule across three alternative choice modelling multiple choice questionnaires was tested by comparing results between split samples with and without a provision rule. Four split samples were used to test the impact of a provision rule on preferences across different communities including local/rural residents and distant/urban residents. A choice modelling analysis that involved a conditional logit model and a random parameter model was used to elicit household willingness to pay for improvements in environmental quality in the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment. The results of the study show that the inclusion of a provision rule had an effect on preferences in the distant/urban communities. However, the impact of a provision rule in the local/rural community sub-samples was negligible. This study suggests that the impact of a provision rule should be analysed in the context of different community characteristics.Choice modelling, Incentive comparability, Provision rule, Non-market valuation, Environment, Environmental Economics and Policy,