Computer-aided verification in mechanism design

In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in complicated strategizing. While incentive properties are simple to state, their proofs are specific to the mechanism and can be quite complex. This raises two concerns. From a practical perspective, checking a complex proof can be a tedious process, often requiring experts knowledgeable in mechanism design. Furthermore, from a modeling perspective, if unsophisticated agents are unconvinced of incentive properties, they may strategize in unpredictable ways. To address both concerns, we explore techniques from computer-aided verification to construct formal proofs of incentive properties. Because formal proofs can be automatically checked, agents do not need to manually check the properties, or even understand the proof. To demonstrate, we present the verification of a sophisticated mechanism: the generic reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design given by Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian. This mechanism presents new challenges for formal verification, including essential use of randomness from both the execution of the mechanism and from the prior type distributions. As an immediate consequence, our work also formalizes Bayesian incentive compatibility for the entire family of mechanisms derived via this reduction. Finally, as an intermediate step in our formalization, we provide the first formal verification of incentive compatibility for the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization

The design of profit-maximizing multi-item mechanisms is a notoriously challenging problem with tremendous real-world impact. The mechanism designer's goal is to field a mechanism with high expected profit on the distribution over buyers' values. Unfortunately, if the set of mechanisms he optimizes over is complex, a mechanism may have high empirical profit over a small set of samples but low expected profit. This raises the question, how many samples are sufficient to ensure that the empirically optimal mechanism is nearly optimal in expectation? We uncover structure shared by a myriad of pricing, auction, and lottery mechanisms that allows us to prove strong sample complexity bounds: for any set of buyers' values, profit is a piecewise linear function of the mechanism's parameters. We prove new bounds for mechanism classes not yet studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature and match or improve over the best known guarantees for many classes. The profit functions we study are significantly different from well-understood functions in machine learning, so our analysis requires a sharp understanding of the interplay between mechanism parameters and buyer values. We strengthen our main results with data-dependent bounds when the distribution over buyers' values is "well-behaved." Finally, we investigate a fundamental tradeoff in sample-based mechanism design: complex mechanisms often have higher profit than simple mechanisms, but more samples are required to ensure that empirical and expected profit are close. We provide techniques for optimizing this tradeoff

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

Synthetic biology and microdevices : a powerful combination

Recent developments demonstrate that the combination of microbiology with micro-and nanoelectronics is a successful approach to develop new miniaturized sensing devices and other technologies. In the last decade, there has been a shift from the optimization of the abiotic components, for example, the chip, to the improvement of the processing capabilities of cells through genetic engineering. The synthetic biology approach will not only give rise to systems with new functionalities, but will also improve the robustness and speed of their response towards applied signals. To this end, the development of new genetic circuits has to be guided by computational design methods that enable to tune and optimize the circuit response. As the successful design of genetic circuits is highly dependent on the quality and reliability of its composing elements, intense characterization of standard biological parts will be crucial for an efficient rational design process in the development of new genetic circuits. Microengineered devices can thereby offer a new analytical approach for the study of complex biological parts and systems. By summarizing the recent techniques in creating new synthetic circuits and in integrating biology with microdevices, this review aims at emphasizing the power of combining synthetic biology with microfluidics and microelectronics

MORPH: A Reference Architecture for Configuration and Behaviour Self-Adaptation

An architectural approach to self-adaptive systems involves runtime change of system configuration (i.e., the system's components, their bindings and operational parameters) and behaviour update (i.e., component orchestration). Thus, dynamic reconfiguration and discrete event control theory are at the heart of architectural adaptation. Although controlling configuration and behaviour at runtime has been discussed and applied to architectural adaptation, architectures for self-adaptive systems often compound these two aspects reducing the potential for adaptability. In this paper we propose a reference architecture that allows for coordinated yet transparent and independent adaptation of system configuration and behaviour