Cyberian Signals

In Law and Social Norms, Eric Posner offers an original and important theory of the emergence of norms. According to Posner, norms are collections of signals. He develops his signaling account in a variety of contexts, including criminal law, family law, political participation, and racial discrimination. This article extends Posner\u27s theory to cyberspace, a domain of social organization not touched on in Posner\u27s book. In particular, I will test Posner\u27s theory by examining how well it explains the emergence of Web site privacy norms. Part One will examine signaling theory. Part Two will explore privacy norms in some detail, and Part Three then will apply signaling theory to privacy norms. The conclusion states that these new norms are not best understood as collections of signals

Organizational Inducements and Social Motives: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Game theory was used to analyze compensation systems based on individual and group incentives. Payoff formulas were developed for these incentives assuming different preferences for individual and social outcomes. Two levels of contributions were considered: (1) Defection. The minimum acceptable level of contributions, and (2) Cooperation. A level of discretionary contributions above the minimum. The discretionary contributions associated with cooperation were represented as a cost to the individual. A classification scheme for uniform n-person games was developed using the approach of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) for 2 x 2 games. This classification scheme defines the natural outcome (cooperation or defection) for each game. The analysis considered the Individual motive, based on maximizing self-interest, and five social motives (Collective, Competitive, Altruism, Equity and Aggression). These motives reflect preferences for outcomes based on payoffs to self and others. The results indicate the natural outcome and game category for different values of the individual and group incentive factors. Satisficing theory was also used to analyze the natural outcome for the Individual motive. Evolutionary game theory was used to develop two simulation models for social motives. The models interpret social motives as (1) genuine preferences for specific social outcomes, or (2) indirect strategies for maximizing individual payoffs. These models explore the interaction of social motives and the resulting impact on the level of cooperation. The results were used to develop effectiveness criteria for selecting inducement systems which should promote cooperation. Additionally, cost curves were used to determine the least cost inducement system. Based on these results, inducement systems using absolute incentives are recommended over systems using competitive incentives. Competitive incentives should only be considered when there is limited need for coordination between individuals and where aggressive and/or competitive behavior is acceptable. The study has theoretical as well as practical implications. Game theory provides a method for expanding expectancy theory to include expectations about the actions of others and provides a framework for integrating expectancy theory and other theories based on social motives (e.g. equity theory). The use of dynamic models from evolutionary game theory breaks new ground in the theory of motivation

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’

When Nice Guys Finish First: The Evolution of Cooperation, The Study of Law, and the Ordering of Legal Regimes

This Note adds to the scholarship in the area of Evolutionary Analysis and the Law (EA). EA is a paradigm that comments on the implications of evolution on the law. EA recognizes that many complex human behaviors that the law seeks to regulate have evolutionary origins that remain relevant today. This Note details how an understanding of the evolutionary basis of cooperation can bring about favorable revisions and reforms in the law. Following a review of the scientific foundation of EA, this Note sets forth the proposition that humans have an evolutionarily developed tendency to cooperate, an idea that contrasts the widely held belief that the evolutionary man is purely self-interested. This Note does, however, observe that the tendency to cooperate is not expressed at all times. This Note then explores the implications of EA on other areas of legal scholarship, such as behavioral law and economics, default rules in partnership law, and efficient mechanisms of trade. This Note concludes by addressing the concerns of EA critics and mapping a path for the future of EA

Justification of coercion.

Abstract available in pdf file

Social cooperation : redefining the self in self-interest

This thesis examines the social psychological process underlying social cooperation. Reviews are presented of (a) the interdependence account of social cooperation; and (b) the structure of and solutions to social dilemmas, the paradigm through which social cooperation is studied. Based on these reviews, two assumptions in this literature are then elaborated on: (i) the primacy of the individual self and (ii) the conceptualization of the group. Building on this critique, a theoretical review of the social identity account is then presented, through the development of social identity and self-categorization theories. While both the interdependence and social identity accounts grew from the work of the early interactionists -- Lewin, Asch and Sherif-- these accounts are now fundamentally distinct. Interdependence theorists understand social cooperation as a function of interdependence structure and transformational processes of individuals; while, social identity theorists understand social cooperation as a function of social context and categorization processes of individuals. While the latter approach does not discount the role that objective interdependence can play in social identification, it argues that interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and sufficient conditions underlying social cooperation. The empirical work of this thesis aims to build support for the social identity approach to the understanding of social cooperation. Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested is that social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity. The empirical strategy is to build a systematic account of social cooperation from a self-categorization perspective while targeting the fundamental theoretical constructs of interdependence theory, specifically the role of objective interdependence and the transformational processes of social value orientations. The role of objective interdependence is examined in Experiment 1, 3, and 4, and social value orientations in Experiment 2. Finally, Experiment 5 directly tests the hypothesis that social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity through a manipulation of salience of social identification. These findings are considered in relation to the theoretical approaches reviewed, with the conclusion being reached that interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and sufficient conditions underlying social cooperation. In contrast, the findings show general support for the self-categorization account of the social psychological mechanism underlying social cooperation. This theoretical analysis allows us to re-define the self in self-interest

Why would a philosopher take an artist seriously? Nietzsche on Wagner, Heidegger on Hölderlin, Adorno on Schönberg.

The centrality to philosophy of the relation between philosophers and artists is as old as philosophy itself. Regardless of whether one accepts Arthur C. Danto's claim that 'philosophy down the ages has consisted in placing codicils to the platonic testament', it is difficult to ignore the challenge the ancient Greek thinker posed when he excluded artists from his Republic. My thesis takes up this challenge head-on, critically asking why a philosopher would take an artist seriously, why addressing artists is so essential to engaging with society and even the world. As it turns out, this question itself involves several queries. The first wants to understand what it means to take someone seriously at all, to understand that to take seriously is to run the risk of taking too seriously, and thereby to fall into ridicule. The second links these insights into seriousness' non-seriousness to the particular case of philosophers and artists. This is to recognize that for a philosopher the recourse to the artist is a claim about the seriousness, not just of the artist, but also of the world itself. It is the claim that our conception of the world is at stake, is serious. Thirdly, we must account for the model of art and artists in this conception, and grasp that the exemplarity of artists is simultaneously their counter-exemplarity. As such, the exemplarity of the artist is indeed his inappropriateness to the Republic, but also the basis for there being any Republic at all. In order to address these queries, the thesis focuses on three prototypical examples: Friedrich Nietzsche on Richard Wagner, Martin Heidegger on Friedrich Hölderlin, and Theodor Adorno on Arnold Schönberg. In all three cases, the recourse to the artist is central to the philosopher's greater philosophical project, and for each, the artist stands as a potential model for our necessary engagement with the world