Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey

The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures: 1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts. We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.Comment: Revised version of the SECOQC White Paper. Published in the special issue on QKD of TCS, Theoretical Computer Science (2014), pp. 62-8

Field test of a practical secure communication network with decoy-state quantum cryptography

We present a secure network communication system that operated with decoy-state quantum cryptography in a real-world application scenario. The full key exchange and application protocols were performed in real time among three nodes, in which two adjacent nodes were connected by approximate 20 km of commercial telecom optical fiber. The generated quantum keys were immediately employed and demonstrated for communication applications, including unbreakable real-time voice telephone between any two of the three communication nodes, or a broadcast from one node to the other two nodes by using one-time pad encryption.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, typos correcte

Metropolitan all-pass and inter-city quantum communication network

We have demonstrated a metropolitan all-pass quantum communication network in field fiber for four nodes. Any two nodes of them can be connected in the network to perform quantum key distribution (QKD). An optical switching module is presented that enables arbitrary 2-connectivity among output ports. Integrated QKD terminals are worked out, which can operate either as a transmitter, a receiver, or even both at the same time. Furthermore, an additional link in another city of 60 km fiber (up to 130 km) is seamless integrated into this network based on a trusted relay architecture. On all the links, we have implemented protocol of decoy state scheme. All of necessary electrical hardware, synchronization, feedback control, network software, execution of QKD protocols are made by tailored designing, which allow a completely automatical and stable running. Our system has been put into operation in Hefei in August 2009, and publicly demonstrated during an evaluation conference on quantum network organized by the Chinese Academy of Sciences on August 29, 2009. Real-time voice telephone with one-time pad encoding between any two of the five nodes (four all-pass nodes plus one additional node through relay) is successfully established in the network within 60km.Comment: 9 pages, 2 figures, 2 table

Quantum key distribution and cryptography: a survey

I will try to partially answer, based on a review on recent work, the following question: Can QKD and more generally quantum information be useful to cover some practical security requirements in current (and future) IT infrastructures ? I will in particular cover the following topics - practical performances of QKD - QKD network deployment - SECOQC project - Capabilities of QKD as a cryptographic primitive - comparative advantage with other solution, in order to cover practical security requirements - Quantum information and Side-channels - QKD security assurance - Thoughts about "real" Post-Quantum Cryptograph

The Case for Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figure; to appear in proceedings of QuantumComm 2009 Workshop on Quantum and Classical Information Security; version 2 minor content revision

Outline of the SECOQC Quantum-Key-Distribution Network in Vienna

A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network is currently implemented in Vienna by integrating seven QKD-Link devices that connect five subsidiaries of SIEMENS Austria. We give an architectural overview of the network and present the enabling QKD-technologies, as well as the novel QKD network protocols.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure