Dynamic Shifting of Virtual Network Topologies for Network Attack Prevention

Computer networks were not designed with security in mind, making research into the subject of network security vital. Virtual Networks are similar to computer networks, except the components of a Virtual Network are in software rather than hardware. With the constant threat of attacks on networks, security is always a big concern, and Virtual Networks are no different. Virtual Networks have many potential attack vectors similar to physical networks, making research into Virtual Network security of great importance. Virtual Networks, since they are composed of virtualized network components, have the ability to dynamically change topologies. In this paper, we explore Virtual Networks and their ability to quickly shift their network topology. We investigate the potential use of this flexibility to protect network resources and defend against malicious activities. To show the ability of reactively shifting a Virtual Network’s topology to se- cure a network, we create a set of four experiments, each with a different dynamic topology shift, or “dynamic defense”. These four groups of experiments are called the Server Protection, Isolated Subnet, Distributed Port Group, and Standard Port Group experiments. The Server Protection experiments involve detecting an attack against a server and shifting the server behind a protected subnet. The other three sets of experiments, called Attacker Prevention experiments, involve detecting a malicious node in the internal network and initiating a dynamic de- fense to move the attacker behind a protected subnet. Each Attacker Prevention experiment utilizes a different dynamic defense to prevent the malicious node from attacking the rest of the Virtual Network. For each experiment, we run 6 different network attacks to validate the effectiveness of the dynamic defenses. The network attacks utilized for each experiment are ICMP Flooding, TCP Syn Flooding, Smurf attack, ARP Spoofing, DNS Spoofing, and NMAP Scanning. Our validation shows that our dynamic defenses, outside of the standard port group, are very effective in stopping each attack, consistently lowering the at- tacks’ success rate significantly. The Standard Port Group was the one dynamic defense that is ineffective, though there are also a couple of experiments that could benefit from being run with more attackers and with different situations to fully understand the effectiveness of the defenses. We believe that, as Virtual Networks become more common and utilized outside of data centers, the ability to dynamically shift topology can be used for network security purposes

FS-OpenSecurity : A taxonomic modeling of security threats in SDN for future sustainable computing

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Container network functions: bringing NFV to the network edge

In order to cope with the increasing network utilization driven by new mobile clients, and to satisfy demand for new network services and performance guarantees, telecommunication service providers are exploiting virtualization over their network by implementing network services in virtual machines, decoupled from legacy hardware accelerated appliances. This effort, known as NFV, reduces OPEX and provides new business opportunities. At the same time, next generation mobile, enterprise, and IoT networks are introducing the concept of computing capabilities being pushed at the network edge, in close proximity of the users. However, the heavy footprint of today's NFV platforms prevents them from operating at the network edge. In this article, we identify the opportunities of virtualization at the network edge and present Glasgow Network Functions (GNF), a container-based NFV platform that runs and orchestrates lightweight container VNFs, saving core network utilization and providing lower latency. Finally, we demonstrate three useful examples of the platform: IoT DDoS remediation, on-demand troubleshooting for telco networks, and supporting roaming of network functions

Policy Conflict Management in Distributed SDN Environments

abstract: The ease of programmability in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) makes it a great platform for implementation of various initiatives that involve application deployment, dynamic topology changes, and decentralized network management in a multi-tenant data center environment. However, implementing security solutions in such an environment is fraught with policy conflicts and consistency issues with the hardness of this problem being affected by the distribution scheme for the SDN controllers. In this dissertation, a formalism for flow rule conflicts in SDN environments is introduced. This formalism is realized in Brew, a security policy analysis framework implemented on an OpenDaylight SDN controller. Brew has comprehensive conflict detection and resolution modules to ensure that no two flow rules in a distributed SDN-based cloud environment have conflicts at any layer; thereby assuring consistent conflict-free security policy implementation and preventing information leakage. Techniques for global prioritization of flow rules in a decentralized environment are presented, using which all SDN flow rule conflicts are recognized and classified. Strategies for unassisted resolution of these conflicts are also detailed. Alternately, if administrator input is desired to resolve conflicts, a novel visualization scheme is implemented to help the administrators view the conflicts in an aesthetic manner. The correctness, feasibility and scalability of the Brew proof-of-concept prototype is demonstrated. Flow rule conflict avoidance using a buddy address space management technique is studied as an alternate to conflict detection and resolution in highly dynamic cloud systems attempting to implement an SDN-based Moving Target Defense (MTD) countermeasures.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Computer Science 201

Hybrid SDN Evolution: A Comprehensive Survey of the State-of-the-Art

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an evolutionary networking paradigm which has been adopted by large network and cloud providers, among which are Tech Giants. However, embracing a new and futuristic paradigm as an alternative to well-established and mature legacy networking paradigm requires a lot of time along with considerable financial resources and technical expertise. Consequently, many enterprises can not afford it. A compromise solution then is a hybrid networking environment (a.k.a. Hybrid SDN (hSDN)) in which SDN functionalities are leveraged while existing traditional network infrastructures are acknowledged. Recently, hSDN has been seen as a viable networking solution for a diverse range of businesses and organizations. Accordingly, the body of literature on hSDN research has improved remarkably. On this account, we present this paper as a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey which expands upon hSDN from many different perspectives

Security attacks and solutions on SDN control plane: A survey

Sommario Software Defined Networks (SDN) è un modello di rete programmabile aperto promosso da ONF , che è stato un fattore chiave per le recenti tendenze tecnologiche. SDN esplora la separazione dei dati e del piano di controllo . Diversamente dai concetti passati, SDN introduce l’idea di separazione del piano di controllo (decisioni di instradamento e traffico) e piano dati (decisioni di inoltro basate sul piano di controllo) che sfida l’integrazione verticale raggiunta dalle reti tradizionali, in cui dispositivi di rete come router e switch accumulano entrambe le funzioni. SDN presenta alcuni vantaggi come la gestione centralizzata e la possibilità di essere programmato su richiesta. Oltre a questi vantaggi, SDN presenta ancora vulnerabilità di sicurezza e, tra queste,le più letali prendono di mira il piano di controllo. Come i controllers che risiedono sul piano di con- trollo gestiscono l’infrastruttura e i dispositivi di rete sottostanti (es. router/switch), anche qualsiasi insicurezza, minacce, malware o problemi durante lo svolgimento delle attività da parte del controller, possono causare interruzioni dell’intera rete. In particolare, per la sua posizione centralizzata, il con- troller SDN è visto come un punto di fallimento. Di conseguenza, qualsiasi attacco o vulnerabilità che prende di mira il piano di controllo o il controller è considerato fatale al punto da sconvolgere l’intera rete. In questa tesi, le minacce alla sicurezza e gli attacchi mirati al piano di controllo (SDN) sono identificati e classificati in diversi gruppi in base a come causano l’impatto sul piano di controllo. Per ottenere risultati, è stata condotta un’ampia ricerca bibliografica attraverso uno studio appro- fondito degli articoli di ricerca esistenti che discutono di una serie di attacchi e delle relative soluzioni per il piano di controllo SDN. Principalmente, come soluzioni intese a rilevare, mitigare o proteggere il (SDN) sono stati presi in considerazione le potenziali minacce gli attachi al piano di controllo. Sulla base di questo compito, gli articoli selezionati sono stati classificati rispetto al loro impatto potenziale sul piano di controllo (SDN) come diretti e indiretti. Ove applicabile, è stato fornito un confronto tra le soluzioni che affrontano lo stesso attacco. Inoltre, sono stati presentati i vantaggi e gli svantaggi delle soluzioni che affrontano diversi attacchi . Infine, una discussione sui risultati e sui esitti ottenuti durante questo processo di indagine e sono stati affrontatti suggerimenti di lavoro futuri estratti du- rante il processo di revisione. Parole chiave : SDN, Sicurezza, Piano di controllo, Denial of Service, Attacchi alla topologiaAbstract Software Defined Networks (SDN) is an open programmable network model promoted by ONF that has been a key-enabler of recent technology trends. SDN explores the separation of data and control plane. Different from the past concepts, SDN introduces the idea of separation of the control plane (routing and traffic decisions) and data plane (forwarding decisions based on the control plane) that challenges the vertical integration achieved by the traditional networks, in which network devices such as router and switches accumulate both functions. SDN presents some advantages such as centralized management and the ability to be programmed on demand. Apart from these benefits, SDN still presents security vulnerabilities and among them, the most lethal ones are targeting the control plane. As the controllers residing on the control plane manages the underlying networking infrastructure and devices (i.e., routers/switches), any security threat, malware, or issues during the carrying out of activities by the controller can lead to disruption of the entire network. In particular, due to its centralized position, the (SDN) controller is seen as a single point of failure. As a result, any attack or vulnerability targeting the control plane or controller is considered fatal to the point of disrupting the whole network. In this thesis, the security threats and attacks targeting the (SDN) control plane are identified and categorized into different groups by considering how they cause an impact to the control plane. To obtain results, extensive literature research has been carried out by performing an in-depth study of the existing research articles that discusses an array of attacks and their corresponding solutions for the (SDN) control plane. Mainly, the solutions intended to detect, mitigate, or protect the (SDN) control plane against potential threats and attacks have been considered. On basis of this task, the potential articles selected were categorized with respect to their impact to the (SDN) control plane as direct and indirect. Where applicable a comparison of the solutions addressing the same attack has been provided. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of the solutions addressing the respective attacks are presented. Finally, a discussion regarding the findings and results obtained during this su- veying process and future work suggestions extracted during the review process have been discussed. Keywords: SDN, Security, Control Plane, Denial of Service, Topology Attacks, Openflo

Systematic Review on Security and Privacy Requirements in Edge Computing: State of the Art and Future Research Opportunities

Edge computing is a promising paradigm that enhances the capabilities of cloud computing. In order to continue patronizing the computing services, it is essential to conserve a good atmosphere free from all kinds of security and privacy breaches. The security and privacy issues associated with the edge computing environment have narrowed the overall acceptance of the technology as a reliable paradigm. Many researchers have reviewed security and privacy issues in edge computing, but not all have fully investigated the security and privacy requirements. Security and privacy requirements are the objectives that indicate the capabilities as well as functions a system performs in eliminating certain security and privacy vulnerabilities. The paper aims to substantially review the security and privacy requirements of the edge computing and the various technological methods employed by the techniques used in curbing the threats, with the aim of helping future researchers in identifying research opportunities. This paper investigate the current studies and highlights the following: (1) the classification of security and privacy requirements in edge computing, (2) the state of the art techniques deployed in curbing the security and privacy threats, (3) the trends of technological methods employed by the techniques, (4) the metrics used for evaluating the performance of the techniques, (5) the taxonomy of attacks affecting the edge network, and the corresponding technological trend employed in mitigating the attacks, and, (6) research opportunities for future researchers in the area of edge computing security and privacy

Application-based authentication on an inter-VM traffic in a Cloud environment

Cloud Computing (CC) is an innovative computing model in which resources are provided as a service over the Internet, on an as-needed basis. It is a large-scale distributed computing paradigm that is driven by economies of scale, in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized, dynamically-scalable, managed computing power, storage, platforms, and services are delivered on demand to external customers over the Internet. Since cloud is often enabled by virtualization and share a common attribute, that is, the allocation of resources, applications, and even OSs, adequate safeguards and security measures are essential. In fact, Virtualization creates new targets for intrusion due to the complexity of access and difficulty in monitoring all interconnection points between systems, applications, and data sets. This raises many questions about the appropriate infrastructure, processes, and strategy for enacting detection and response to intrusion in a Cloud environment. Hence, without strict controls put in place within the Cloud, guests could violate and bypass security policies, intercept unauthorized client data, and initiate or become the target of security attacks. This article shines the light on the issues of security within Cloud Computing, especially inter-VM traffic visibility. In addition, the paper lays the proposition of an Application Based Security (ABS) approach in order to enforce an application-based authentication between VMs, through various security mechanisms, filtering, structures, and policies