79 research outputs found
Revisiting Russell\u27s Theory of Descriptions
Bertrand Russellâs theory of definite descriptions played a significant role in the development of philosophy of language. However, the shift from semantics to pragmatics in the narrative of language philosophy seemed to leave Russellâs theory in the past as an important but obsolete stepping stone. There is a chance that Russell may have been dismissed too casually, and if so, the grounds on which his theory is rejected must be carefully re-evaluated. In this paper I examine two problems with Russellâs theory that extend beyond the most well-known direct criticisms. In particular, I investigate problems with Russellâs approach to egocentricity as well as his treatment of descriptions of fictional subjects. I then proceed to explore the high-level implications of these problems
Experimenting with the king of France: Topics, verifiability and definite descriptions
International audienceDefinite descriptions with reference failure have been argued to give rise to different truth-value intuitions depending on the local linguistic context in which they appear. We conducted an experiment to investigate these alleged differences, thereby contributing new data to the debate. We have found that pragmatic strategies dependent on verification and topicalisation, suggested in the context of trivalent/partial theories, indeed play a role in people's subjective judgments. We discuss the consequences of these findings for all major approaches to definite descriptions (i.e. Russellian, Strawsonian, pragmatic). Finally, we offer a discussion of the relative contribution of verificational and topicality effects on truth values, reaching the conclusion that verification is primarily relevant and topicality is dependent on that. We thus support von Fintel's (2004) position on the primacy of verification, but not his dismissal of topicality as a facto
Reference and Presupposition
The topic of this paper is the logical analysis and translation of definite descriptions (structures of the form âthe Fâ), in particular Bertrand Russellâs Theory of Descriptions, as put forth in âOn Denotingâ (1905). I argue in favor of an opposing theory, a presuppositional analysis of definite descriptions that fits in the tradition of Frege and Strawson, building upon the recent work of Heim and Elbourne. I argue that a definite description has a referential function that is supported by presuppositions of existence and uniqueness located outside of the analyzed sentence. Using a series of example sentences, I show that a presuppositional analysis handles the logic of ordinary language in a manner superior to a Russellian analysis, produces more natural readings of embedded sentences containing definite descriptions, explains why definite descriptions function in a consistent way across different types of sentences, and provides a much better account of the logical commitments of using referential terms. After providing background on Russellâs theory and its criticisms, I review and analyze Elbourneâs examples of sentences embedding definite descriptions in non-doxastic propositional attitudes or the antecedents of conditionals. I then present and analyze my own examples involving embedding within disjunctions and within two kinds of non-statement: questions and commands. I compare the effects of embedding sentences using proper namesâanother kind of referential term. I then analyze some logical consequences of Russellian analysis, and answer a potential Russellian objection
Bivalence and the challenge of truth-value gaps
This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I start by identifying truth-bearers: an utterance, for instance, is a truth-bearer if it says that something is the case. Truth-bearers are evaluable items, with truth- and falsity-conditions statable in corresponding instances of schemas for truth and falsehood. A genuine case of a truth-value gap should be an utterance that is neither true nor false but says something to be the case. But it is inconsistent to accept the schemas for truth and falsehood and the existence of genuine cases of truth-value gaps. Secondly, I expound Williamsonâs argument, which explores this inconsistency, and I identify two kinds of strategy to disarm his argument: those that preserve the schemas for truth and falsehood, and those that do not. Neither strategy is found to be persuasive. Thirdly, I argue that cases of reference failure causing truth-value gaps illustrate the upshot of Williamsonâs argument. Fourthly, I examine Scott Soamesâs account of liar sentences as counterexamples to bivalence. Soames adopts a strategy of the first kind to avoid contradictions. I argue that his solution allows some contradictions to be true, and that he fails to show that liar sentences are truth-bearers. Finally, I examine Charles Travisâs case for isostheneia: an equal balancing of reasons to evaluate a statement as true or as false, in which case a statement is neither. Travis avoids contradictions by adopting a strategy of the second kind. I argue that the schemas for truth and falsehood are immune to Travisâs objections, and that isostheneia fails to identify evaluable items. The cases examined confirm that utterances that are neither true nor false say nothing. My claim is thus that truth-value gaps are not counterexamples to bivalence
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