Intelligence Secrets

Review of James Rusbridger, Betrayal at Pearl Harbour: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II and Bradley Smith Eric Nave: The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-194

Menorah Review (No. 20, Fall, 1990)

Abba Hillel Silver, The Holocaust and American Politics: 1943-1944 -- Different Jews - One Judaism -- Book Briefing -- Rescuing Jews During the Holocaust -- Balancing -- Text and Context: The Case of American Judaism -- Book Briefing

America\u27s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan

During the time President Truman authorized the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, the United States was preparing to invade the Japanese homeland. The brutality and the suicidal defenses of the Japanese military had shown American planners that there was plenty of fight left in a supposedly defeated enemy. Senior military and civilian leaders presented Truman with several options to force the surrender of Japan. The options included the tightening of the naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan, invasion, a negotiated peace settlement, and the atomic bomb became an option, once bomb became operational. Truman received recommendations, advice and proposals from civilian and military leaders within the first two months of taking office after President Roosevelt died. Only after meeting with the senior leadership to discuss the various options did Truman authorize the planning and execution of the invasion of Japan. However, the extremely large casualty estimates presented by the Chiefs of Staff remained a concern for Truman, especially in the wake of the bloody battles on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. These estimates became the driving factor for Truman’s ultimate decision to use the new weapon against Japan and to end the war before anymore Americans service members died unnecessarily. The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was only Truman’s decision to make. All the other leaders provided their recommendations and advice based on the events that shaped the brutalities of the war in the pacific. At no time did Truman receive advice on not using the atomic bomb. Critics and military leaders’ disapproval of his decision came after the war had ended. To this day, Truman’s decision remains a controversial topic among scholars and will continue to be a source of debate well into the future

Realistic caution and ambivalent optimism: US intelligence assessments and war preparations against Japan, 1918-1941

Throughout the years prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the United States defence establishment held an ambiguous view on Japanese policy and strategic aims. A number of factors precluded a clear-cut forecast, among the most important of which was the opportunistic and secretive manner in which Japanese leaders formulated their plans. Under the circumstances, the available intelligence could not provide a definite indication of the moves which the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) would undertake. The situation was further complicated because reliable pieces of evidence revealed Japan did not possess the military and economic resources to defeat a coalition of several Great Powers. The Americans were thus not inclined to expect the Imperial forces to undertake a full-scale conquest of the Asia–Pacific region. The inadequate knowledge of Japanese war plans, in turn, was one of the key factors which led United States defence officials to believe that efforts to bolster their military strength in the Far East were not necessary

Spartan Daily, November 1, 1934

Volume 23, Issue 30https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/2209/thumbnail.jp

Churchill and the Historians

Review of Robert Blake & Roger Louis, eds., Churchill: A Major Reassessment of his Life in Peace and War. London: Oxford University Press, 1992; Tuvia Ben-Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992; Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader: Right or Wrong? London: Bloomsbury, 1991; John Charmley, Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992