Robustness of interdependent random geometric networks

We propose an interdependent random geometric graph (RGG) model for interdependent networks. Based on this model, we study the robustness of two interdependent spatially embedded networks where interdependence exists between geographically nearby nodes in the two networks. We study the emergence of the giant mutual component in two interdependent RGGs as node densities increase, and define the percolation threshold as a pair of node densities above which the mutual giant component first appears. In contrast to the case for a single RGG, where the percolation threshold is a unique scalar for a given connection distance, for two interdependent RGGs, multiple pairs of percolation thresholds may exist, given that a smaller node density in one RGG may increase the minimum node density in the other RGG in order for a giant mutual component to exist. We derive analytical upper bounds on the percolation thresholds of two interdependent RGGs by discretization, and obtain 99% confidence intervals for the percolation thresholds by simulation. Based on these results, we derive conditions for the interdependent RGGs to be robust under random failures and geographical attacks.United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Grant HDTRA1-14-1-0058

Multilayer Networks in a Nutshell

Complex systems are characterized by many interacting units that give rise to emergent behavior. A particularly advantageous way to study these systems is through the analysis of the networks that encode the interactions among the system's constituents. During the last two decades, network science has provided many insights in natural, social, biological and technological systems. However, real systems are more often than not interconnected, with many interdependencies that are not properly captured by single layer networks. To account for this source of complexity, a more general framework, in which different networks evolve or interact with each other, is needed. These are known as multilayer networks. Here we provide an overview of the basic methodology used to describe multilayer systems as well as of some representative dynamical processes that take place on top of them. We round off the review with a summary of several applications in diverse fields of science.Comment: 16 pages and 3 figures. Submitted for publicatio

Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics. Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we show that this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initial conditions