38 research outputs found
PDNPulse: Sensing PCB Anomaly with the Intrinsic Power Delivery Network
The ubiquitous presence of printed circuit boards (PCBs) in modern electronic
systems and embedded devices makes their integrity a top security concern. To
take advantage of the economies of scale, today's PCB design and manufacturing
are often performed by suppliers around the globe, exposing them to many
security vulnerabilities along the segmented PCB supply chain. Moreover, the
increasing complexity of the PCB designs also leaves ample room for numerous
sneaky board-level attacks to be implemented throughout each stage of a PCB's
lifetime, threatening many electronic devices. In this paper, we propose
PDNPulse, a power delivery network (PDN) based PCB anomaly detection framework
that can identify a wide spectrum of board-level malicious modifications.
PDNPulse leverages the fact that the PDN's characteristics are inevitably
affected by modifications to the PCB, no matter how minuscule. By detecting
changes to the PDN impedance profile and using the Frechet distance-based
anomaly detection algorithms, PDNPulse can robustly and successfully discern
malicious modifications across the system. Using PDNPulse, we conduct extensive
experiments on seven commercial-off-the-shelf PCBs, covering different design
scales, different threat models, and seven different anomaly types. The results
confirm that PDNPulse creates an effective security asymmetry between attack
and defense
Self-powered Time-Keeping and Time-of-Occurrence Sensing
Self-powered and passive Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices (e.g. RFID tags, financial assets, wireless sensors and surface-mount devices) have been widely deployed in our everyday and industrial applications. While diverse functionalities have been implemented in passive systems, the lack of a reference clock limits the design space of such devices used for applications such as time-stamping sensing, recording and dynamic authentication. Self-powered time-keeping in passive systems has been challenging because they do not have access to continuous power sources. While energy transducers can harvest power from ambient environment, the intermittent power cannot support continuous operation for reference clocks. The thesis of this dissertation is to implement self-powered time-keeping devices on standard CMOS processes.
In this dissertation, a novel device that combines the physics of quantum tunneling and floating-gate (FG) structures is proposed for self-powered time-keeping in CMOS process. The proposed device is based on thermally assisted Fowler-Nordheim (FN) tunneling process across high-quality oxide layer to discharge the floating-gate node, therefore resulting in a time-dependent FG potential. The device was fully characterized in this dissertation, and it does not require external powering during runtime, making it feasible for passive devices and systems.
Dynamic signature based on the synchronization and desynchronization behavior of the FN timer is proposed for authentication of IoT devices. The self-compensating physics ensure that when distributed timers are subjected to identical environment variances that are common-mode noise, they can maintain synchronization with respect to each other. On the contrary, different environment conditions will desynchronize the timers creating unique signatures. The signatures could be used to differentiate between products that belong to different supply-chains or products that were subjected to malicious tampering. SecureID type dynamic authentication protocols based on the signature generated by the FN timers are proposed and they are proven to be robust to most attacks. The protocols are further analyzed to be lightweight enough for passive devices whose computational sources are limited.
The device could also be applied for self-powered sensing of time-of-occurrence. The prototype was verified by integrating the device with a self-powered mechanical sensor to sense and record time-of-occurrence of mechanical events. The system-on-chip design uses the timer output to modulate a linear injector to stamp the time information into the sensing results. Time-of-occurrence can be reconstructed by training the mathematical model and then applying that to the test data. The design was verified to have a high reconstruction accuracy
Towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware
Historically, hardware was thought to be inherently secure and trusted due to its
obscurity and the isolated nature of its design and manufacturing. In the last two
decades, however, hardware trust and security have emerged as pressing issues.
Modern day hardware is surrounded by threats manifested mainly in undesired
modifications by untrusted parties in its supply chain, unauthorized and pirated
selling, injected faults, and system and microarchitectural level attacks. These threats,
if realized, are expected to push hardware to abnormal and unexpected behaviour
causing real-life damage and significantly undermining our trust in the electronic and
computing systems we use in our daily lives and in safety critical applications. A
large number of detective and preventive countermeasures have been proposed in
literature. It is a fact, however, that our knowledge of potential consequences to
real-life threats to hardware trust is lacking given the limited number of real-life
reports and the plethora of ways in which hardware trust could be undermined. With
this in mind, run-time monitoring of hardware combined with active mitigation of
attacks, referred to as trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware, is proposed
as the last line of defence. This last line of defence allows us to face the issue of live
hardware mistrust rather than turning a blind eye to it or being helpless once it occurs.
This thesis proposes three different frameworks towards trustworthy computing
on untrustworthy hardware. The presented frameworks are adaptable to different
applications, independent of the design of the monitored elements, based on
autonomous security elements, and are computationally lightweight. The first
framework is concerned with explicit violations and breaches of trust at run-time,
with an untrustworthy on-chip communication interconnect presented as a potential
offender. The framework is based on the guiding principles of component guarding,
data tagging, and event verification. The second framework targets hardware elements
with inherently variable and unpredictable operational latency and proposes a
machine-learning based characterization of these latencies to infer undesired latency
extensions or denial of service attacks. The framework is implemented on a DDR3
DRAM after showing its vulnerability to obscured latency extension attacks. The
third framework studies the possibility of the deployment of untrustworthy hardware
elements in the analog front end, and the consequent integrity issues that might arise
at the analog-digital boundary of system on chips. The framework uses machine
learning methods and the unique temporal and arithmetic features of signals at this
boundary to monitor their integrity and assess their trust level
Biometrics & [and] Security:Combining Fingerprints, Smart Cards and Cryptography
Since the beginning of this brand new century, and especially since the 2001 Sept 11 events in the U.S, several biometric technologies are considered mature enough to be a new tool for security. Generally associated to a personal device for privacy protection, biometric references are stored in secured electronic devices such as smart cards, and systems are using cryptographic tools to communicate with the smart card and securely exchange biometric data. After a general introduction about biometrics, smart cards and cryptography, a second part will introduce our work with fake finger attacks on fingerprint sensors and tests done with different materials. The third part will present our approach for a lightweight fingerprint recognition algorithm for smart cards. The fourth part will detail security protocols used in different applications such as Personal Identity Verification cards. We will discuss our implementation such as the one we developed for the NIST to be used in PIV smart cards. Finally, a fifth part will address Cryptography-Biometrics interaction. We will highlight the antagonism between Cryptography â determinism, stable data â and Biometrics â statistical, error-prone â. Then we will present our application of challenge-response protocol to biometric data for easing the fingerprint recognition process
Model Building and Security Analysis of PUF-Based Authentication
In the context of hardware systems, authentication refers to the process of confirming the identity and authenticity of chip, board and system components such as RFID tags, smart cards and remote sensors. The ability of physical unclonable functions (PUF) to provide bitstrings unique to each component can be leveraged as an authentication mechanism to detect tamper, impersonation and substitution of such components. However, authentication requires a strong PUF, i.e., one capable of producing a large, unique set of bits per device, and, unlike secret key generation for encryption, has additional challenges that relate to machine learning attacks, protocol attacks and constraints on device resources. We describe the requirements for PUF-based authentication, and present a PUF primitive and protocol designed for authentication in resource constrained devices. Our experimental results are derived from a 28 nm Xilinx FPGA.
In the authentication scenario, strong PUFs are required since the adversary could collect a subset of challenges and response pairsto build a model and predict the responses for unseen challenges. Therefore, strong PUFs need to provide exponentially large challenge space and be resilient to model building attacks. We investigate the security properties of a Hardware-embedded Delay PUF called HELP which leverages within-die variations in path delays within a hardware-implemented macro (functional unit) as the entropy source. Several features of the HELP processing engine significantly improve its resistance to model-building attacks. We also investigate a novel technique that significantly improves the statistically quality of the generated bitstring for HELP.
Stability across environmental variations such as temperature and voltage, is critically important for Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Nearly all existing PUF systems to date need a mechanism to deal with âbit flipsâ when exact regeneration of the bitstring is required, e.g., for cryptographic applications. Error correction (ECC) and error avoidance schemes have been proposed but both of these require helper data to be stored for the regeneration process. Unfortunately, helper data adds time and area overhead to the PUF system and provides opportunities for adversaries to reverse engineer the secret bitstring. We propose a non-volatile memory-based (NVM) PUF that is able to avoid bit flips without requiring any type of helper data. We describe the technique in the context of emerging nano-devices, in particular, resistive random access memory (Memristor) cells, but the methodology is applicable to any type of NVM including Flash