Taxation and Household Portfolio Composition: U.S. Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of assets that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets. It analyzes data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, and 1995 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys. The empirical findings suggest that a household's marginal tax rate has an important effect its asset allocation decisions. The probability that a household owns tax-advantaged assets is strongly related to its tax rate on ordinary income. In addition, the amount of investment through tax-deferred accounts such as 401(k) plans and IRAs is an increasing function of the household's marginal tax rate. Holdings of corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets, and of tax-exempt bonds are also increasing in the household's marginal tax rate. Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as corporate bonds and interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share of wealth as a household's marginal tax rate increases.

Insuring Educational Risk: Opportunities versus Income

We develop a model of education where individuals face educational risk. Successfully entering the skilled labor sector depends on individual effort in education and public resources, but educational risk still causes (income) inequality. We show that an optimal public policy consists of deferred skill-specific tuition fees, lump-sum transfers/taxes, and public funding of the educational sector. We argue that improved educational opportunities matter more than direct income transfers in a Second-best setting. Contrary to standard models of income risk, it is not optimal to use a proportional wage tax, because combining skill-specific tuition fees and public education spending provide both insurance and redistribution at lower costs. A wage tax is only optimal if skill-specific tuition fees are not available.human capital investment, endogenous risk, learning effort, optimal taxation, public education

Redistribution spurs growth by using a portfolio effect on human capital

We demonstrate by mathematical analysis and systematic computer simulations that redistribution can lead to sustainable growth in a society. The human capital dynamics of each agent is described by a stochastic multiplicative process which, in the long run, leads to the destruction of individual human capital and the extinction of the individualistic society. When agents are linked by fully-redistributive taxation the situation might turn to individual growth in the long run. We consider that a government collects a proportion of income and reduces it by a fraction as costs for administration (efficiency losses). The remaining public good is equally redistributed to all agents. We derive conditions under which the destruction of human capital can be turned into sustainable growth, despite the losses from the random growth process and despite the administrative costs. Sustainable growth is induced by redistribution. This effect could be explained by a simple portfolio-effect which re-balances individual stochastic processes. The findings are verified for three different tax schemes: proportional tax, taking proportional more from the rich, and proportionally more from the poor. We discuss which of these tax schemes is optimal with respect to maximize growth under a fixed rate of administrative costs, or with respect to maximize the governmental income. This leads us to some general conclusions about governmental decisions, the relation to public good games, and the use of taxation in a risk taking society.Comment: 12 pages, plus 8 Figures, plus matlab-code to run simulation and produce figur

Do Mobile Pensioners Threaten the Deferred Taxation of Savings?

We investigate optimal taxation of lifetime income with and without an emigration option during old age. The government sets the rates of deferred taxation and of possibly reduced taxation of interest. If agents are immobile, the optimal policy consists in full deferral of income taxes on savings and a full taxation of interest. Mobility of the old calls for lower degrees of deferral and reduced taxation of interest. However, the optimum never entails full immediate taxation of savings in combination with full tax exemption on capital income.deferred taxation, income tax, savings, migration

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital

In a model with ex-ante homogenous households, earnings risk and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work and to invest in human capital. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but are only targeted at off-setting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, since education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non-tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education due to risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than without education subsidies.labor taxation, human capital investment, education subsidies, idiosyncratic risk, risk properties of human capital

Refinancing Europe’s Higher Education through Deferred and Income-Contingent Fees: An empirical assessment using Belgian, German and UK data

The arguments for refinancing the European Union's (EU) higher education via higher tuition fees largely rest on preserving the profitability of the educational investment and offering deferred and income-contingent payments. Using income survey datasets on Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) we first estimate how graduates' private return on educational investment is likely to be affected by higher private contributions. We then evaluate the effect of income-contingent and deferred payment mechanisms on lifetime net income and its capacity to account for graduates' ability to pay, considering numerous ways of financing the cost of introducing income-contingency. Our analysis reveals that increasing individuals' contributions to higher education costs, through income-contingent and deferred instruments, does not significantly affect the private rate of return of heterogeneous graduates, allows for payments to be indexed to ability to pay, and can be implemented in ways that minimize the risk of adverse selection. These findings prove robust to significant variations between countries' unharmonised higher education institutional structures.Higher Education Finance, income-contingent loans, risk pooling and risk shifting

FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS

The Dutch Parliament has passed legislation for a new income tax that abolishes the current tax on personal capital income and substitutes it by a presumptive capital income tax, which is in fact a net wealth tax. This paper contrasts this wealth tax with a conventional realization-based capital gains tax, a retrospective capital gains tax which attempts to charge interest on the deferred tax, and a capital accretion tax which taxes capital gains as they accrue. None of the approaches meets all criteria for a ''good'' income tax, i.e., equity, efficiency, and administrative feasibility. We thus conclude that the effective and neutral taxation of capital income can best be ensured through a combination of (a) a capital accretion tax to capture the returns on easy-to-value financial products, (b) a capital gains tax with interest to tax the returns on hard-to-value real estate and small businesses, and (c) a broad presumptive capital income tax, i.e., a net wealth tax, to account for the utility of holding wealth. We favor uniform and moderate proportional tax rates in the context of a dual income tax under which capital income is taxed separately from labor income.public economics ;

The tax system and the financial crisis

This paper investigates the effects of the tax system on the economic factors that triggered the financial crisis. We examine three cases in which the tax regime interacted with these factors, reinforcing them. First, we focus on the taxation of residential building: while the importance of capital gains taxes is disputed, the deductibility of mortgage interest may have contributed to the financial crisis by creating some of the raw materials for the securitization industry. Second, a narrow perspective on the tax treatment, together with specific provisions, may have fostered performance-based remuneration of managers, resulting in overemphasis of short-term profitability and incentive to excessive risk-taking. Third, the securitization process, which played a key role in the outbreak of the financial crisis, was accompanied by opportunities for tax arbitrage and reduction of the overall tax wedge paid by investors, through offset of incomes that are ordinarily taxed at different rates; a de facto exemption of CDS premiums received by non-residents supplemented the tax arbitrage.taxation, financial crisis, housing market, stock options, securitization, credit default swaps

Generalized Cash Flow Taxation

We show the unique form that must be taken by a tax system based entirely on realization accounting to implement a uniform capital income tax, or, equivalently, a uniform wealth tax. This system combines elements of an accrual based capital income tax and a traditional cashflow tax, having many of the attributes of the latter while still imposing a tax burden on marginal capital income. Like the traditional cash-flow tax, this system may be integrated with a tax on labor income. We also show how such a tax can be supplemented with an optional accounting for a segregated subset of actively traded securities, subjected separately to mark-to-market taxation at the uniform capital income tax rate, to permit a fully graduated tax system applicable to labor income.